# Phillips v. Curiale

> Supreme Court of New Jersey · July 13, 1992 · 128 N.J. 608

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9859147

## Case

- **Full name:** Angelica Phillips, as Administratrix and Administratrix Ad Prosequendum of the Estate of Walter Phillips, Decedent, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark Curiale and Charles Watson, Defendants-Respondents, and Fmc Corporation, Defendant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of New Jersey
- **Decided:** July 13, 1992
- **Citations:** 128 N.J. 608; 608 A.2d 895; 1992 N.J. LEXIS 401
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Clifford
- **Judges:** Wilentz, Clifford, Handler, Pollock, O'Hern, Garibaldi, Stein
- **Cited by:** 104 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9859147

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that, in substantive due process analysis of retroactive statute, New Jersey courts should balance the importance of the public interest as compared with the value of the right affected by the statute to determine if the legislature reasonably exercised its police powe…
- explaining "'[t]here can be no vested right in the continued existence of a statute or rule of the common law which precludes its change or repeal'" (quoting Savarese v. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 235 N.J. Super. 298, 309 (App. Div. 1989))
- holding that retroactive application of statute turns on legislative intent and whether retroactivity works either an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice
- holding that retroactive application of statute turns on legislative intent and whether retroactivity works either unconstitutional interference with vested rights or manifest injustice

## Opinion text

CLIFFORD, J.,
dissenting in part.
Only from so much of the Court’s otherwise straightforward and eminently sensible opinion as attempts to come to grips with the slippery doctrine of retroactivity do I dissent. See Part IV, ante at 620-628, 608 A.2d 901 -905. I join in the judgment because I agree that the Legislature did not intend that N.J.S.A. 38A:13-1.2 apply to plaintiff’s claim. See ante at 619, 608 A. 2d 901 .
Not only is the discussion of retroactivity in Part IV unnecessary to the Court’s disposition of the appeal, as the opinion readily acknowledges, ante at 620, 608 A. 2d 901 , it is entirely irrelevant. “Retroactivity” has nothing to do with this case. The problem is not one of applying today’s legislation to cases that antedate the effective date of the legislation; rather, the question is whether, by the very terms of its enactment, the Legislature has itself applied the statute to a given situation— here, plaintiff’s case. The Court has correctly decided that the statute does not apply. I would not further muddy the already-murky waters of retroactivity analysis.
For reversal and, remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7,
Opposed — None.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9859147. Public record. Not legal advice.