# People v. Freeman

> California Supreme Court · October 24, 1994 · 8 Cal. 4th 450

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9855128

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRED HARLAN FREEMAN, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** October 24, 1994
- **Citations:** 8 Cal. 4th 450; 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 558; 94 Daily Journal DAR 14941; 882 P.2d 249; 31 A.L.R. 5th 888; 1994 Cal. LEXIS 5392
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Mosk
- **Judges:** Arabian, Mosk, George
- **Cited by:** 408 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9855128

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding Caldwell claim waived because there was no objection

## Opinion text

MOSK, J.
—I concur in the judgment. I am also in general agreement with the majority opinion by Justice Arabian and with the concurring opinion by Justice George.
*526 I write separately for one purpose, and for one purpose alone.
For 15 years, the Legislature has had before it an invitation to prohibit trial courts from attempting to define proof beyond a reasonable doubt in their jury instructions in criminal cases. (See People v. Brigham (1979) 25 Cal.3d 283, 292-316 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 905 , 599 P.2d 100 ] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
The invitation was extended at that time because any purported instructional definition of reasonable doubt—including, and perhaps especially, that which is deemed standard—was seen to run a substantial risk of violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which, in the words of In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ], “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” (.People v. Brigham, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 293 (cone. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
The risk of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause is even more substantial today. Indeed, it may now be characterized as grave. (See generally, Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. _ [ 127 L.Ed.2d 583 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 ].)
During the past 15 years, however, the Legislature has not acted. It shows no sign of acting now. Against its omission, we should take steps. In so doing, we would not trench on the legislative sphere. We would merely carry out our paramount obligation to enforce the United States Constitution, which is of course “the supreme law of the land” (Cal. Const., art. Ill, § 1). For we are required not only to remedy federal constitutional violations committed in the past, but also to prevent similar violations arising in the future.
Therefore, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, I would henceforth prohibit trial courts from attempting any instructional definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9855128. Public record. Not legal advice.