# Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 18, 1979 · 442 U.S. 560

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842029

## Case

- **Full name:** TOUCHE ROSS & CO. v. REDINGTON, TRUSTEE, Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 18, 1979
- **Citations:** 442 U.S. 560; 99 S. Ct. 2479; 61 L. Ed. 2d 82; 1979 U.S. LEXIS 115
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Brennan
- **Judges:** Retinquist, Rehnqttist, Btjrger, Bkennan, Stewakt, White, Blackmtjn, Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Powell
- **Cited by:** 1,753 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842029

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that (1) when Congress intended to provide a private remedy under a particular statute, it knew how to do so and did so expressly; and (2) when the principal express civil remedy for a particular statutory violation was limited in scope, the Court is “extremely relucta…
- finding that “the statute by its terms, grants no private rights to any identifiable class and proscribes no conduct as unlawful ... [a]t least in such a case as this, the inquiry ends there ... and the question whether Congress intended to create a private right of action, [i…
- finding no private cause of action for statute “flanked by provisions of the [act] that explicitly grant private causes of action” and noting that “when Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly”
- stating that “[t]he central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action” and that the remaining three factors are “traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent.”
- explaining that merely because “a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person.” (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979))

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Brennan,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion. The Court of Appeals implied a cause of action for damages under § 17 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78q (a), in favor of respondents, who purport to represent customers of a bankrupt brokerage firm, against petitioner accounting firm, which allegedly injured those customers by improperly preparing and certifying the reports on the brokerage firm required by § 17 (a) and the rules promulgated thereunder. Under the tests established in our prior cases, no cause of action should be implied for respondents under § 17 (a). Although analyses of the several factors outlined in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), may often overlap, I agree that when, as here, a statute clearly *580 does not “create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff,” id., at 78 , i. e., when the plaintiff is not “ 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted/ ” ibid., quoting Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 39 (1916), and when there is also in the legislative history no “indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, ... to create such a remedy,” 422 U. S., at 78 , the remaining two Cort factors cannot by themselves be a basis for implying a right of action.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842029. Public record. Not legal advice.