# Chimel v. California

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 23, 1969 · 395 U.S. 752

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9841976

## Case

- **Full name:** Chimel v. California
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 23, 1969
- **Citations:** 395 U.S. 752; 89 S. Ct. 2034; 23 L. Ed. 2d 685; 1969 U.S. LEXIS 1166
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Harlan
- **Judges:** Stewakt, Harlan, White, Black
- **Cited by:** 5,373 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Reported overruled in part by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) — not on the Supreme Court's list.
- Negative treatments: 5
- Distinguished by: 14
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9841976

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 [1967], does not apply to electronic surveillance conducted prior to the decision in that case
- holding that Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 [1967], does not apply to electronic surveillance conducted prior to the decision in that case
- concluding that it is "reasonable" for an arresting officer to search "the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon" because "[a] gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one conceale…
- holding that where a search is conducted pursuant to a lawful arrest, “[t]here is ample justification … for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ – construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a w…
- explaining when an arrest is made “[t]here is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’— construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evide…

## Opinion text

*769 Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion with these remarks concerning a factor to which the Court has not alluded.
The only thing that has given me pause in voting to overrule Harris and Rabinowitz is that as a result of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), and Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963), every change in Fourth Amendment law must now be obeyed by state officials facing widely different problems of local law enforcement. We simply do not know the extent to which cities and towns across the Nation are prepared to administer the greatly expanded warrant system which will be required by today’s decision; nor can we say with assurance that in each and every local situation, the warrant requirement plays an essential role in the protection of those fundamental liberties protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, one is now faced with the dilemma, envisioned in my separate opinion in Ker, 374 U. S., at 45-46 , of choosing between vindicating sound Fourth Amendment principles at the possible expense of state concerns, long recognized to be consonant with the Fourteenth Amendment before Mapp and Ker came on the books, or diluting the Federal Bill of Rights in the interest of leaving the States at least some elbow room in their methods of criminal law enforcement. No comparable dilemma exists, of course, with respect to the impact of today’s decision within the federal system itself.
This federal-state factor has not been an easy one for me to resolve, but in the last analysis I cannot in good conscience vote to perpetuate bad Fourth Amendment law.
I add only that this case, together with Benton v. Maryland, post, p. 784, North Carolina v. Pearce, ante, p. 711, and Simpson v. Rice, ante, p. 711, all decided *770 today, serve to point up, as few other cases have, the profound changes that the “incorporation doctrine” has wrought both in the workings of our federal system and upon the adjudicative processes of this Court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9841976. Public record. Not legal advice.
