# Sears v. Hull

> Arizona Supreme Court · July 16, 1998 · 192 Ariz. 65

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9844355

## Case

- **Full name:** Paula S. SEARS and Alan E. Sears, Wife and Husband, on Their Own Behalf and on Behalf of Their Minor Children Anna Marie Sears, Rebecca L. Sears, Isaiah S. Sears and Isabella C. Sears, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. Jane Dee HULL, Governor of Arizona; State of Arizona; And Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, an Indian Tribe Organized Under the Indian Reorganized Act of 1934, Defendants/Appellants
- **Court:** Arizona Supreme Court
- **Decided:** July 16, 1998
- **Citations:** 192 Ariz. 65; 273 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 36; 961 P.2d 1013; 1998 Ariz. LEXIS 75
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Jones
- **Judges:** McGregor, Jones, Zlaket, Feldman, Martone
- **Cited by:** 96 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9844355

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding allegations of harm that proposed gaming facility would expose plaintiffs’ children to “conduct contrary to the[ir] values,” “result in urban crowding, traffic and stresses,” and cause “economic loss” to surrounding homes and businesses, “alleged only generalized harm …
- holding 19 that plaintiffs’ nuisance allegations based on “urban crowding, traffic and stresses which 20 will detract from the quality of their immediate community” stated “only generalized harm 21 rather than any distinct and palpable injury”
- holding the court should only apply the doctrine narrowly and only under exceptional circumstances
- rejecting argument that legislators had standing to attack compact when legislature expressly authorized the governor to enter into gaming contracts; under these circumstances this case no longer presented issues of constitutional moment requiring court to waive standing requi…
- rejecting a plaintiff’s argument that would allow “virtually any citizen [to] challenge any action of any public officer under the mandamus statute by claiming that the officer has failed to uphold or fulfill state or federal law”

## Opinion text

JONES, Vice Chief Justice,
specially concurring:
I concur in the judgment and rationale of the court. I write separately, however, to remind the parties that today’s opinion, once again, does not resolve the federal question identified and discussed in the concurring opinion in Salt River Pimar-Maricopa Indian Community v. Hull, 190 Ariz. 97,105 , 945 P.2d 818, 826 (1997). That discussion, though still valid, need not be repeated here.
The issue, briefly stated, is whether IGRA authorizes the tribe, via state compact, to conduct certain forms of Class III gaming on tribal land in spite of Arizona’s long-standing prohibition against such gaming on non-tribal land.
In even simpler terms, the issue is whether the state may approve, and whether the tribe may conduct, gaming activity which the state, by law, has otherwise declared illegal. Plaintiffs raised the issue, but the court holds that plaintiffs lack judicial standing to bring the action. Accordingly, the court must dismiss the case without reaching the controlling federal question.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9844355. Public record. Not legal advice.