# Federation for American Immigration Reform, Inc. v. Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States

> Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · August 30, 1996 · 93 F.3d 897

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9843173

## Case

- **Full name:** FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, INC., Appellant, v. Janet RENO, Attorney General of the United States, Et Al., Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
- **Decided:** August 30, 1996
- **Citations:** 93 F.3d 897; 320 U.S. App. D.C. 234; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22388
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Rogers
- **Judges:** Williams, Ginsburg, Rogers
- **Cited by:** 45 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9843173

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding INA immigration quota provision not ”integral[ly] relatfed]" to INA provision allowing Attorney General to parole aliens into the country for a limited time because the two provisions addressed different subject matter, no legislative history linked the purpose of one …
- noting that the causal relationship that the plaintiff alleged was more direct than the attenuated causal chain in Florida Audubon, observing that there was evidence indicating that the plaintiffs’ injury was fairly traceable to the defendants’ actions and adding that “the ins…
- holding the test unsatisfied, but decided before Patchak and Lexmark clarified the test’s leniency
- stating that, under zone of interests test, court may examine statutory provisions having “integral relationship” to the statute under which the suit was brought

## Opinion text

ROGERS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The Federation for American Immigration Reform, Inc. (“FAIR”) has brought suit in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) by the Attorney General. In accordance with a joint communiqué issued by the governments of the United States and Cuba on September 9, 1994, the Attorney General announced a policy of paroling a substantial number of Cubans into the United States each year and, after one year’s presence in the United States, adjusting their status to permanent residents. 1 FAIR’S complaint alleges that the Attorney General’s parole program for special Cuban migrants exceeds her authority under the parole provision, INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (d)(5)(A) (1994), the Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub.L. No. 89-732, § 1 , 80 Stat. 1161 , 1161 (1966), as amended by Pub.L. No. 96-212, § 203 (i), 94 Stat. 102 , 108 (1980), reprinted as 8 U.S.C. § 1255 note (1994), and several other provisions of the INA. The court concludes that FAIR’S members are not within the “zone of interests” of the immigration statutes and affirms the dismissal of the complaint. Because I conclude that FAIR has standing and its complaint does not present a non-justicia-ble political question, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Prudential standing. In its complaint, FAIR asserts that the limits on immigration *905 in the INA “were enacted by Congress to protect U.S. citizens and previously admitted immigrants from the adverse effects of immigration in excess of the absorptive capacity of the nation and of the communities where the immigrants settle.” Cmplt. ¶ 26. Viewing the question as “whether the language of the statutes invoked by the plaintiff or the supporting legislative history suggests a congressional intent to permit the plaintiffs suit,” Majority Opinion (“Maj. Op”) at 902, the court “see[s] little that pushes us one way or the other in discerning whether Congress intended to permit suit by members of this broad class.” Maj. Op. at 902. The court concludes that the “near-universality” of the injury operates as a “tie-breaking rule” indicating that FAIR’S members are not within the zone of interests. Maj. Op. at 90S. In conducting the zone-of-interests inquiry in this manner, the court ignores express instruction from the Supreme Court and fashions a new standard without any previous support.
In Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 , 107 S.Ct. 750, 757 , 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987), the Court articulated the zone-of-interests test in the following terms:
The “zone of interest” test is a guide for deciding whether, in view of Congress’ evident intent to make agency action presumptively reviewable, a particular plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular agency decision. In eases where the plaintiff is not itself the subject of the contested regulatory action, the test denies a right to review if the plaintiffs interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit. The test is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.
