# Rosetta Davis v. Department of Agriculture

> Merit Systems Protection Board · September 1, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9837919

## Case

- **Court:** Merit Systems Protection Board
- **Decided:** September 1, 2023
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ROSETTA BEATRICE DAVIS, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, DC-0752-21-0127-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DATE: September 1, 2023
Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

James L. Fuchs, Esquire, Baltimore, Maryland, for the appellant.

Shirley Pointer, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
reversed the agency removal action. For the reasons discussed below, we
GRANT the agency’s petition for review. We AFFIRM the initial decision’s
findings that the appellant failed to prove her affirmative defenses and MODIFY
the administrative judge’s analysis of the affirmative defenses to address

1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

subsequent case law. We REVERSE the initial decision as to the removal action
and SUSTAIN the appellant’s removal for medical inability to perform her job
duties.

BACKGROUND
¶2 At the time of her removal, the appellant was employed as a GS-12 Program
and Management Analyst in the agency’s Farm Production and Conservation
(FPAC) Business Center. 2 Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 13. Beginning in
April 2018 and continuing through the effective date of her removal on
November 22, 2019, the appellant failed to regularly report to duty. IAF, Tab 11
at 53-58. During that period, the appellant submitted notes from her treating
physicians identifying her medical conditions and treatment. Id. at 61-76.
Specifically, in a letter dated May 17, 2018, a doctor requested that the appellant
be excused from work through May 20, 2018. Id. at 61. In a letter dated May 22,
2018, a medical note indicated that she had a medical evaluation that day. Id.
at 62. By a letter dated June 14, 2018, she was treated by her psychiatrist for
anxiety and panic disorder due to a “severe anxiety attack as a result of on -going
harassment by management,” and was identified as “totally incapacitated” and
excused from work through July 14, 2018. Id. at 64-65. In a letter dated July 12,
2018, her physician noted that she was undergoing treatment and additional
testing for a concussion she sustained on May 16, 2018, and that she was “on full
disability until further notice.” Id. at 69.
¶3 On August 7, 2018, the appellant requested that her leave be designated as
protected under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), citing the
July 14, 2018 letter. Id. at 78. Although the record is unclear, it appears that the
2
As the administrative judge observed, at some point during the events at issue in this
appeal the agency underwent a reorganization and the appellant’s position was
realigned from a GS-12 Program Specialist in the Farm Service Agency (FSA) to a
GS-12 Program and Management Analyst in FPAC Business Center , Office of the Chief
Operating Officer, Homeland Security Division. IAF, Tab 31, Initial Decision (ID)
at 15-16; compare IAF, Tab 1 at 13, with IAF, Tab 11 at 28-38.
3

appellant’s request was granted and she was on FMLA -protected leave from
August 7 through October 31, 2018. See id. at 18, 53. On October 23, 2018,
while on FMLA, the appellant requested full-time telework to accommodate her
conditions and indicated that she would provide medical documentation to
support her request. Id. at 81. The appellant provided a letter dated October 24,
2018, from her psychiatrist stating that she was being treated for chronic anxiety
disorder as result of harassment and retaliation while at work, and that she could
return to work “providing the conditions of her work environment are free of
harassment and hostility,” as well as a letter from her physician dated October 25,
2018, stating that she was still undergoing treatment for a concussion, and that he
could not provide a “confirmed date or type of recovery.” Id. at 72, 74, 80. The
agency subsequently engaged in the interactive process, and on December 4,
2018, offered the appellant an accommodation of 1 telework day per week,
concluding that granting the appellant’s requested accommodation of full -time
telework would require removal of the essential functions of her position. Id.
at 83-88, 98-100. On December 11, 2018, the appellant rejected the offered
reasonable accommodation. Id. at 91. The appellant and the agency’s reasonable
accommodations coordinator continued to engage in the interactive process over
the following 3 months, but the efforts ultimately proved fruitless. See id.
at 114-75. Throughout this time, the appellant continued to utilize extensive
leave. Id. at 53, 55, 57.
¶4 On May 3, 2019, the agency agreed to conduct a series of three job searches
for a position within the appellant’s medical restrictions to which she could be
reassigned, which it identified as the accommodation of “last resort.” Id.
at 177-78, 192-202. After the third and final job search did not produce any
vacant positions for which the appellant qualified, on October 1, 2019, the agency
informed the appellant that it had fulfilled its legal obligations in its effort to
accommodate her medical restrictions. IAF, Tab 22 at 150. By that time, the
4

