# State v. Pannell > Idaho Supreme Court · July 10, 1995 · 127 Idaho 420 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9845280 ## Case - **Full name:** STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Bob PANNELL, Defendant-Appellant - **Court:** Idaho Supreme Court - **Decided:** July 10, 1995 - **Citations:** 127 Idaho 420; 901 P.2d 1321; 1995 Ida. LEXIS 94 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Trout - **Judges:** McDevitt, Trout, Johnson, Transtrum, Tern, Silak - **Cited by:** 26 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9845280 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - noting that the use of intrusive tactics during an investigatory detention are permissible when they are “a reasonable precaution for the officer’s safety” - holding use of handcuffs exceeded the reasonable bounds of a Terry stop when suspect had been “fully compliant” - discussing compliance and number of suspects as relevant factor in determining whether handcuffs may be used during investigatory detention ## Opinion text TROUT, Justice, joined by SILAK, Justice, dissenting. Because I do not agree that the officers in this case effected anything more than an investigatory detention, I must respectfully dissent from the Court’s opinion. It is clear from the record and transcript that these officers were approaching a suspect who they believed had been involved in some domestic disturbance while intoxicated, and who might very likely be carrying a weapon. While they admittedly determined that Pannell was not so intoxicated that he should be arrested for driving under the influence, they certainly believed he could not operate a motor vehicle safely. They also determined that they should investigate the domestic dispute which caused them to be dispatched in the first place. In order to do so and in the interest of public safety, they decided to return to 97 Coy Lane with Pannell but did not allow him to drive his vehicle; rather the officers placed him in a patrol vehicle. Officer Moses made clear in his testimony why he chose to handcuff and transport the defendant: I told him (Pannell) that we needed to go back to the residence to investigate what went on at the residence, because I was just there briefly and not in the house. And he says okay. And I told him due to the fact of the alcohol, that he had been drinking and the field sobriety test, given he was right at a .10, maybe a little under, maybe a little over, and I did not feel *426 comfortable with him driving his vehicle back to the residence. And I told him I would transport him up there, and which he agreed and said it was fine. Additionally, at the preliminary hearing, Officer Moses stated: And I told him (Pannell) that for my safety and policy, that he’d be placed in handcuffs and patted down and placed in my vehicle, then we’d go back to the scene. Officer Moses told the defendant he was going to drive him back to his residence to complete the investigation, and then handcuffed him and placed him in the patrol car in order to carry out the transportation safely. The Court states that “at all relevant times, Deputy Moses was accompanied by Deputy Conrad.” This statement is not correct because the only time relevant to this appeal is the time frame after Pannell was handcuffed. The Court later acknowledges that Officer Moses transported Pannell unaccompanied by any other officers, but apparently feels it is important that the officer chose to do so. The important point is that Officer Moses was alone in the patrol vehicle with an intoxicated and potentially violent suspect, a factor the Court found important in State v. Johns. The Court also discounts the facts that Pannell appeared intoxicated and had been involved in a domestic dispute potentially involving weapons. These facts would lead any reasonable officer to conclude that the suspect should be restrained during transportation. The fact that Officer Moses was transporting Pannell back to the scene of a domestic dispute from which he had departed, raises the issue of the risk of flight, as well as concerns about returning Pannell to the scene of a possible crime. Officer Moses testified that he placed Pannell in the back seat of the patrol car, and that the back doors had handles enabling a person to open the door from the back seat. Again, the flight issue meets a concern in State v. Johns, cited by the Court. The Court then reaches the conclusion that the officers handcuffed Pannell unnecessarily because he had been compliant thus far. In support of this finding, the Court cites cases involving handcuffing the suspect with no intention of transporting him. In such cases the officer was not handicapped due to the confines of a moving vehicle and was fully capable of subduing the suspect in case he became violent. None of the cases cited involve handcuffing a suspect in order to transport him to the scene of the dispute. The Court simply ignores the fact that Officer Moses handcuffed Pannell for transportation and safety purposes while continuing a legitimate investigation. Quite reasonably, the officers did not place an intoxicated and potentially violent criminal suspect unrestrained in the back seat of the patrol car. The trial court’s findings that the officers were apprehensive due to the nature of the call and the defendant’s intoxicated state support its conclusion that the officers used the least intrusive means to effectuate the investigation. Thus, I cannot agree with the Court’s opinion that the police utilized “a degree of force which exceeded that justified for an investigatory detention.” See State v. Wheeler, 108 Wash.2d 230 , 737 P.2d 1005 (1987) (given the legitimate concern for police safety when a suspect is being transported in a police car, the handcuffing of the suspect for the purpose of transporting him to the scene of a burglary was consistent with good police practice and common sense, and thus did not transform an investigatory stop into an arrest). Having agreed with the trial court that this was an investigatory detention, I also believe it correctly applied Michigan v. Long to the facts of this case. The Court cites Officer Moses’ testimony that he searched the vehicle for weapons because he believed the suspect would have access to a weapon inside the vehicle if the officers determined that he should not be placed under arrest. His concern stemmed from the call from dispatch indicating that weapons were involved. This concern is squarely addressed in Michigan v. Long, when the Supreme Court states that an officer may search a vehicle for weapons if he believes the suspect *427 will have access to them if he is not arrested. Michigan v. Long, 468 U.S. 1032, 1051 , 108 S.Ct. 3469 , 3482, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (citing United States v. Powless, 546 F.2d 792 (8th Cir1977), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 910 , 97 S.Ct. 1185 , 51 L.Ed.2d 588 (1977). Therefore, I believe the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9845280. Public record. Not legal advice.