# Lodge 76, International Ass'n of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 25, 1976 · 427 U.S. 132

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842013

## Case

- **Full name:** LODGE 76, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS & AEROSPACE WORKERS, AFL-CIO, Et Al. v. WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 25, 1976
- **Citations:** 427 U.S. 132; 96 S. Ct. 2548; 49 L. Ed. 2d 396; 1976 U.S. LEXIS 159
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Powell
- **Judges:** Brehnan, Brennan, Burger, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist
- **Cited by:** 516 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Disagreed with by Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076 (2006).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 2
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842013

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the “crucial inquiry” under Morton is “whether the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate effective implementation of the [NLRA]’s processes” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that, by regulating certain forms of economic pressure used during labor disputes but not others, Congress expressed a clear intent to leave other economic weapons free from federal or state regulation
- holding that a Wisconsin employment relations board could not find a refusal to work overtime, an action that did not violate the NLRA, an unfair labor practice
- stating that the states are not afforded flexibility in picking and choosing which economic devises of labor and management will be deemed unlawful
- holding that state or local regulations are preempted when they attempt to govern actions that Congress intended to leave unregulated

## Opinion text

Mr. Justice Powell,
with whom The Chief Justice joins, concurring.
The Court correctly identifies the critical inquiry with respect to pre-emption as whether “the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate effective implementation of the Act’s processes.” Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U. S. 369, 380 (1969). See ante, at 147-148.
This is equally true whether the self-help activities *156 are those of the employer or the Union. I agree with the Court that the Wisconsin law, as applied in this case, is pre-empted since it directly curtails the self-help capability of the Union and its members, resulting in a significant shift in the balance of free economic bargaining power struck by Congress. I write to make clear my understanding that the Court’s opinion does not, however, preclude the States from enforcing, in the context of a labor dispute, “neutral” state statutes or rules of decision: state laws that are not directed toward altering the bargaining positions of employers or unions but which may have an incidental effect on relative bargaining strength. Except where Congress has specifically provided otherwise, the States generally should remain free to enforce, for example, their law of torts or of contracts, and other laws reflecting neutral public policy. * See Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1337 , 1355-1356 (1972).
With this understanding, I join the opinion of the Court.
State laws should not be regarded as neutral if they reflect an accommodation of the special interests of employers, unions, or the public in areas such as employee self-organization, labor disputes, or collective bargaining.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9842013. Public record. Not legal advice.