# Brown v. Moseley > Supreme Court of South Carolina · June 12, 1952 · 222 S.C. 1 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9845777 ## Case - **Full name:** Brown v. Moseley - **Court:** Supreme Court of South Carolina - **Decided:** June 12, 1952 - **Citations:** 222 S.C. 1; 71 S.E.2d 591; 1952 S.C. LEXIS 10 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Baker - **Judges:** Stukes, Tayror, Oxner, Baker - **Cited by:** 3 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9845777 ## Opinion text Baker, Chief Justice (dissenting). I respectfully (and as always, reluctantly) dissent from at least the result of the prevailing opinion. If the defendant had been appointed subsequent to the amendment of 1952 of Section 3473 of the Code of 1942, and concéding without so deciding, that the prevailing opinion correctly holds that the amendment is constitutional, then it might be said, with some show of logic, that defendant’s term of office would not terminate until following the general election for the office of Sheriff of Kershaw County in 1954; but, under the law as it existed when the appointment was made, the time for the holding of a general election for the office of Sheriff of Kershaw County was in 1952; and the term of office to which defendant was appointed under the authority of Section 3474 of the Code of 1942, necessarily terminates following the general- election in 1952, or December 31, 1952. The result above stated is in accord with the holdings of this Court since the case of Reister v. Hemphill, 2 S. C. 325. Whenever the occasion has arisen this Court has pointed out that the term of office runs for the period specified in the Constitution, regardless of any vacancy occurring during the term. A person filling a vacancy in a constitutional office “is simply placed in that position to perform the duties of the” office. The term is unaffected. Privette v. Grinnell, 191 S. C. 376, 4 S. E. (2d) 305 ; Limehouse v. Blackwell, 190 S. C. 122, 2 S. E. (2d) 483 ; Cannon v. Sligh, 170 S. C. 45, 169 S. E. 712 ; State ex rel. Huckabee v. Hough, 103 S. C. 87, 87 S. E. 436 ; Wright v. Charles, 4 S. C. 178. The constitutional term of office of the sheriff of Kershaw County under the law prevailing prior to the enactment of the 1952 statute was at all times a four year term. There was no authority for an election in 1918. The term which *12 began after the general election in 1916 continued for four years, and a new term began after each four year period, so that in 1952 an election should be held to establish the beginning of a new term. If vested property rights were involved in the irregularities in the elections for sheriff in Kershaw County, a different situation might be presented. Here we are afforded an opportunity to conform the term of office of the sheriff of Kershaw County to the constitutional and statutory provisions prescribing the term. What is being done by the majority opinion, on the other hand, is to extend the term of office of defendant’s predecessor for a period of two years, thereby enlarging the term to six years. Stated another way, the Court is in effect preventing the holding of an election at the time when the Constitution and statutes expressly require it, and thereby extending the term of office for a period of two years. Nothing could be clearer under our decisions than that the term of office .of a constitutional officer cannot be enlarged or reduced by legislation. Yet, here the Court is adding two years to the term of defendant’s predecessor, and giving the appointed encumbent two years of office beyond the period for which he was appointed. There are no morals involved in this case such as would have been if the plaintiff were attacking or questioning the right of one who had been elected to hold this office for four full years from the date of his election. For instance, if the late Sheriff DeBruhl had not died, and was the encumbent sheriff, and his right to hold the office until 1954 under his election in 1950 was being attacked, the morals and justice of the case would weigh very heavily with the writer. Here, however, the defendant holds the office of Sheriff of Kershaw County by grace of his appointment by his Excellency, Governor Byrnes “until the next general election for county sheriffs” which at the time of his appointment was fixed by law for Kershaw County as the general election in 1952. *13 From any angle, there will be a vacancy in the office of Sheriff of Kershaw County after the general election of 1952, and the only manner in which the encumbent, the defendant in this case, can lawfully hold such office until the general election in 1954, if the amendment to Section 3473 is constitutional, is for the Governor of this state to re-appoint him as sheriff of said county following the general election in 1952, and he again qualify, unless, of course, some elector becomes a candidate for this office in 1952, and is by the electorate elected. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9845777. Public record. Not legal advice.