# Travelers Insurance Co. v. Savio

> Supreme Court of Colorado · September 30, 1985 · 706 P.2d 1258

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9851834

## Case

- **Full name:** TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. William A. SAVIO, Respondent
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Colorado
- **Decided:** September 30, 1985
- **Citations:** 706 P.2d 1258; 54 U.S.L.W. 2228; 1985 Colo. LEXIS 513
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Rovira
- **Judges:** Kirshbaum, Erickson, Rovira, Neighbors
- **Cited by:** 269 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9851834

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that an insurer’s failure to pay a valid claim is a failure to perform under the insurance contract that can support a bad faith claim if the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for its failure to pay
- holding that "covered employee stands in the same position as an insured in a private insurance contract"
- recognizing a breach-of-duty action by an employee against a workers’ compensation carrier even though the carrier issued its policy to the employer
- stating that “an insurance company, however, may challenge claims which are fairly debatable”

## Opinion text

ROVIRA, Justice,
dissenting:
The majority shapes out of whole cloth a new claim for relief outside the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act), a claim better left to creation by the legislature than the court.
The legislature has over the years developed a comprehensive scheme for compensating persons who suffer injury arising out of or in the scope of their employment. This detailed and extensive program has developed and expanded over the years along with provisions for the protection not only of the employee, but of employers and their insurance carriers.
The majority holds that the Act does not cover Savio’s new injuries; namely, loss of income due to delay, mental distress, and loss of attorney fees for the prosecution of his case. In support of this view, it concludes that these injuries did not result from Savio’s employment or his initial injury. I disagree. Savio’s alleged injuries stem from the original injury to his ankle. Simply stated, but for his ankle injury, none of the subsequent events would have occurred, and therefore all of his newly acquired injuries emanate from his employment and the injury.
The majority also holds that Savio’s asserted claims must be decided in courts of law because the Act provides no remedy for his alleged injuries. While acknowledging that insurance carriers can lose their authority to do a compensation business in this state and be subject to fines if they knowingly or willfully violate any of the provisions of the Act, the majority holds that this is insufficient and inadequate because it does not provide any direct remedy to Savio.
This conclusion of the majority points up my underlying disagreement with its opinion. The legislature has established penalties and punishments for insurance carriers who violate the Act. Not satisfied with the legislative resolution of this issue, the majority has decided to legislate and create a new remedy — a remedy outside the Act *1278 which is to be found in litigation in the courts.
In light of my opinion that the court has inappropriately authorized a claim for relief outside the Act, little benefit will be derived from further lengthy explication of my views. Suffice it to say that, if the legislature is satisfied with the result reached by the majority, nothing further need be done. If dissatisfied, the Act can be appropriately revised by the legislature. Majority op. at 1271 n. 17. See Padilla v. Industrial Commission of Colorado, 696 P.2d 273 (Colo.1985) (Rovira, J., dissenting).
While I disagree with the majority’s resolution of the underlying issue, I agree that if a common law action for bad faith is permitted such tort requires proof of unreasonable conduct and knowledge that the conduct is unreasonable or a reckless disregard of the fact that the conduct is unreasonable.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9851834. Public record. Not legal advice.