# State v. Stokes

> Court of Appeals of North Carolina · May 21, 2002 · 150 N.C. App. 211

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9845213

## Case

- **Full name:** State of North Carolina v. Richard Allen Stokes
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of North Carolina
- **Decided:** May 21, 2002
- **Citations:** 150 N.C. App. 211; 565 S.E.2d 196; 2002 N.C. App. LEXIS 512
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Hunter
- **Judges:** McGee, Smith, Hunter
- **Cited by:** 5 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Reversed in part, on other grounds by State v. Stokes, 357 N.C. 220 (2003).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9845213

## Opinion text

HUNTER, Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority with respect to Parts II and III of the opinion. However, because I would hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to Officer Varner, I dissent as to Part I. The majority holds that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the statement as being in violation of the Fifth Amendment because Officer Varner imtiated an interrogation of defendant without re-informing him of his Miranda rights and without an express waiver of those rights. I disagree, and would uphold the trial court’s extensive findings and conclusions that defendant’s statement was a spontaneous statement not the result of any police-initiated interrogation or inducement, and that defendant made the statement freely, voluntarily and with knowledge of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present.
“A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is conclusive on appeal ‘if [it is] supported by competent evidence.’ ” State v. Buchanan, 355 N.C. 264, 265 , 559 S.E.2d 784, 785 (2002) (citation omitted). Such a ruling is conclusive notwithstanding evidence to the contrary. State v. Young, 148 N.C. App. 462, 465 , 559 S.E.2d 814, 817 , appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 500 , 564 S.E.2d 233 (2002). “ ‘TMs deference is afforded the trial judge because he is in the best position to weigh the evidence, given that he has heard all *228 of the testimony and observed the demeanor of the witnesses.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 207 , 539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000)).
Here, the trial court found, and I believe the evidence supports, that Officer Varner was looking into defendant’s cell as he walked by; that “defendant spontaneously said to Officer Varner, ‘What do you want?’ that Officer Varner simply responded “ ‘How?’ that defendant then “spontaneously” told Officer Varner something to the effect that “he kept crying, and I lost it and there ain’t nothing I can do but the time now”; that defendant appeared calm during the exchange; and that Officer Varner thereafter simply walked away. Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that the statement was not made as a result of any inducement or persuasion, that defendant made the statement freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge and understanding of his constitutional rights, and therefore, that defendant’s constitutional rights had not been abridged.
The trial court’s finding that defendant spontaneously and without persuasion or inducement initiated a conversation with Officer Varner which led to the inculpatory statement was clearly supported by competent evidence in the form of Officer Varner’s testimony, and is therefore conclusive. This finding supports the trial court’s conclusion of law that there was no violation of defendant’s constitutional rights. It is well-established that “ ‘ “Miranda warnings and waiver of counsel are required only when an individual is being subjected to custodial interrogation.” ’ ” State v. Parks, 148 N.C. App. 600, 606 , 560 S.E.2d 179, 184 (2002) (citations omitted). Custodial interrogation is defined as “ ‘ “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” ’ ” Id. (citations omitted).
In Parks , we recently held that the defendant’s inculpatory statements were not made in the context of a police-initiated interrogation where the evidence clearly showed that the defendant initiated the conversation that led to the inculpatory statements. Id. at 607 , 560 S.E.2d at 184 . The evidence showed that the defendant initiated contact with the officer by asking him whether he was in trouble. Defendant thereafter made several incriminating statements during the conversation which ensued as a result of defendant’s initial question to the officer. We held that the officer’s testimony “clearly establishes that defendant initiated the conversation which led to his incul-patory statements,” and therefore, “[defendant did not make the *229 inculpatory statements in the context of a police-initiated interrogation, and thus was not required to have been informed of his Miranda rights.” Id. at 607 , 560 S.E.2d at 184 ; see also State v. Taylor, 332 N.C. 372, 384 , 420 S.E.2d 414, 421 (1992) (defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not implicated where defendant initiated conversations which lead to his incriminating statements).
