# Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 12, 2000 · 530 U.S. 133

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9844017

## Case

- **Full name:** Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 12, 2000
- **Citations:** 530 U.S. 133; 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 406; 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 3474; 2000 Daily Journal DAR 6199; 68 U.S.L.W. 4480; 78 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,045; 82 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1748; 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4629; 120 S. Ct. 2097; 147 L. Ed. 2d 105; 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3966
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Ginsburg
- **Judges:** Ginsburg, O'Connor, Ggns-Burg
- **Cited by:** 12,287 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9844017

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that "[fjirst, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination," which shifts to respondent the burden to "produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason .... This burde…
- explaining that “[f]irst, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination,” which shifts to respondent the burden to “produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. . . . This bur…
- stating, in age discrimination case in which plaintiff-employee was not promoted, while younger employees were, that “the plaintiff may attempt to establish that he was the victim of intentional discrimination ‘by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy o…
- explaining that the burden-shifting analysis in an employment discrimination case first requires the plaintiff to come forward with a prima facie case of discrimination; if a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the employer to present evidence of a legit…

## Opinion text

Justice Ginsburg,
concurring.
The Court today holds that an employment discrimination plaintiff may survive judgment as a matter of law by submitting two categories of evidence: first, evidence establishing a “prima facie case,” as that term is used in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 (1973); and second, evidence from which a rational factfinder could conclude that the employer’s proffered explanation for its actions was false. Because the Court of Appeals in this case plainly, and erroneously, required the plaintiff to offer some evidence beyond those two categories, no broader holding is necessary to support reversal.
I write separately to note that it may be incumbent on the Court, in an appropriate case, to define more precisely the circumstances in which plaintiffs will be required to submit evidence beyond these two categories in order to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law. I anticipate that such circumstances will be uncommon. As the Court notes, it is a principle of evidence law that the jury is entitled to treat a party’s dishonesty about a material fact as evidence of culpability. Ante, at 147. Under this eommonsense principle, evidence suggesting that a defendant accused of illegal discrimination has chosen to give a false explanation for its actions gives rise to a rational inference that the defendant could be masking its actual, illegal motivation. Ibid. Whether the defendant was in fact motivated by discrimination is of course for the finder of fact to decide; that is the lesson of St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502 (1993). But the inference remains — unless it is conclusively *155 demonstrated, by evidence the district court is required to credit on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, see ante, at 151, that discrimination could not have been the defendant’s true motivation. If such conclusive demonstrations are (as I suspect) atypical, it follows that the ultimate question of liability ordinarily should not be taken from the jury once the plaintiff has introduced the two categories of evidence described above. Because the Court’s opinion leaves room for sueh further elaboration in an appropriate case, I join it in full.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9844017. Public record. Not legal advice.