In an accompanying footnote, the Supreme Court declared that the approach taken by the D.C. Circuit in Control Data Corp. v. Baldrige, 655 F.2d 283, 293-95 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881 , 102 S.Ct. 363 , 70 L.Ed.2d 190 (1981) (requiring a positive showing, albeit only “slight,” of congressional intent to benefit the class of which the plaintiff is a member), was “inconsistent with our understanding of the ‘zone of interest’ test, as now formulated.” 479 U.S. at 400 n. 15, 107 S.Ct. at 757 n. 15. As the court notes, Maj. Op. at 902-03, the presumption of re-viewability of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (“APA”), can be overcome not only by express statement in the statute or its legislative history that Congress did not intend to permit suit by a particular class of plaintiffs, but also if the plaintiffs interest is “in fact inconsistent with the animating purpose” of the statute. National Fed’n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 883 F.2d 1038, 1043-44 (D.C.Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936 , 110 S.Ct. 3214 , 110 L.Ed.2d 662 (1990). On the other hand, if the plaintiff is a “suitable challenger” in the sense that its “interests, while not in any specific or obvious sense among those Congress intended to protect, coincide with the protected interests,” then the plaintiff is permitted to bring suit. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918, 922-23 (D.C.Cir.1989).
The issue is whether FAIR falls within the zone of interests of the limitations on the Attorney General’s authority to grant parole, not the zone of interests of the permissive aspect of the parole authority. When a plaintiff “challenge[s] [a] program as ultra vires,” the court should ask whether the “statutory provision was intended to protect persons like the litigant by limiting the authority conferred. If so, the litigant’s interest may be said to fall within the zone protected by the limitation.” Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 , 811 n. 14 (opinion of Bork, J.). The INA imposes limits on the overall number as well as on the characteristics of immigrants to the United States. INA §§ 201-203, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153 (1994). When the parole provision was first adopted in 1952, the Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary explained that the INA established “strict qualitative tests” for admission, and “any discretionary authority to waive the grounds for exclusion [by parole] should be carefully restricted to those cases where extenuating circumstances clearly require such action and ... the discretion *906 ary authority should be surrounded with strict limitations.” H.R.Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1705. In other words, the “strict limitations” on the Attorney General’s parole authority implement the INA’s overall limits on immigration. 2
When Congress abolished the national quota system in 1965 and set an overall numerical limitation on immigration, with a system of “preferences” for immigrants meeting certain qualifications, the Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary explained that the “limit will permit immigration within what is believed to be the present absorptive capacity of this country.” S.Rep. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3332. These limits on immigration are obviously intended to benefit current residents of the United States. Cf. S.Rep. No. 132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985) (“[W]e believe that the formulation of U.S. immigration policy must involve a judgment of what would promote the interests of American citizens_”). Congress has arrived at these limits on immigration by weighing “both the economic and noneconomic impacts of immigration.” Id. at 4 . 3
The court does not explain why FAIR would not be a “suitable challenger” to bring a claim that the Attorney General has acted beyond her parole authority. FAIR’S interest in limiting immigration so as to prevent what it considers to be the adverse economic impacts of immigration coincides with one of Congress’ implicit purposes in enacting limitations on the Attorney General’s parole authority. Hence, FAIR’S interest is not “marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute.” Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399 , 107 S.Ct. at 757 .
The court provides no authority for its proposition that the “near-universal character of [an] asserted interest” overcomes the presumption of reviewability under the APA. Maj. Op. at 902. As the court acknowledges, Maj. Op. at 901, FAIR does not present a mere generalized grievance, “claiming only harm to [its] and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the ... laws.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573, 112 S.Ct. at 2143; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 , 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Rather, FAIR alleges imminent injury to its members’ concrete and particularized interest in job opportunities and local public services. See infra Part II. Although FAIR’S members’ injury-in-fact is particular, FAIR’S asserted legal interest is general— indeed, everyone resident in the United States is protected by the INA from what Congress considers to be the harms from over-immigration. In the same manner, everyone is protected by laws governing the preservation of national parks, only those persons concretely affected by the over-development of such a park suffer the injury-in-faet necessary for constitutional standing. 4 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 , 92 S.Ct. 1361 , 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). *907 To take other examples, the legal interest of groups like voters and television viewers are similarly held by almost the entire populace, yet such groups are within the zone of interests of certain statutes. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.Cir.1966). “[T]he fact of [injury-in-fact] is what gives a person standing to seek judicial review under the statute, but once review is properly invoked, that person may argue the public interest in support of his claim that the agency has failed to comply with its statutory mandate.” Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 737 , 92 S.Ct. at 1367 . There appears no reason to conclude from the generality of the legal interest that FAIR asserts that FAIR’S members do not fall within the relevant zone of interest.
