# State v. Kirchoff

> Supreme Court of Iowa · March 21, 1990 · 452 N.W.2d 801

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9845178

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Timothy John KIRCHOFF, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Iowa
- **Decided:** March 21, 1990
- **Citations:** 452 N.W.2d 801; 1990 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 63; 1990 WL 32210
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Neuman
- **Judges:** McGiverin, Neuman, Larson, Lavorato, Snell
- **Cited by:** 39 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9845178

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding defendant’s agreement with trial court’s incorrect statement that defendant had waived his right to file a motion in arrest of judgment did not operate as a waiver of that right
- holding substantial compliance is the measure for judging whether the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(6) have been met
- holding substantial compliance is the measure for judging whether the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(b) have been met
- discussing nuances of the motion-in-arrest-of-judgment requirement in 1990

## Opinion text

*810 NEUMAN, Justice
(dissenting)
I respectfully dissent.
The directive of Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 8(2)(b), as interpreted by this court in State v. Fluhr, is plain: It is the court’s duty to inform the defendant of the trial rights being waived upon plea of guilty to a crime more onerous than a serious misdemeanor. One may question the wisdom of such a rule, given the fact that counsel is supposedly retained to impart the same information. Commending the rule, however, is the likelihood that it will pay delayed dividends by reducing postconviction claims of ineffective counsel.
Instead of resolving these opposing views by rule change, the majority has simply rewritten the rule to its liking. Substituting one shortcut for another, the majority excuses the trial court’s error and dumps a decade of precedent in the process. I would reverse and remand for the procedure guaranteed this defendant by rule.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9845178. Public record. Not legal advice.
