# People v. Whitfield > Illinois Supreme Court · December 20, 2005 · 217 Ill. 2d 177 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9859551 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RONALD WHITFIELD, Appellant - **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court - **Decided:** December 20, 2005 - **Citations:** 217 Ill. 2d 177; 298 Ill. Dec. 545; 840 N.E.2d 658; 2005 Ill. LEXIS 2075 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Thomas - **Judges:** McMorrow, Thomas - **Cited by:** 420 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Disagreed with by People v. Santana, 401 Ill. App. 3d 663 (2010). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 1 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9859551 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that “due process is violated when a defendant pleads guilty in exchange for a specific sentence and the trial court fails to advise the defendant, prior to accepting his plea, that a mandatory supervised release term will be added to that sentence” and that the remedy… - holding that the 17 defendant’s “constitutional right to due process and fundamental fairness was 18 violated” where he was never advised at the plea hearing that mandatory parole 19 would be imposed and where subsequent imposition thereof resulted in a more 20 onerous sentence - holding that the defendant’s “constitutional right to due process and fundamental fairness was violated” where he was never advised at the plea hearing that mandatory parole would be imposed and where subsequent imposition thereof resulted in a more onerous sentence - stating that it would not be fair to hold that a defendant forfeited the right to bring a postconviction claim about an omitted admonishment because that would place the onus on the defendant to ensure his own admonishment - noting that a trial court’s failure to admonish a defendant concerning applicable term of mandatory supervised release was not a constitutional violation as long as the sentence plus the term of mandatory supervised release was less than the maximum sentence defendant was told… ## Opinion text CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS, specially concurring: I agree with the majority that defendant made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated because he did not receive the benefit of his bargain and further that the appropriate remedy for such a claim, under the circumstances, would be to modify the defendant’s sentence. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the cause need not be remanded for an evidentiary hearing to test defendant’s claim that he failed to receive the benefit of his bargain. I write separately because I reach the conclusion that an evidentiary hearing is not required for different reasons than the majority. The purpose of a postconviction proceeding is to allow inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the original conviction and sentence that have not been, and could not have been adjudicated previously on direct appeal. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999). The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides the mechanism by which those under a criminal sentence can assert that their convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their constitutional rights. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378-79 (1998). The Act provides for various, distinct stages to conduct this inquiry. First, a defendant commences proceedings under the Act by the filing of a petition, which must clearly set forth the respects in which the defendant’s rights were violated. 725 ILCS 5/122—2 (West 2002). The Act requires that a defendant attach affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting the petition’s allegations. 725 ILCS 5/122—2 (West 2002). Thereafter, if the defendant is under a sentence of imprisonment, the circuit court is to examine the petition to determine if it is frivolous or patently without merit; if it is determined to be frivolous or patently without merit, the court is authorized to dismiss the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122—2.1(a) (West 2002). If the petition is not dismissed at this stage, it is docketed for further proceedings in accordance with sections 122—4 through 122—6 of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122—2.1(b) (West 2002). Under section 122—5 of the Act, the State then has an opportunity to file a motion to dismiss or an answer. 725 ILCS 5/122—5 (West 2002). If a motion to dismiss is filed and then denied, the State must then file an answer within 20 days after such denial. 725 ILCS 5/122—5 (West 2002). The court may then receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence. 725 ILCS 5/122—6 (West 2002). In its discretion, the court may order the defendant to be brought before the court for the hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122—6 (West 2002). If the court finds in favor of the defendant, it is required to enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings. 725 ILCS 5/122—6 (West 2002). In the present case, the State’s motion to dismiss was granted without comment, so it never actually had an opportunity to file an answer denying the factual allegations of defendant’s petition. While it is true that all well-pleaded facts in a defendant’s petition and in the accompanying affidavits are taken as true, this is only for the purpose of making a substantial showing that constitutional rights have been violated so that a defendant can proceed to an evidentiary hearing on his allegations. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d at 528 . This court has repeatedly stressed that an evidentiary hearing is required whenever a defendant makes a substantial showing of a violation of constitutional rights. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 381 . Thus, if the court finds a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, the inquiry is normally advanced to the third stage of the postconviction procedure where the trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246 (2001). When the petitioner’s claims are based on matters outside the record, it is not the intent of the Act that such claims be adjudicated on the pleadings. People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 360 (2000); People v. Kitchen, 189 Ill. 2d 424, 433 (1999); Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 382 . In support of its ruling that no hearing is required, the majority asserts that “it is unclear what sort of additional showing defendant could provide which would establish his lack of knowledge.” 217 Ill. 2d at 200. The State’s counter to this seems to be that, at an evidentiary hearing on a defendant’s claims, the burden is on the defendant to prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence (People v. Coleman, 206 Ill. 2d 261, 277 (2002)), and that contract principles govern this case, requiring the party seeking to enforce a contract to prove its terms (see, e.g., Mannion v. Stallings & Co., 204 Ill. App. 3d 179, 186 (1990)). According to the State, the exact terms of the offer agreed upon are matters outside the record. Therefore, it contends, defendant would have to prove his claim either by testifying orally that the State did not tell him during plea negotiations that MSR would be included in his sentence or by submitting an affidavit indicating the same. The State also maintains that it would be free to submit evidence to show that defendant was told that MSR would be a part of his sentence. According to the State, these scenarios would raise conflicts in the evidence and questions of credibility for the court to resolve at the hearing. The State’s analysis would be sound if not for the requirement of Supreme Court Rule 402(b), which requires that the terms of a plea agreement be “stated in open court.” 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(b). Specifically, the rule provides in relevant part as follows: “The court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is voluntary. If the tendered plea is the result of a plea agreement, the agreement shall be stated in open court. The court, by questioning the defendant personally in open court, shall confirm the terms of the plea agreement ***.” (Emphases added.) 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(b). One of the purposes of an open-court statement and a personal confirmation of the terms of the plea agreement is to prevent a defendant from swearing falsely at a later collateral attack upon the proceedings that the terms of the agreement were other than the actual sentence imposed. See People v. Salvaggio, 38 Ill. App. 3d 482, 486 (1976). Additionally, this court has emphasized that the requirement “prevents misunderstandings as to the terms of an agreement. It is an efficient means of reducing what is typically an oral understanding to a matter of record. It also insures that the agreement will be visible for examination. *** Announcing the agreement in open court will deter *** future unfounded claims by a defendant that an agreement entered into was not honored.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Dudley, 58 Ill. 2d 57, 60 (1974). It would be incongruous to hold that the State is free to argue that the terms of the agreement differed from those stated in open court, while at the same time, preclude a defendant from challenging a plea stated in open court on the basis that it differed from an earlier oral understanding. Rule 402(b) takes the guessing game out of discerning the parties’ oral understandings by reducing those understandings to a matter of record. This is analogous to a contract setting where the parties’ oral negotiations are reduced to a written contract, with all previous understandings merging into the written contract. Because I find that the plea agreement is a matter of record that can be easily discerned from a review of that record, I agree that no evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the benefit-of-the-bargain issue in this case. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9859551. Public record. Not legal advice.