# Jett v. Dallas Independent School District

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 22, 1989 · 491 U.S. 701

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842105

## Case

- **Full name:** Jett v. Dallas Independent School District
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 22, 1989
- **Citations:** 491 U.S. 701; 57 U.S.L.W. 4858; 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 27; 50 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 39,070; 109 S. Ct. 2702; 105 L. Ed. 2d 598; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3130
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Scalia
- **Judges:** O'Connor, Scalia, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens
- **Cited by:** 2,069 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Reported abrogated by statute, as recognized in Moonblatt v. District of Columbia — not on the Supreme Court's list.
- Negative treatments: 2
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842105

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that Monell liability under a “practice or custom” theory requires showing that the decisions of “those officials who have the power to make official policy on a particular issue . . . caused the deprivation of rights at issue . . . by acquiescence in a longstandin…
- holding that because the “express ‘action at law” provided by § 1983 ... provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for [a] violation of the rights guaranteed by § 1981”, plaintiff “must show that the violation of his ‘right to make contracts’ protected by § 1981 was caused…
- recognizing that for plaintiff to succeed on § 1981 race-discrimination claim brought under § 1983, he “must show that the violation of his ‘right to make contracts’ protected by § 1981 was caused by a custom or policy within the meaning of Monell and subsequent cases”
- stating that, “[r]eviewing the relevant legal materials, including state 25 and local positive law, as well as custom or usage having the force of law, the trial judge must identify those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority”
- holding that section 1981 can provide no broader remedy against a state actor than section 1983 and that therefore a plaintiff bringing such a claim must show custom or policy within the meaning of Monell, cited infra, just as the section 1983 plaintiff would

## Opinion text

Justice Scalia,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I and IV of the Court’s opinion, and Part III except insofar as it relies upon legislative history. To hold that the more general provisions of 42 U. S. C. § 1981 establish a mode of liability for a particular category of offense by municipalities that is excluded from the closely related statute ( 42 U. S. C. § 1983 ) which deals more specifically with that precise category of offense would violate the rudimen *739 tary principles of construction that the specific governs the general, and that, where text permits, statutes dealing with similar subjects should be interpreted harmoniously.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842105. Public record. Not legal advice.