# State v. Fowler

> Court of Appeals of Arizona · October 29, 1987 · 156 Ariz. 408

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9851569

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Arizona, Respondent, v. David Lee FOWLER, Petitioner
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Arizona
- **Decided:** October 29, 1987
- **Citations:** 156 Ariz. 408; 752 P.2d 497; 1987 Ariz. App. LEXIS 580
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Kleinschmidt
- **Judges:** Shelley, Kleinschmidt, Brooks
- **Cited by:** 15 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9851569

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that statute of limitations “unconstitutionally invade[d] the province of the supreme court’s rule-making authority” because it contradicted limitation period stated in Rules of Criminal Procedure
- holding a statutory one-year time limitation applying to filing petitions for post-conviction relief unconstitutional because the law conflicted with Rule 32

## Opinion text

KLEINSCHMIDT, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result. I do not find the distinctions drawn by many of the cases cited by the majority between what is “procedural” and what is “substantive” to be very helpful. I tend to agree with the observation of the Colorado Supreme Court in Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 314-15 , 592 P.2d 792, 800-01 (1979), that a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another, depending on the underlying social policies of the competing rule of court and statute. Viewed this way, a very strong argument can be made *415 that the legislative policy of finality embodied in A.R.S. § 13-4234(F) ought to prevail in this case. Given cases like Daou v. Harris, 139 Ariz. 353 , 678 P.2d 934 (1984) (reasonable time limits are procedural), and the fact that the right to prescribe the rules of evidence, a field in which there is great room for fundamental policy considerations to operate, remains a province of the supreme court, I cannot say that the statutory one year limitation is substantive. Nor can I say that the statute is “reasonable and workable” in relation to the rule so that the two can co-exist. See State ex rel. Collins v. Siedel, 142 Ariz. 587 , 691 P.2d 678 (1984).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9851569. Public record. Not legal advice.