appellant had accrued over 1,400 hours of leave without pay (LWOP). See IAF,
Tab 11 at 54.
¶5 By a letter dated October 11, 2019, the agency proposed to remove the
appellant from her position based on her inability to report for duty and perform
the full scope of her job duties. Id. at 17-21. The agency did not specifically
label the underlying charge in the proposal letter. Id. Nevertheless, the agency
stated in the proposal that “[s]ince, on or about, April 23, 2018, you have been
unable to report for duty on a full-time regular basis due to a medical condition.”
Id. at 17. The proposal also listed some of the essential job duties of the
appellant’s position and noted that they were required to be complet ed in person
and could not be performed remotely. Id. The proposal further identified the
medical documentation the appellant had provided , recounted the agency’s efforts
to accommodate her conditions, stated her absence had “no foreseeable end,” and
noted that others had taken on the additional burden of fulfilling her duties . Id.
at 17-20. The proposal provided the appellant with the opportunity to respond
orally or in writing. Id. at 20.
¶6 After the appellant failed to respond to the proposal orally or in writing, see
id. at 23, on November 13, 2019, the deciding official issued a decision sustaining
the appellant’s removal from her position and from Federal service , id. at 23-26.
The decision reiterated that the appellant was being removed from service “based
on [her] inability to report to duty and to perform the full scope of duties of [her]
officially assigned position,” noting that the provided medical documentation
indicated that she had been “unavailable for duty since April 23, 2018, for
compelling reasons beyond [her] control,” and that the submitted medical
documentation stated that there was no foreseeable end in sight to her absences,
and her condition “precludes [her] from performing the essential duties of [her]
position on a full-time regular basis.” Id. at 23. The decision also stated that
removal promoted the efficiency of the service and that a lesser action would be
inadequate. Id. at 23-24.
5

¶7 After exhausting the agency’s equal employment opportunity (EEO)
complaint process, the appellant timely filed the instant Board appeal. IAF,
Tab 1, Tab 5 at 15. The appellant raised affirmative defenses of disability
discrimination based on disparate treatment and a failure to accommodate theory,
and reprisal for protected EEO activity. IAF, Tab 19 at 7-12, 17-24.
¶8 After the appellant withdrew her hearing request, IAF, Tab 6, the
administrative judge issued an initial decision based on the written record,
reversing the agency removal action, IAF, Tab 31, Initial Decision (ID) at 3, 19.
Specifically, the administrative judge concluded that the charge that supported the
appellant’s removal was essentially an excessive absences charg e, and that to
prove the charge the agency had to establish, among other things, that it warned
the appellant that adverse action could be taken unless she returned to duty. ID
at 7 (citing Schultz v. United States Navy, 810 F.2d 1133, 1137 (Fed Cir. 1987)).
Based on her review of the record, the administrative judge concluded that there
was no evidence that the agency gave the appellant any such warning, and so the
agency failed to meet its burden of proving the charge. ID at 8-10. Because the
agency failed to meet its burden of proving the sole charge, she reversed the
removal action. ID at 19. She also concluded that the appellant failed to prove
any of her affirmative defenses. ID at 10-19.
¶9 The agency has filed a petition for review arguing that the administrative
judge erroneously reframed the agency’s medical inability charge as a charge of
excessive absences. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 10-14.
Alternatively, it argues that it met its burden of proving the excessive absences
charge. Id. at 14-17. The agency has also certified its compliance with the
administrative judge’s interim relief order. Id. at 17, 27-28. The appellant has
responded to the petition for review. PFR File, Tab 3. The appellant has also
filed a supplemental pleading alleging that the agency failed to comply with the
administrative judge’s interim relief order. PFR File, Tab 4. Finally, the agency
filed a response to the appellant’s supplemental pleading reasserting that it has
6