In a similar case, our Supreme Court reiterated that an interrogation does not ensue where the defendant initiates the contact. See State v. Todd, 313 N.C. 110 , 326 S.E.2d 249 (1985). In that case, the evidence established that the officer happened to be standing nearby the defendant’s jail cell when the defendant indicated that he wanted to speak to the officer, and a conversation ensued wherein defendant made incriminating statements. Id. at 115 , 326 S.E.2d at 252 . The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that he had been subjected to a custodial interrogation, stating that although all the parties conceded the statement was made while the defendant was in custody, “we agree with the State and the trial judge that the statement was not made as a result of interrogation. Both the circumstances surrounding the statement and the substance of the statement are clear indications that it was volunteered.” Id. at 116 , 326 S.E.2d at 253 ; see also, e.g., State v. Coffey, 345 N.C. 389, 401 , 480 S.E.2d 664, 671 (1997) (even assuming the defendant was being interrogated at the time he made incriminating statements, no constitutional violation occurred where “the trial court correctly concluded that defendant initiated the communication with the law enforcement officers”).
I would hold that we are bound by the trial court’s finding that defendant spontaneously initiated the conversation with Officer Varner, who happened to walk by his cell, by asking Officer Varner what he wanted, and that this finding supports a conclusion that defendant did not make the subsequent statement in the context of a police-initiated custodial interrogation.
Moreover, I would uphold the trial court’s conclusion that defendant’s statement was made after he freely, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent, his right to have an attorney present, and all other applicable rights. In State v. Morganherring, 350 N.C. 701, 722 , 517 S.E.2d 622, 634-35 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1024 , 146 L. Ed. 2d 322 (2000), our Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that he did not knowingly waive his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because there was no evidence in the record that the defendant’s confession was anything but voluntary. The record in *230 this case likewise fails to show that defendant’s incriminating statement or waiver of his rights was anything but voluntary and knowing. “A trial court’s finding of voluntariness, when supported by competent evidence, is conclusive on appeal.” State v. Samuels, 25 N.C. App. 77, 78-79 , 212 S.E.2d 393, 394 (1975) (holding no violation of defendant’s constitutional rights where trial court found that defendant’s statements were made “ ‘suddenly, spontaneously and voluntarily,’ ” and not in response to interrogation, and such findings were supported by competent evidence).
We stated in State v. Morrell, 108 N.C. App. 465 , 424 S.E.2d 147 , appeal dismissed, disc. review denied and cert. denied, 333 N.C. 465 , 427 S.E.2d 626 (1993), that the voluntariness of a confession must be determined in light of the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 474, 424 S.E.2d at 153 . We stated that some factors to consider in assessing whether a confession was voluntary are “ ‘whether the defendant was in custody when he made the statement; the mental capacity of the defendant; and the presence of psychological coercion, physical torture, threats, or promises.’ ” Id. at 474-75 , 424 S.E.2d at 153 (citation omitted). In applying those factors, we noted that although the defendant was in custody, that factor alone is not determinative. Id. at 475 , 424 S.E.2d at 153 . The trial court found that the statements were freely given as they were not the product of any threat, promise, or duress, and that the defendant was not suffering from any mental or emotional disorder, nor was she impaired or disabled. Id. Based on those findings, the trial court concluded the statements were voluntary. Id. We upheld the .conclusion, noting that we are bound by the trial court’s findings, which were supported by competent evidence. Id.
In the present case, the trial court’s findings establish that there was no persuasion or inducement, that defendant was calm, and that both his initiation of the conversation and subsequent incriminating statement were made “spontaneously.” Indeed, the evidence shows that in response to defendant’s question, Officer Varner simply said one word. There is no evidence, and defendant does not argue, that he was otherwise impaired by any mental or emotional disorder or disability that would have prevented him from understanding the nature of his statement and the waiver of his constitutional rights.
In summary, the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact that defendant initiated the conversation with Officer Varner, that Officer Varner responded with one word, and that defendant, with a calm and collected demeanor, subsequently made a sponta *231 neous incriminating statement. These findings support a conclusion that theré was no police-initiated custodial interrogation, and that defendant spontaneously volunteered the statement without persuasion and after a voluntary and knowing waiver of his rights. The record fails to show any violation of defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress, and thus find no error in defendant’s trial.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9845213. Public record. Not legal advice.