# Gehin v. Wisconsin Group Insurance Board

> Wisconsin Supreme Court · February 23, 2005 · 278 Wis. 2d 111

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9854232

## Case

- **Full name:** Luann Gehin, Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Wisconsin Group Insurance Board, Respondent-Appellant
- **Court:** Wisconsin Supreme Court
- **Decided:** February 23, 2005
- **Citations:** 278 Wis. 2d 111; 692 N.W.2d 572; 2005 WI 16; 2005 Wisc. LEXIS 16
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Butler
- **Judges:** Abrahamson, Butler, Prosser, Roggensack, Wilcox
- **Cited by:** 17 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9854232

## Opinion text

LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.
¶ 111. (concurring). I join the decision and mandate in this matter. I write separately to address the concerns raised by my colleagues, Justice Wilcox and Justice Prosser, about the impact that this decision will have on administrative hearings and on unrepresented claimants in those hearings.
¶ 112. Justice Wilcox writes that the residuum rule makes it more difficult for parties, particularly plaintiffs, to prove their case before an administrative body. Wilcox, J., dissenting, ¶ 145. He is concerned that many claimants will not be able to afford expert witnesses, id, and that as a result, the residuum rule is inherently unfair to unrepresented claimants. Id., ¶ 149. Justice Prosser similarly writes that our decision will force financially struggling claimants to pay *161 the bills for expert testimony. Id. ¶ 196. He is also concerned about the unrepresented claimant. Id., ¶ 198.
¶ 113. These are legitimate concerns. I believe, however, that these concerns are overstated. I disagree with Justice Prosser's conclusion that in the future, "participants in administrative hearings will be required to provide live, in-person testimony to corroborate rehable hearsay evidence". Prosser, J., dissenting, ¶ 201. As Justice Roggensack's dissent points out, corroboration can be introduced in a number of ways. Claimants who have a medical condition can testify as to that condition. Other witnesses can be called as well. Testimonial evidence would provide the corroboration necessary to allow a hearing examiner to consider hearsay medical reports concerning the condition. Corroboration of hearsay does not have to come from experts, but hearsay must be corroborated to constitute "substantial evidence." That is precisely what is lacking in this case.
¶ 114. I agree with Justice Roggensack that the court can look at the remainder of the evidence to see whether corroboration exists that would allow a hearing examiner to consider hearsay medical reports. I disagree with her conclusion that such corroboration exists in this case. Absent the hearsay medical reports, there is simply no evidence in the record that would corroborate a conclusion that Gehin was not disabled within the meaning of the contract.
¶ 115. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9854232. Public record. Not legal advice.