# United States v. Jackson C. O'dell, III

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · February 27, 2003 · 320 F.3d 674

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9843248

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jackson C. O’DELL, III, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** February 27, 2003
- **Citations:** 320 F.3d 674; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 3527
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Nelson
- **Judges:** Nelson, Clay, Haynes
- **Cited by:** 60 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9843248

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding a limited remand where this court earlier had found clearly erroneous the district court’s application of a “safety valve” for mandatory minimum sentencing and “remand[ed] for re-sentencing without application of the safety valve”
- observing that “[t]he basic tenet of the limited remand component of the mandate rule is that ‘a district court is bound to the scope of the remand issued by the court of appeals.’ ”
- noting that “we reverse the district court’s determination that [defendant] was not an armed career criminal ... and remand for resentencing,” provided an instance of general remand
- holding there was a limited mandate when previous appellate order remanded to the district court for “resentencing without application of the safety valve”
- stating that the appellate court’s analysis must inform implementation of the mandate

## Opinion text

DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree that the remand in O’Dell IV was limited rather than general. I write separately, however, to note that were it to be held that the remand was general rather than limited, it would make no difference to the result in this case. The motions that Mr. O’Dell filed in the district court on the day of his sentencing — pleadings styled “Defendant’s Motion for Downward Departure” and “Motion to Resen-tence Within Constitutional Protections of Fifth Amendment Due Process and Eighth Amendment Protections” — could not properly have been granted in any event.
As to the request for a downward departure, it is clear that O’Dell was subject to a mandatory minimum five-year sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(B). It is equally clear that he could not claim the benefit of any statutory exception to the five-year mandate. This being so, the district court had no power to depart from the requirements of the statute. See United States v. Burke, 237 F.3d 741, 745 (6th Cir.2001):
“In the absence of one of the exceptions set out in [18 U.S.C.] §§ 3553(e), (f), or such other similar exceptions as Congress may create, defendants may not be sentenced, by means of a downward departure, to a term of imprisonment or other punishment below the minimum imposed by the statute under which they were convicted.”
As to the constitutional claim, under the facts of this case, the notion that a five-year sentence was somehow unconstitutional strikes me as frivolous.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9843248. Public record. Not legal advice.