# In Re Marriage of Awan > Appellate Court of Illinois · February 17, 2009 · 388 Ill. App. 3d 204 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9859863 ## Case - **Full name:** In Re MARRIAGE OF KHADIM HUSSAIN AWAN, Petitioner-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, and ZAHIDA PARVEEN, Respondent-Appellee and Cross-Appellant - **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois - **Decided:** February 17, 2009 - **Citations:** 388 Ill. App. 3d 204; 327 Ill. Dec. 656; 902 N.E.2d 777; 2009 Ill. App. LEXIS 91 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Wright - **Judges:** McDade, Wright - **Cited by:** 21 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9859863 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that “a dissolution judgment in bifurcated proceedings is valid and that the reservation of issues does not render the judgment of dissolution nonfinal” - finding the date of dissolution is the proper valuation date for property in a bifurcated proceeding without mentioning section 503(f) - noting that, unlike transfers between parents and their children, transfers of property among siblings are not presumed to be gifts ## Opinion text JUSTICE WRIGHT, specially concurring: I agree with both the result and analysis in this case. However, I specially concur because I do not believe that the parties seriously contemplated the difficulties a bifurcated judgment would present. This lack of foresight put the trial judge in a most difficult position when the hearing on the second half issues concluded nearly 18 months later. I specially concur because the judge’s decision was thorough, well reasoned, and demonstrated the court’s best efforts to fairly resolve issues created by the bifurcated judgment that the parties agreed to embrace. In spite of the court’s equitable approach, the order must be reversed in part. A bifurcated judgment is not appropriate in all dissolution cases. Counsel must approach an agreed request with great restraint. A bifurcated judgment should not be viewed as a solution to appease clients who are anxious to end a marriage in order to advance other significant business or personal endeavors. Nor should a bifurcated judgment proceeding be used as a means to put a difficult dissolution on the back burner, to be addressed on another day. A bifurcated approach may relieve some personal stress on the former spouses, but may inevitably create other more difficult property issues for the trial judge to resolve when a contested hearing cannot be immediately scheduled due to court and counsel’s busy calendars. Here, on December 11, 2003, the trial judge specifically declined petitioner’s request to dissolve the marriage prior to a resolution of all property issues. The court’s decision should be commended. The request to dissolve the marriage on December 11, 2003, was not made by agreement of both parties and appropriate circumstances for bifurcation did not exist as mandated by the statute. On February 2, 2004, the parties renewed the request to proceed in a bifurcated manner, but this time agreed to a bifurcated judgment. Petitioner’s counsel submitted a written order for the judge’s signature stating, in part: “ ‘the marriage is dissolved and the bonds of matrimony are set aside and each of the parties are restored to all the rights and privileges of unmarried persons,’ but continuing all other second half proceedings in accordance with the case management conference order.” Apparently relying on the court’s written minute entry, petitioner’s counsel then recorded and filed a copy of the certificate of dissolution of marriage with the circuit clerk on February 2, 2004, the same date as the agreed termination of the marriage. Even though the certificate of dissolution was recorded, counsel did not present an agreed order for the judge’s signature until nearly six weeks later. Upon receipt, the trial judge promptly signed the order on March 26, 2004. Shortly thereafter, on June 29, 2004, attorney for petitioner appeared before the judge to make a special request for the next available full day of the court’s time to hear the second-half issues. The court allowed the request. On July 15, 2004, petitioner’s counsel sent a notice for a full-day hearing on the second-half issues scheduled for October 1, 2004. This hearing would have occurred just over six months after the trial judge’s order dissolving the marriage on March 26, 2004. However, the difficulties in this case began when the hearing did not take place October 1, 2004. The parties agreed to reschedule the matter for another full-day setting to take place on December 22, 2004. On December 10, 2004, petitioner’s attorney once again filed a motion to continue the hearing on the grounds that discovery had not been completed. On December 16, 2004, the court entered the following minute entry: “Counsel by phone. Motion to continue granted over resp. objection. Case to be reset ASAE This will be a must go trial date. LRL” In spite of the docket entry set forth above, the parties did not address the court to request a trial date until April 18, 2005. Once again, the court cleared the court schedule and set a full-day hearing for July 22, 2005. On July 12, 2005, again, petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to continue the one-day trial on the grounds that discovery was still not completed. Over the respondent’s objection, the court continued the hearing. On August 9, 2005, petitioner’s attorney sent notice rescheduling the hearing for October 5, 2005, nearly one year to the day after the originally scheduled second-half hearing date. On October 5, 2005, the hearing began as scheduled but was not completed. On December 19, 2005, the parties appeared and completed the second-half hearing. By selecting the most recent value for the real estate as presented by the parties at trial, the trial court created an equitable solution to the valuation issues arising from the long delay between the judgment and the second-half proceedings. However, the fluctuation in value was the obligation of the parties to consider; not the obligation of the trial judge to resolve in spite of her best efforts to be fair to both former spouses. Absent an express agreement that another date will control valuation, the parties could have avoided many difficulties in this case by recognizing the court would be required, in spite of the consequences to the parties, to measure all property values as of the date the former spouses were free to remarry, that being the date of the judgment of dissolution. For these reasons, I specially concur. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9859863. Public record. Not legal advice.