complied with the administrative judge’s interim relief order, and the appellant
has replied to the agency’s response. PFR File, Tabs 5-6.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
The agency has complied with the administrative judge’s interim relief order.
¶10 When, as here, the appellant is the prevailing party in an initial decision
that grants interim relief, any petition or cross petition for review must be
accompanied by a certification that the agency has complied with the interim
relief order either by providing the required interim relief or by satisfying the
requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (B). In an appeal from an
adverse action that was reversed, the agency’s evidence must show, at a
minimum, that it has appointed the appellant to a position carrying the
appropriate title, grade, and rate of pay, effective the date of the initial decision.
Moore v. U.S. Postal Service, 78 M.S.P.R. 80, 83 (1998). If an agency files a
petition or cross petition for review and has not provided the interim relief
ordered, the appellant may request dismissal of the agency’s petiti on or cross
petition. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(d). In such circumstances, the Board has
discretion to dismiss the agency’s petition pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(e).
¶11 In the initial decision, the administrative judge ordered the agency to
provide interim relief to the appellant in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
§ 7701(b)(2)(A) in the event either party filed a petition for review. ID at 20.
The appellant argues that the agency failed to comply with the administrative
judge’s interim relief order because it failed to provide her with access to certain
agency equipment and systems and has refused to pay her back pay and
retroactive benefits, among other things. PFR File, Tab 3 at 15-17, Tab 4 at 4-10,
Tab 6 at 4-17. Consequently, she asks the Board to dismiss the agency’s petition
for review. PFR File, Tab 6 at 8-13.
¶12 However, the relief the appellant is requesting is full relief, not interim
relief, which she is not entitled to until a final decision has been rendered in her
7

favor. See Johnston v. Department of the Treasury, 100 M.S.P.R. 78, ¶ 25 (2005)
(noting that the purpose of interim relief is not to make the appellant whole at the
interim relief stage of the proceedings, but rather, to provide the limited relief of
5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A) during the pendency of the petition for review process);
Ginocchi v. Department of the Treasury, 53 M.S.P.R. 62, 71 n.6 (1992) (same);
Hall v. Department of the Interior, 90 M.S.P.R. 32, ¶ 9 (2001) (noting that an
agency is not required to pay an award of back pay before a decision is final);
5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(f) (stating that compliance with interim relief orders does
not require paying back pay for the period preceding the date of the initial
decision). Here, the agency has certified and provided evidence that it has
reinstated the appellant to her former position at her prior grade and pay level,
effective July 16, 2021, the date of the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 1 at 17,
27-28; Tab 5 at 8-11. The appellant has not challenged the agency’s certification
of her reinstatement. Accordingly, we find that the agency has provided the
interim relief required under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A) and we deny the
appellant’s motion to dismiss the agency’s petition for review. 3

The administrative judge applied an incorrect legal standard to the agency’s
charge.
¶13 On review, the agency argues that the administrative judge erred by
reframing the agency’s non-disciplinary charge of “Inability to Report for Duty
on Full-Time Basis Due to a Medical Condition,” as a disciplinary-based charge

3
To the extent the appellant is seeking to enforce the interim relief provisions of the
initial decision, we deny her request. See PFR File, Tab 3 at 16 (requesting the Board
to “expeditiously have the Agency enforce the [interim relief] Order, as written”). The
Board’s regulations do not allow for a petition for enforcement of an interim relief
order while an appeal is pending Board review; such petitions apply only to final Board
decisions. Sanders v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 144, ¶ 8 n.5,
aff’d, 625 F. App’x 549 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and overruled on other grounds by Haas v.
Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 36; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a)-(b). Upon
our issuance of this final Board order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
with the appropriate regional office if she still believes the agency has not provided full
interim relief. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(g).
8