II.
I address briefly the defendants’ remaining arguments for why FAIR’S claims are non-justiciable, which rely on constitutional standing concerns and the political-question doctrine. 5
Constitutional standing. A plaintiff presents a justiciable “ease or controversy” under Article III only if the plaintiff meets three constitutional standing requirements. First, the plaintiff’s “injury in fact” must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; second, that injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and third, the judicial relief requested must be likely to redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 , 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-37 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
FAIR alleges in its complaint that, according to INS statistics, 75% of Cuban immigrants in 1991 to 1993 stated that they intended to settle in the Miami area. FAIR recites that, between 1970 and 1990, the foreign-born population of the Miami area increased by 568,000, whereas the native-born population increased by only 100,000. Based on the experiences of FAIR’S members with past immigration, FAIR contends that its members who reside in the Miami area will suffer harm in four respects: (1) their children’s public schools will become even more overcrowded; (2) local public medical facilities will become even less efficient and accessible; (3) local police protection will be even further diluted; and (4) employment opportunities will be even further diminished. In each instance, FAIR has provided specific examples of alleged injuries of this nature suffered by its members.
At the pleading stage, FAIR has sufficiently alleged injury in fact. 6 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561 , 112 S.Ct. at 2137 (“At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice_”). Its claimed injuries are quite concrete, and they are particularized because they are confined to the Miami area. Although FAIR’S allegations of injury draw on experience from past *908 Cuban migration, “past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 , 94 S.Ct. 669, 676 , 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); see also International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798, 803 (D.C.Cir.1985). Of course, the alleged injuries to the Miami area from the special Cuban migrant program may never occur, cf. David Card, The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market, 43 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 245 (1990), and the defendants may contest FAIR’S showing of injury in fact at the summary-judgment stage. 7
The district court concluded that FAIR could establish neither causation nor redress-ability. First, the court reasoned that “[t]here are simply too many independent variables in the chain of causation linking defendants’ actions with plaintiffs injuries.” Federation of Am. Immigration Reform v. Reno, 897 F.Supp. 595, 604 (D.D.C.1995). The court pointed in particular to the uncertainty whether the Cuban migrants will choose to settle in the Miami area and to the possibility that “plaintiffs injuries could be abated by actions of the political branches of the Florida government.” Id. Second, the court denied that the relief sought would redress FAIR’S members’ injuries because the defendants could admit the Cuban migrants into the United States through alternative methods that would result in the same injuries. Alternatively, if the defendants were unable to fulfill their obligations under the joint communiqué, the Cuban government might react by lifting emigration restrictions, which could potentially result in even greater injury to FAIR’S members. Id. at 605 .
In deciding whether the injury caused by the migration of Cubans to the Miami area is fairly traceable to the defendants’ actions, the court must ask whether “the third party’s conduct is sufficiently dependent upon the incentives provided by the defendant’s action.” Wilderness Soc’y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 17 (D.C.Cir.1987). When a defendant’s action is “the primary factor enabling” the third-party action harmful to the plaintiff, the causation element of standing is satisfied. 8 Id. Under Griles , the defendants’ (allegedly unlawful) admission of the special Cuban migrants into the United States is the “primary factor enabling” them to settle in the Miami area: without the defendants’ actions, none of the special Cuban migrants would enter the country. 9 The speculative possibility that local governments might alleviate the injuries to FAIR’S members is not germane to the standing inquiry; FAIR’S chain of causation does not rely upon any actions to be taken by local governments, and FAIR is not required “to negate the kind of speculative and hypothetical possibilities suggested.” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78 , 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2633 , 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978).
