# Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook

> Illinois Supreme Court · June 15, 2000 · 191 Ill. 2d 493

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9860207

## Case

- **Full name:** MICHIGAN AVENUE NATIONAL BANK, as Special Adm’r of the Estate of Cynthia Collins, Deceased, Appellant, v. THE COUNTY OF COOK Et Al., Appellees
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 15, 2000
- **Citations:** 191 Ill. 2d 493; 247 Ill. Dec. 473; 732 N.E.2d 528; 2000 Ill. LEXIS 825
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Harrison
- **Judges:** McMorrow, Harrison
- **Cited by:** 450 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9860207

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying the Tort Immunity Act where “ ‘the gravamen of plaintiffs action against defendants is that defendants’ failure either to perform examinations or to adequately perform examinations led to defendant[s’] failure to diagnose Collins’ breast cancer, which, in turn, proxim…
- applying the Tort Immunity Act where " 'the gravamen of plaintiff's action against defendants is that defendants' failure either to perform examinations or to adequately perform examinations led to defendant's failure to diagnose Collins' breast cancer, which, in turn, proxima…
- reasoning that the “legislature has the inherent authority to repeal or change the common law and may do away with all or part of it”

## Opinion text

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
The Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act is in derogation of the common law action against local public entities. It must therefore be strictly construed against the public entity involved. Aikens v. Morris, 145 Ill. 2d 273, 278 (1991). Applying this strict construction, I would hold that plaintiff may proceed against defendants pursuant to sections 6 — 106(c) and 6 — 106(d) of the Act (745 ILCS 10/6— 106(c), (d) (West 1992)). Sections 6 — 106(c) and 6 — 106(d) specify that public entities and their employees are not exonerated from liability for injuries proximately caused by their negligence in prescribing or administering treatment for physical illness. There is no question that defendants prescribed and administered treatment for the decedent’s illness in the case before us. The problem with their conduct, and the reason they are not immune, is that after they ascertained that the decedent was afflicted with a physical condition that posed a hazard to her health, they prescribed a course of care that was fatally deficient. Instead of ordering mammograms and biopsies, chemotherapy or surgery, defendants relegated the decedent to a passive régimen of waiting and watching, and they waited too long.
Because the wrong remedy was wrongly administered, defendants’ conduct falls squarely within the terms of subsections (c) and (d) of section 6 — 106. Any other conclusion is inconsistent with the public policy underlying that statute, which “militates in favor of holding public employees liable for negligently prescribing or administering treatment which causes injury.” O’Brien v. Township High School District 214, 83 Ill. 2d 462, 468 (1980). Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed, and the cause should be remanded for further proceedings. I therefore dissent.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9860207. Public record. Not legal advice.