# Penry v. Lynaugh > Supreme Court of the United States · June 26, 1989 · 492 U.S. 302 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842110 ## Case - **Full name:** Penry v. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 26, 1989 - **Citations:** 492 U.S. 302; 57 U.S.L.W. 4958; 109 S. Ct. 2934; 106 L. Ed. 2d 256; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3148 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Stevens - **Judges:** O'Connor, Iv-A, Ii-B, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Ii-A, Rehnquist, White, Scalia, Kennedy, Iv-C - **Cited by:** 2,195 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Red flag:** Overruled on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). - Negative treatments: 3 - Distinguished by: 4 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842110 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that “evidence about the defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less… - stating evidence about the defendants background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems may be less culpable t… - holding that the purpose of mitigating evidence is to ensure that the jury “treat[s] the defendant as a ‘uniquely individual human bein[g]’ and has made a reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence” (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S… - holding, in reviewing a case tried in March of 1980, that “evidence about the defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to … - stating that by 14 early 1986 "it was clear from Lockett and Eddings" that the Constitution prohibited a State from "prevent[ing] the sentencer from considering and giving effect to evidence relevant to the defendant’s background or character or to the circumstances of the off… ## Opinion text Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. As I stated in my separate opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 318-319 , and n. 2 (1989), it is neither logical nor prudent to consider a rule’s retroactive application before the rule itself is articulated. Nor am I at all sure that courts should decide the retroactivity issue if it was not raised below. Cf. Zant v. Moore, 489 U. S. 836, 837 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Finally, I do not support the Court’s assertion, without benefit of argument or briefing on the issue, that Teague's retroactivity principles pertain to capital cases. Cf. Teague, 489 U. S., at 321 , and n. 3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But assuming, arguendo, that those principles do apply, it is clear that the Court’s discussion of the mitigating evidence question, with which I agree, does not establish a “new rule” *350 as that term is used for retroactivity purposes. I thus join Parts I, II-B, and III. In Part IV-A the Court decides that a rule that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a mentally retarded person ought to apply retroactively. Assuming retroactivity is pertinent, I agree that the first exception to Justice Harlan’s nonretroactivity doctrine “should be understood to cover not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense,” ante, at 330, and that this claim lies within that exception. * The remaining sections of Part IV adequately and fairly state the competing arguments respecting capital punishment of mentally retarded persons. In my judgment, however, that explication — particularly the summary of the arguments advanced in the Brief for American Association on Mental Retardation et al. as Amici Curiae, ante, at 336-337 — compels the conclusion that such executions are unconstitutional. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety. Because I believe that retroactivity should not be considered until after a right is established, see Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 318-319 , and n. 2 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), the Court’s rejection of this claim ordinarily would preclude me from agreeing even for purposes of argument that the rule Penry seeks may be applied retroactively. I do so here because the Court has fleshed out the merits of Penry’s claim sufficiently to allow me to reach a contrary conclusion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842110. Public record. Not legal advice.