# People v. Nunn > California Supreme Court · May 8, 1956 · 46 Cal. 2d 460 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9844057 ## Case - **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Respondent, v. LESLIE ROBERT NUNN, Appellant - **Court:** California Supreme Court - **Decided:** May 8, 1956 - **Citations:** 46 Cal. 2d 460; 296 P.2d 813; 1956 Cal. LEXIS 201 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Carter - **Judges:** Carter, McCOMB - **Cited by:** 76 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9844057 ## Opinion text CARTER, J. I dissent. I cannot agree that any law of the State of California permits an officer to go about using a fictitious name and make false statements to induce a doctor to prescribe a narcotic or medicine that requires a prescription for a patient, and to misrepresent that he is such patient. Such conduct, whether by an officer, or anyone else, violates sections 11170, 11170.5 and 11171 of the Health and Safety Code. Section 11170 of the Health and Safety Code provides as follows: “(1) No person shall obtain or attempt to obtain narcotics, or procure or attempt to procure the administration of or prescription for narcotics, (a) by fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or subterfuge; or (b) by the concealment of a material fact. ... (3) No person shall, for the purpose of *472 obtaining narcotics, falsely assume the title of, or represent himself to be [here follows a list of authorized persons] or other authorized person. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Section 11170.5 of the Health and Safety Code says: “No person shall, in connection with the prescribing, furnishing, administering, or dispensing of a narcotic, give a false name or false address.” Section 11171 reads: “No person shall obtain or possess a prescription that does not comply with this division.” (Emphasis added.) It is plain from the foregoing that the officer violated every one of these mandates of the Legislature. He obtained each of the prescriptions involved in this case (a) by fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and subterfuge; and (b) he concealed a material fact, namely his true identity. He represented himself to be an authorized person, which he was not. He obtained and possessed prescriptions that did not comply with the provisions of the Health and Safety Code. Thereafter he falsely had them filled in violation of section 11170 of the Health and Safety Code. The Legislature clearly intended these sections to apply to all persons. False and fictitious use of one’s name and misrepresentation of one’s character are fraud and deceit, which the statute expressly forbids. Fraud vitiates everything. It nullifies judgments obtained thereby. If these statutes that expressly forbid any person to use these means, are changed by judicial construction, to authorize an officer to obtain a prescription (a) by fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or subterfuge; or (b) by concealment of a material fact, or by giving a false name or address, or obtain or possess a narcotic that does not comply with these provisions of the Health and Safety Code, then such sections, if thus construed and applied, violate due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. That constitutional guarantee provides for American standards for the administration of justice and conduct consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice must lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. (Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 [ 47 S.Ct. 103 , 71 L.Ed. 270 , 48 A.L.R. 1102 ]; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100 [ 29 S.Ct. 14 , 53 L.Ed. 97 ]; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323, 325, 326 [ 58 S.Ct. 149 , 82 L.Ed. 288 ]; Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. *473 459, 463 [ 67 S.Ct. 374 , 91 L.Ed. 422 ]; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 [ 67 S.Ct. 1672 , 91 L.Ed. 1903 , 171 A.L.R. 1223 ].) The obtaining of a prescription from a duly licensed doctor by means of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation—in violation of the express commands of the Legislature—is reprehensible, unlawful, and contrary to the conscience of mankind. This court is not authorized to legislate that it is lawful or to condone it judicially. If it does, then the statutes, as thus construed, violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. If the knowing presentation of perjured testimony in a criminal prosecution amounts to the denial of due process of law (Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 [ 55 S.Ct. 340 , 79 L.Ed. 791 , 98 A.L.R. 406 ]), it should follow as a matter of course that evidence obtained by means of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation should have the same effect. The purity of the courts belongs to the courts. (Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 [ 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 , 86 A.L.R. 249 ]; People v. Cohan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [ 282 P.2d 905 ] and cases cited therein.) When the officer in this case falsified his name and character he acted in an individual capacity, for the state did not authorize him to act falsely and fraudulently and to violate the express provisions of the Health and Safety Code. But if we approve such conduct then we become a party to it. This the court cannot do, lest the citizen shall say, “If the officer can falsify, why can’t we?” Courts of justice must set an example of truth and justice and equal application of the law’s mandates to officers and citizens alike, lest the bad example of one shall lead to misconduct of the other. Civilized standards of due process guaranteed by the federal Constitution forbid this. I do not think this court or any court should ratify, adopt and approve such lawless disregard of honesty, decency and the express and plain provisions of the Health and Safety Code as written and adopted by our lawmakers. For the foregoing reasons and those stated in my dissenting opinion in People v. Braddock, 41 Cal.2d 794, 803 [ 264 P.2d 521 ], I would reverse the judgment and grant defendant a new trial. Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied June 6, 1956. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9844057. Public record. Not legal advice.