# Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 29, 1988 · 487 U.S. 977

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842097

## Case

- **Full name:** Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 29, 1988
- **Citations:** 487 U.S. 977; 56 U.S.L.W. 4922; 46 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 38,065; 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 102; 108 S. Ct. 2777; 101 L. Ed. 2d 827; 1988 U.S. LEXIS 3035
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Stevens
- **Judges:** O'Connor, Stevens, O'Connorí, Ii-A, Ii-B, Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Scaliaj, Ii-C, Scalia, Black-Mun, Stevens-, Kennedy
- **Cited by:** 1,212 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842097

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that, to establish a prima facie case under Title VII, “[o]nce the employment practice at issue has been identified, causation must be proved; that is, the plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in questio…
- stating that one of the reasons that disparate impact analysis should be applicable to subjective employment criteria as well as objective criteria is that “even if one assumed that any such discrimination can be adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis, the pro…
- concluding that subjective employment practices may be analyzed under the disparate-impact approach of Title VII because they “may be said to ‘adversely affect [an individual’s] status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin’ ”
- explaining that a legitimate business purpose might be related to " ‘the employer's legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy workmanship’ " (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975))
- explaining that "the necessary _____ premise of the disparate impact approach is that some employment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination"

## Opinion text

Justice Stevens,
concurring in the judgment.
The question we granted certiorari to decide, though extremely important, is also extremely narrow. It reads as follows:
“Is the racially adverse impact of an employer’s practice of simply committing employment decisions to the unchecked discretion of a white supervisory corps subject to the test of Griggs vs. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971)?” Pet. for Cert. i.
Essentially for the reasons set forth in Parts II-A and II-B of Justice O’Connor’s opinion, I agree that this question must be answered in the affirmative. At this stage of the proceeding, however, I believe it unwise to announce a “fresh” interpretation of our prior cases applying disparate-impact analysis to objective employment criteria. See ante, at 994. Cases in which a Title VII plaintiff challenges an employer’s practice of delegating certain kinds of decisions to the subjective discretion of its executives will include too many variables to be adequately discussed in an opinion that does not focus on a particular factual context. I would therefore postpone any further discussion of the evidentiary standards set forth in our prior cases until after the District Court has made appropriate findings concerning this plaintiff’s prima facie evidence of disparate impact and this defendant’s explanation for its practice of giving supervisors discretion in making certain promotions.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842097. Public record. Not legal advice.