# Silverstein v. Brander > Appellate Court of Illinois · December 11, 2000 · 317 Ill. App. 3d 1000 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9859494 ## Case - **Full name:** MARTIN SILVERSTEIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VICTORIA BRANDER Et Al., Defendants-Appellees (Mark Stolar Et Al., Defendants) - **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois - **Decided:** December 11, 2000 - **Citations:** 317 Ill. App. 3d 1000; 251 Ill. Dec. 276; 740 N.E.2d 357 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Gordon - **Judges:** McNulty, McBride, Gordon - **Cited by:** 27 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9859494 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding that an internist could offer standard of care testimony in a case against a defendant physiatrist where the testimony pertained solely to the physiatrist's medical management of the patient, an area in which the internist "demonstrated adequate expertise" ## Opinion text McBRIDE and GORDON, JJ., concur. SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court: Following the filing of our opinion in this case on June 20, 2000, RIC and Brander petitioned for rehearing, and they subsequently filed a document entitled “Joint Petition for Withdrawal of Opinion or in the Alternative for Correction of Opinion and Dismissal of Appeal” (Joint Petition). Although RIC and Brander claimed in the motion that plaintiff and his attorneys joined the motion, only defense counsel signed it. On September 13, 2000, we informed the parties that we would consider the joint motion upon presentation of a proper request, signed by both parties, by September 27, 2000. John Cushing, plaintiff’s attorney, filed an affidavit dated September 27, 2000, in which he swore that he did not consent to the withdrawal of the opinion, he did not receive a copy of the Joint Petition, and he first learned of the Joint Petition when his office received this court’s order of September 13, 2000. RIC and Brander moved for an extension of time to file a motion signed by both parties. We continued the motion for extension of time, and we ordered defense counsel to respond to Cushing’s affidavit by October 19, 2000. On October 6, 2000, the parties filed a joint motion to withdraw the opinion in light of a settlement the parties concluded some time after RIC and Brander filed their original Joint Petition. We reminded defense counsel of the need for a response to Cushing’s affidavit. On November 1, 2000, defense counsel Thomas Hill filed an affidavit contradicting Cushing’s affidavit. Because the parties have presented a joint motion reflecting settlement of the case, we will now consider the petition for withdrawal of the opinion. “A case can become moot when, pending the decision on appeal, events occur which render it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief to either party. [Citations.] A reviewing court can, of course, take judicial notice of such events or facts which, while not appearing in the record, disclose that an actual controversy no longer exists between the adverse parties.” Bluthardt v. Breslin, 74 Ill. 2d 246, 250 , 384 N.E.2d 1309 (1979). Once the parties have settled a case, the court generally cannot grant effective relief. Therefore, settlement of a case before issuance of the court’s decision on appeal generally renders the appeal moot. See Dixon v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 151 Ill. 2d 108, 116-17 , 601 N.E.2d 704 (1992). But the parties here did not settle the case pending our decision on the appeal. When we filed our opinion, the parties had an actual controversy concerning the issues we addressed. We granted relief, and the subsequent settlement, reached SVa months following the filing of our opinion, only finalized the effect of that relief. When the parties reached their settlement, only the petition for rehearing was properly before us. The settlement may affect the petition for rehearing, but it cannot render the original appeal moot. The parties have presented no applicable precedent supporting the request for withdrawal of the opinion. Accordingly, the request is denied. In the interest of maintaining a sound body of precedent, we address the issues raised in the petition for rehearing. See Chicago City Day School v. City of Chicago, 289 Ill. App. 3d 55, 58-59 , 681 N.E.2d 126 (1997). RIC and Brander claim that the record on appeal does not accurately reflect the date on which they filed the motion in limine, and they contest other particular factual assertions in the opinion. We have restated some of the opinion to reflect more accurately the precise facts shown by the record. RIC and Brander also argue that our opinion shows a conflict between section 2 — 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1005 (West 1998)) and Rule 2.1(e) of the circuit court of Cook County (Cook Co. Cir. Ct. R. 2.1(e) (eff. July 1, 1976)). We disagree. The general permission to file motions for summary judgment does not prevent the court from creating appropriate rules, including timing rules, for presentation of such motions. See Savage v. Mui Pho, 312 Ill. App. 3d 553, 557 , 727 N.E.2d 1052 (2000); In re Marriage of Jackson, 259 Ill. App. 3d 538, 543 , 631 N.E.2d 848 (1994). A party’s preference for raising an effectively dispositive issue in a motion in limine does not constitute good cause for belated presentation of the dispositive motion. We deny the petition for rehearing. McBRIDE and GORDON, JJ., concur. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9859494. Public record. Not legal advice.