FAIR also satisfies the redressability element of standing. The defendants now contend, curiously, that declaratory and injunc-tive relief against the Cuban parole program *909 would be ineffectual because the government could simply admit the Cuban migrants through alternative, lawful means. By contrast, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, declared under penalty of perjury to the district court that “[wjithout the use of section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, it would be virtually impossible for the United States to comply with its legal obligations under the September 9 migration agreement.” Declaration of Michael Skol ¶ 10 (Jan. 30, 1995). In its complaint, FAIR alleges that “the Defendants cannot lawfully admit [the special Cuban migrants] into the United States.” Cmplt. ¶38. Because, the court must accept FAIR’S allegations as true, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 , 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), and the defendants identify no alternative legal procedure for admitting the special Cuban migrants, FAIR’S members’ alleged injuries are re-dressable by the judicial relief that FAIR requests. The defendants’ assertion that judicial relief would be unavailing because the Cuban government would take actions that would lead to even larger numbers of Cubans coming to the United States is speculative and is belied by current United States policy, which is to interdict Cuban refugees at sea and not allow them to enter the United States. See The President’s News Conference (Aug. 19, 1994), 30 Weekly Comp. PRES. DoCS. 1682, 1683 (Aug. 22, 1994).
Political question doctrine. To identify non-justiciable political questions, the court must ask:
“(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of Government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?”
Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1511 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 , 100 S.Ct. 533, 534 , 62 L.Ed.2d 428 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 , 82 S.Ct. 691, 710 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
The sensitive immigration context in which FAIR’S claims arise counsels caution, but not complete judicial abnegation of jurisdiction. There is no “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,” as would be required to conclude that FAIR’S complaint presented a political question. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217 , 82 S.Ct. at 710 . As this court stated in Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C.Cir.1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 1 , 108 S.Ct. 252 , 98 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987):
The Executive has broad discretion over the admission and exclusion of aliens, but that discretion is not boundless. It extends only as far as the statutory authority conferred by Congress and may not transgress constitutional limitations. It is the duty of the courts, in cases properly before them, to say where those statutory and constitutional boundaries lie.
See also Ukrainian-American Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Baker, 893 F.2d 1374, 1380 (D.C.Cir.1990) (concluding that a First Amendment challenge to the government’s asylum procedures did not present a political question). Despite the sovereign character of immigration decisions, see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 , 97 S.Ct. 1473, 1477-78 , 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977), they are subject to judicial review.
The district court ruled correctly that FAIR’S claims did not present a non-justicia-ble political question. 897 F.Supp. at 601-03 . As the district court noted, the Supreme Court’s decision in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221 , 106 S.Ct. 2860 , 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986), “is remarkably similar to the instant case.” 897 F.Supp. at 603 . In Japan Whaling, the United States entered into an executive agreement with the government of Japan regarding whale-harvesting quotas, and the plaintiffs challenged the Secretary of Commerce’s failure to “certify” Japan under a statute providing for penalties against nations that did not comply with more restrictive quotas. The Supreme Court rejected the government’s contention that the case presented a political question, stating that “the challenge to the Secretary’s decision not to certify Japan ... presents a purely legal question of statutory interpretation.” 478 *910 U.S. at 230 , 106 S.Ct. at 2866 . The plaintiffs in both cases claim that the Executive Branch, pursuant to an executive agreement with a foreign nation, violated a congressional statute. 10 The interpretation of § 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA is well within the area of judicial expertise.
Because FAIR’S complaint raises only statutory questions, there are “judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it,” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 , 82 S.Ct. at 710 , in the text of the statute itself, as well as in accompanying regulations adopted by the Attorney General, 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1996). Admittedly, the scope of judicial review is limited: “The unusually broad Congressional power over the admission of aliens into the United States is reflected in the narrow construction by courts of their own power to review the discretionary decisions of the Attorney General made pursuant to authority delegated to him [or her] by Congress.” Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 212 (2d Cir.1982); see also Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 976-77 (11th Cir.1984) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 , 105 S.Ct. 2992 , 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985). But even though “the Attorney General has broad discretion to grant or deny parole,” that discretion “is not unlimited.” Moret v. Karn, 746 F.2d 989, 991 (3d Cir.1984). Therefore, FAIR’S complaint does not present any non-justiciable political questions.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand the case to the district court.
. The United States government has undertaken in its agreement with Cuba to admit a minimum of 20,000 Cubans into the United States each year, not including immediate relatives of United States citizens. The government has estimated that about 3,000 Cuban migrants would arrive as immigrants, about 7,000 as refugees, and about 10,000 as parolees. Statement of Doris Meiss-ner, Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Serv., transcript at 15 (Sep. 9, 1994).
