# Young v. Woodall > Supreme Court of North Carolina · June 13, 1996 · 343 N.C. 459 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9855114 ## Case - **Full name:** KIMBERLY (HICKS) YOUNG v. CHRISTOPHER ALLEN WOODALL in His Individual Capacity and as an Officer of the Winston-Salem Police Department and WINSTON-SALEM POLICE DEPARTMENT and THE CITY OF WINSTON-SALEM - **Court:** Supreme Court of North Carolina - **Decided:** June 13, 1996 - **Citations:** 343 N.C. 459; 471 S.E.2d 357; 1996 N.C. LEXIS 339 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Frye - **Judges:** Frye, Webb, Whichard - **Cited by:** 37 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9855114 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating that “[t]he failure of the legislature to amend a statute which has been interpreted by a court is some evidence that the legislature approves of the court’s interpretation - holding that the fact that “[a] witness said [that] she could not tell whether [an officer’s headlights] were on” did not tend to show “that the headlights were off’ - holding no gross negligence when law enforcement officer was involved in an event of increased speed at approximately 2:00 a.m. without activating his blue lights and siren - holding no gross negligence when a law enforcement officer drove in the nighttime “at a high rate of speed” to pursue a vehicle with only one operating headlight ## Opinion text Justice Frye dissenting. As the majority notes, this Court held in Goddard v. Williams, 251 N.C. 128 , 110 S.E.2d 820 (1959), that the standard of care provided by N.C.G.S. § 20-145 is an ordinary negligence standard. Goddard , 251 at 133, 110 S.E.2d at 824 . This statute was recently before this Court in Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580 , 369 S.E.2d 601 (1988), where we said: This Court has established the standard of care where the conduct of an officer in the chase or apprehension of a law violator results in the officer’s vehicle colliding with another person, vehicle, or object. The officer is held to the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the discharge of official duties of a like nature under like circumstances. If the officer complies with this standard under these circumstances, he is exempt from the statutory speed laws. Goddard v. Williams, 251 N.C. 128 , 110 S.E.2d 820 (1959); Glossom v. Trollinger, 227 N.C. 84 , 40 S.E.2d 606 (1946); Collins v. Christenberry, 6 N.C. App. 504 , 170 S.E.2d 515 (1969). Id. at 582-83 , 369 S.E.2d at — (emphasis added). As the plaintiff notes, the General Assembly has not amended the statute to change the ordinary negligence standard, and until today it was settled as the law. The majority now says that the meaning of the statute is clear and overrules Goddard in so far as Goddard “is inconsistent with this case.” I do not believe the statute is so clear that we should overrule Goddard and those cases which have followed it for decades as the proper interpretation of the statute passed by the General Assembly. While the Court in Bullins stated a different standard of care when the injuries complained of do not result from the officer’s vehicle colliding with another person, vehicle, or object, the opinion concluded that the officers in that case were not negligent in pursuing and continuing to pursue the vehicle. Thus, the Court apparently *465 would have reached the same result had it simply applied the Goddard standard to the facts of that case without stating a different standard. Having restated the Goddard standard so recently, I would not now discard it. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case. Justice Whichard dissenting. Section 20-145 of the North Carolina General Statutes exempts law enforcement officers from speed laws while in pursuit of violators of the law. However, the exemption does not “protect the driver of any such vehicle from the consequence of a reckless disregard of the safety of others.” N.C.G.S. § 20-145 (1993). In Goddard v. Williams, 251 N.C. 128 , 110 S.E.2d 820 (1959), this Court interpreted Section 20-145 as requiring an officer to “observe the care which a reasonably prudent man would exercise in the discharge of official duties of a like nature under like circumstances.” Id. at 134 , 110 S.E.2d at 824 . Thus, under Goddard , “an officer is liable for his negligent acts as well as for his wilful and wanton acts.” Id. at 133 , 110 S.E.2d at 824 . The majority now overrules the ordinary negligence standard from Goddard and replaces it with one imposing liability only when the officer acts with gross negligence. I agree. The language of N.C.G.S. § 20-145 is clear. A pursuing officer is exempt from observing the speed limit except when he acts with “a reckless disregard of the safety of others.” Gross negligence is wanton conduct done with conscious or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others. Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 583 , 369 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1988). Therefore, the majority correctly holds that reckless disregard is tantamount to gross negligence, not ordinary negligence as enunciated in Goddard , and that gross negligence is the standard to which law enforcement officers should be held under N.C.G.S. § 20-145. Applying the gross negligence standard, the majority also concludes, however, that the trial court should have granted Officer Woodall’s motion for summary judgment. I disagree. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the undisputed facts establish that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (1990). It is a drastic measure and should be employed with caution. Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 518 , 186 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1972). *466 Defendant, as the movant, has the burden of establishing that no triable issue of fact exists. Roumillat v. Simplistic Enters., Inc., 331 N.C. 57, 62-63 , 414 S.E.2d 339, 341-42 (1992). All inferences of fact must be drawn against the movant and in favor of the nonmovant. Id. With these principles in mind, the record shows without dispute that upon turning around and giving chase to the Camaro, Officer Woodall entered the intersection of Link Road and Peters Creek Parkway while a yellow caution light was flashing in his direction. He did not activate his blue lights or siren, nor did he notify the police dispatcher of his intentions to pursue the Camaro, as departmental regulations required. Although he testified in his deposition that his speed was not excessive, a witness to the accident alleged in her affidavit that she “observed a police car travelling at a high rate of speed proceeding down Peters Creek Parkway.” Woodall concedes that if he was speeding, department policy required him to turn on all of his emergency equipment. Further, whether he even had his headlights on is disputed. He asserts that they were on, while the witness said she could not “say for certain whether or not the headlights of the vehicle were on.” This forecast of evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Woodall acted with “a reckless disregard of the safety of others” within the meaning and intent of N.C.G.S. § 20-145; summary judgment was thus improper. I therefore respectfully dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9855114. Public record. Not legal advice.