# Miller v. Fenton

> Supreme Court of the United States · December 3, 1985 · 474 U.S. 104

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842070

## Case

- **Full name:** MILLER v. FENTON, SUPERINTENDENT, RAHWAY STATE PRISON, Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** December 3, 1985
- **Citations:** 474 U.S. 104; 54 U.S.L.W. 4022; 106 S. Ct. 445; 88 L. Ed. 2d 405; 1985 U.S. LEXIS 144
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Rehnquist
- **Judges:** BREnnan, Burgee, Connor, Marshall, O'ConnOR, Rehnquist, White
- **Cited by:** 1,483 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842070

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding "assessments of credibility and demeanor” are "not crucial” to deciding voluntariness of confession; relevant inquiry is "whether the techniques for extracting the statements ... are compati ble with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will n…
- recognizing that "certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation, or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"
- holding Ochoa - 30 that under the due process clause, “certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned”
- holding that the voluntariness of a confession is not a factual issue entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), but is a legal question meriting independent consideration in a federal habeas corpus proceeding
- explaining that the “appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law has been, to say the least, elusive” and that the difficulty is compounded by considerations of allocation and judicial efficiency

## Opinion text

Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting.
The Court decides that the voluntariness of a confession is not an issue of fact presumed to be correct under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (d). I think it is difficult to sensibly distinguish the determination that a particular confession was voluntary from the determinations which we have held to be entitled to a presumption of correctness under § 2254(d). See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539 (1981); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U. S. 591 (1982) (per curiam); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 431-437 (1983); Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U. S. 111 (1983) (per curiam); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U. S. 114 (1983) (per curiam); Patton v. Yount, 467 U. S. 1025, 1036-1038 (1984); and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412, 426-430 (1985). While the Court relies principally on stare decisis for the result it reaches today, almost all the cases upon which it relies entailed direct review by this Court of state-court decisions *119 rather than federal habeas review. But even if that difference were deemed immaterial, it seems to me that stare deci-sis is not a sufficient reason for excluding a finding as to the voluntariness of a confession from the presumption embodied in § 2254(d). All of the recent cases cited evince a more reasoned approach to this issue than the interesting but somewhat mystical exegesis in cases such as Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 603-605 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
I also disagree with the Court’s decision to remand this case to the Court of Appeals for a second run at the voluntariness issue. I think the majority of that court made it clear that it had evaluated the admissibility of the confession under the correct standard as defined by this Court today. It is unfortunate that petitioner’s challenge to his conviction for a murder which occurred 12 years ago should be the subject of additional and unnecessary litigation and delay.
I respectfully dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842070. Public record. Not legal advice.