.The court concludes, Maj. Op. at 903-04, that the parole provision does not have an "integral relationship” with the limitations on immigration in INA §§ 201-203, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153 . Cf. Air Courier Conference v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 530 , 111 S.Ct. 913, 921 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1125 (1991). I agree that it does not avail FAIR to be within the zone of interest for specific limitations on immigration that are not at issue, such as the limits on immigrants capable of performing labor for which qualified workers are unavailable in the United States, INA § 203(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (b)(3). On the other hand, the Attorney General’s parole authority does bear an "integral relationship” to the limitations on immigration as a whole. Just as in Clarke , in which the section of the statute under which the plaintiff sought relief was "a limited exception to the otherwise applicable requirement” of another section of the statute, 479 U.S. at 401 , 107 S.Ct. at 758 , the Attorney General's parole authority is a limited exception to the general restrictions on immigration.
. Senate Report No. 132 accompanied the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359. The quoted passages can also be found in identical form in a Senate report from the previous Congress accompanying a similar bill that was not enacted into law. S.Rep. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1983).
. The court distinguishes the application of the zone-of-interests test to environmental statutes on the ground that anti-conservation groups tire politically more powerful than pro-immigration groups. Maj. Op. at 902. Standing to sue, however, does not depend on the likelihood of agency "capture” by opposed interest groups. FAIR’S *907 members fall within the zone of interests of the limitations on the Attorney General's parole authority regardless whether she acts out of her sense of the public interest or at the behest of interest groups favoring Cuban immigration.
. In addition, the defendants contend that the federal courts lack jurisdiction over FAIR'S claims because they fall within the exceptions to judicial reviewability under § 10 of the APA for when "statutes preclude judicial review” and when "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a). Reviewa-bility under the APA is generally not a jurisdictional matter but rather a question of “[wjhether a cause of action exists.” Air Courier Conference v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517 , 523 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 913 , 917 n. 3, 112 L.Ed.2d 1125 (1991). The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and denied as moot defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). In this dissenting opinion I need address the issue of standards permitting judicial review only in connection with the political question doctrine. See infra.
. The defendants maintain, citing Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137 , 59 S.Ct. 366, 369 , 83 L.Ed. 543 (1939), that the injuries suffered by FAIR'S members are not legally cognizable. The legal-interest test, however, was laid to rest by the Supreme Court in 1970. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 , 90 S.Ct. 827, 829 , 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970).
. The defendants assert that the parolees in the Cuban parole program will have different characteristics from past Cuban immigrants. If that is so, the defendants will have the opportunity to establish that fact at summary judgment.
. The district court relied on our decision in Von Aulock v. Smith, 720 F.2d 176, 180-85 (D.C.Cir.1983). In that case, the court denied standing because it concluded that third parties would have taken the identical actions regardless of the defendant's conduct. Von Aulock is distinguishable because the special Cuban migrants would not enter the United States but for the defendants’ parole program.
. Recently, in Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C.Cir.1996, in banc), in which the plaintiffs sought to set aside a rule-making granting a tax credit to a certain ethanol-fuel mixture because the Secretary of the Treasury prepared an environmental impact statement assertedly required under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing "both because of the uncertainty of several individual links and because of the number of speculative links that must hold for the chain to connect the challenged acts to the asserted particularized injury.” Assuming the validity of the court's conclusion in that case, but see id. at 1, at 904 (Rogers, J., dissenting), however, the causal relationship that FAIR alleges is more direct than in the case of a tax incentive, and the pattern of past Cuban migration to the Miami area makes it highly likely that many of the special Cuban migrants will settle there. Furthermore, the instant case remains at the pleading stage.
. The defendants attempt to distinguish Japan Whaling on the ground that the plaintiffs in that case sought a writ of mandamus, whereas FAIR seeks a prohibitory injunction under the APA. This is a distinction without significance, as far as the political question doctrine goes; if anything, the less intrusive nature of the relief that FAIR seeks makes its claims even less problematic.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9843173. Public record. Not legal advice.