# State v. Roberti

> Oregon Supreme Court · May 4, 1982 · 293 Or. 59

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9845477

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE OF OREGON, Petitioner on Review, v. GARY PATRICK ROBERTI, Respondent on Review
- **Court:** Oregon Supreme Court
- **Decided:** May 4, 1982
- **Citations:** 293 Or. 59; 644 P.2d 1104; 1982 Ore. LEXIS 863
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Roberts
- **Judges:** Tanzer, Roberts, Lent, Peterson, Linde
- **Cited by:** 61 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9845477

## Opinion text

ROBERTS, J.,
concurring.
I voted with the majority in this case because I believe requiring the police to be sensitive to the impact of an interrogation upon a defendant is, in the long run, more protective of a defendant’s constitutional rights and more consistent with the kind of safeguards Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 , 86 S Ct 1602 , 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966) meant to provide than is requiring a police officer to give a defendant the warnings required by Miranda at the point at which the officer has made a decision to arrest.
Were our opinion here only deciding this case and nothing more, I would have voted with the dissent by *76 Justice Lent. My concern with the position of that dissent applied generally, however, is that making a police officer’s decision to arrest the trigger point for issuance of Miranda warnings points the way to the possibility of police abuse, and leaves the investigatory procedure too susceptible to police manipulation. Only the officer knows at what point he or she makes a decision to arrest. By requiring that something other than the officer’s state of mind be considered in determining whether or not a defendant is “deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,” Miranda, 384 US at 444, 477 , 86 S Ct at 1612, 1629 , 16 L Ed 2d at 706, 725 , the officer has to make a determination of whether or not that individual would feel a significant, coercive deprivation of his or her freedom of action. It is my belief that this inquiry ultimately provides the standard of protection enunciated in Miranda and with which we struggle here.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9845477. Public record. Not legal advice.