# Rogers v. Tennessee > Supreme Court of the United States · May 14, 2001 · 532 U.S. 451 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842163 ## Case - **Full name:** Rogers v. Tennessee - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** May 14, 2001 - **Citations:** 532 U.S. 451; 121 S. Ct. 1693; 149 L. Ed. 2d 697; 2001 U.S. LEXIS 3519 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Stevens - **Judges:** Scalia, O'Connor, Stevens, Thomas, Breyer - **Cited by:** 544 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842163 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that ex post facto analysis of judicial decisions must be conducted under the Due Process Clause and that retroactive application of judicial interpretation does not’ violate due process unless the change was “ ‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which… - stating that the Ex Post Facto Clause principles cannot strictly be applied to the common law, but concluding that "a judicial alteration of a common law doctrine of criminal law violates the principle of fair warning, and hence must not be given retroactive effect ... [when] … - holding that the “retroactive application of judicial interpretations of criminal statutes” violates the due process right to fair notice only when such application is “unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue” … - concluding "that a judicial alteration of a common law doctrine ofcriminal law violates the principle of fair warning, and hence must not be given retroactive effect, only where it is `unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the co… - holding that the retroactive application of a judicial decision abolishing the common law "year and a day” rule was not an ex post facto violation because that constitutional clause applies to legislative acts — black letter law— not to judicial decisionmaking ## Opinion text Justice Stevens, dissenting. While I have joined Justice Scaua’s entire dissent, I must add this brief caveat. The perception that common-law judges had no power to change the law was unquestionably an important aspect of our judicial heritage in the 17th century but, as he has explained, that perception has played a role of diminishing importance in later years. Whether the most significant changes in that perception occurred before the end of the 18th century or early in the 19th century is, in my judgment, a tangential question that need not be resolved in order to decide this case correctly. For me, far more important than the historical issue is the fact that the majority has undervalued the threat to liberty that is posed whenever the criminal law is changed retroactively. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842163. Public record. Not legal advice.