# Moseley v. Mosier

> Supreme Court of South Carolina · August 30, 1983 · 279 S.C. 348

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9853370

## Case

- **Full name:** Deborah C. MOSELEY, Appellant, v. John R. MOSIER, Respondent
- **Court:** Supreme Court of South Carolina
- **Decided:** August 30, 1983
- **Citations:** 279 S.C. 348; 306 S.E.2d 624; 1983 S.C. LEXIS 382
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Lewis
- **Judges:** Harwell, Littlejohn, Ness, Gregory, Lewis
- **Cited by:** 90 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9853370

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating "that the parties may by agreement exclude the family court of jurisdiction to modify any aspect of a separation agreement, except matters affecting children"

## Opinion text

*354 Lewis, Chief Justice
(dissenting):
The trial judge held the respondent in contempt for failure to make child support payments in accordance with a prior divorce decree. The provisions for child support were contained in a prior separation agreement which had been made a part of the decree by reference.
The questions of whether the lower court had jurisdiction to adjudge respondent guilty of contempt or the merits of such determination have not been raised by any exception on appeal and are not properly before the Court for determination.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Family Court erred in failing to enforce the provisions for child support as set forth in the separation agreement and made a part of the order of the court by reference.
The trial judge, in holding respondent in contempt for failure to make child support payments, deferred sentence upon respondent paying $500.00 on the arrearage and making future payments in the amount of $75.00 per week. The order provided that the arrearage under the prior divorce decree, above the amounts ordered to be paid in this matter, would accrue and accumulate. The original divorce decree, of which the separation agreement was a part, was therefore not modified, rather the payment of any arrearage was simply deferred.
I agree that the Family Court always has jurisdiction to modify child support upon a proper showing. This is in accord with our prior holding that no agreement of the parties can prejudice the rights of the children. Johnson v. Johnson, 251 S. C. 420, 163 S. E. (2d) 229 . The court may, therefore, enforce an agreement of the husband and wife relative to their child or may modify such an agreement, as the best interest of the child dictates.
Regardless of what might have been the authority of the court with reference to other matters contained in the separation agreement, it is conceded that the court had jurisdiction at all times over questions concerning child support. In this case, the court reviewed the terms of the separation agreement as to child support, approved them, and made these provisions a part of the divorce decree. No one knew better than respondent that he had agreed to support his children, the amount of the payments to be made, and that he was *355 under an order of court to pay. To now say, as does the majority, that there was no order directing the payment of child support is to completely ignore the plain facts contained in this record.
The only issue remaining is whether the trial judge properly deferred sentence on finding respondent guilty of contempt. The imposition of sentence for contempt is a matter resting largely within the discretion of the trial judge. Whether that discretion was properly exercised in this case should be determined in the light of the present facts. Since the order under appeal was issued about three (3) years ago, I would remand the question of sentence and the payment of arrearages to the lower court with instructions to forthwith reexamine these matters in the light of the present facts.
The order of the lower court should be affirmed and the cause remanded for reexamination of the issues of sentence and payment of the arrearage due.
I therefore dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9853370. Public record. Not legal advice.