of “excessive absences.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5, 10-14. It argues that the
removal proposal and decision letters clearly identified that the appellant’s
removal was based on her inability to work because of her medical condition, and
so the administrative judge erred by reframing the agency’s reason for removal as
being due to the appellant’s excessive absences. Id. at 10-12. The agency notes
that, unlike an excessive absences charge, in order to prove a charge based on
medical inability, it need only prove that a nexus exists between the appellant’s
medical conditions and the observed deficiencies in her performance or conduct,
or a high possibility, given the nature of the work involved, that the appellant’s
condition may result in harm to herself or others, or more succinctly, that the
appellant’s medical condition prevented her from being able to safely and
efficiently perform the core duties of her position. Id. at 12 (citing Miller v.
Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 11 (2014); Clemens v. Department
of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 5 (2014)). If the administrative judge had
correctly analyzed the agency’s charge under the standard for medical inability
instead of the standard for excessive absences, the agency argues, she would have
determined that the agency met its burden of proving the charge. Id. at 12-14.
¶14 An agency is not required to affix a label to a charge. Otero v. U.S. Postal
Service, 73 M.S.P.R. 198, 202 (1997). Instead, it is simply required to state the
reasons for a proposed adverse action in sufficient detail to allow the employee to
make an informed reply. Id. Additionally, a charge must be viewed in light of
the accompanying specifications and circumstances and should not be technically
construed. Id.
¶15 As a general rule, an agency may not take an adverse action based on an
employee’s use of approved leave. Savage v. Department of the Army,
122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 30 (2015), overruled in part by Pridgen v. Office of
Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-25. However, an exception may
exist where the following criteria are met: (1) the employee was absent for
compelling reasons beyond her control so that agency approval or disapproval of
9

leave was immaterial because she could not be on the job; (2) the absences
continued beyond a reasonable time, and the agency warned the employee that an
adverse action could be taken unless she became available for duty on a regular
full-time or part-time basis; and (3) the agency showed that the position needed to
be filled by an employee available for duty on a regular, full-time or part-time
basis. Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 30; Cook v. Department of the Army,
18 M.S.P.R. 610, 611-12 (1984). This exception is applicable only under unusual
circumstances, i.e., where the employee is unable to return to duty because of the
continuing effects of illness or injury. Cook, 18 M.S.P.R. 610, 611-12.
¶16 Alternatively, an agency may remove an employee if she is unable, because
of a medical condition, to perform the duties of her position. Savage
122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 34. To establish a charge of “medical inability to perform”
based on a current medical condition, an agency must prove a nexus between the
employee’s medical condition and observed deficiencies in her performance or
conduct or a high probability, given the nature of the work involved, that her
condition may result in injury to herself or others. Fox v. Department of the
Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 25 (2014); see Haas v. Department of Homeland
Security, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 15 (recognizing this standard and comparing it with
the differing standard that applies in the context of an employee’s removal from a
position with medical standards based solely on their medical history). The
Board has otherwise described this standard as requiring that the agency establish
that the appellant’s medical condition prevents her from being able to safely and
efficiently perform the core duties of her position. Haas, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶¶ 15,
20. In determining whether an agency has met this burden, the Board will
consider whether a reasonable accommodation, short of reassignment, exists that
would enable the appellant to safely and efficiently perform her core duties. Id.,
¶ 25.
¶17 In the initial decision, the administrative judge determined that the agency’s
unlabeled charge should be treated as a charge of excessive absences and
10

analyzed it under this standard. ID at 7-10. She ultimately concluded that the
agency failed to meet its burden of proving the charge because it could not
demonstrate that it warned the appellant that an adverse action could be taken
unless she returned to duty. ID at 8-10 (citing Schultz, 810 F.2d at 1137).
¶18 Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the agency intended to
charge the appellant with medical inability to perform. We acknowledge that the
agency listed the dates she was absent and recited its conclusion as to why her
situation met what appear to be elements of an excessive absences charge. IAF,
Tab 11 at 17-20. For example, the agency alleged that she was “unavailable for
duty for compelling reasons beyond her control,” others were performing her
work, and “it is imperative that [her] position be filled” by someone who could
perform the essential duties. Id. at 19-20; see Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 30.
¶19 Nonetheless, we find that the administrative judge’s interpretation of the
proposal notice took an overly narrow view of the agency’s allegations, and that
the agency’s unlabeled narrative charge was instead a charge of medical inability
to perform. In a similar case, Edwards v. Department of Transportation,
109 M.S.P.R. 579, ¶¶ 13-14 (2008), disagreed with on other grounds by EEOC
Petition No. 0320080101, 2009 WL 1904988 (June 23, 2009), concurred in and
adopted by 112 M.S.P.R. 82 (2009), the Board disagreed with an administrative
judge’s interpretation of a charge labeled “unavailability for duty” as a charge of
excessive absences. The Board concluded that the agency effectively charged the
appellant with being medically unable to perform her duties because its focus was
on her apparent inability to perform her regular duties. Id., ¶ 14. To that end, the
agency discussed the appellant’s medical restrictions in the proposed notice of
removal and removal decision, repeatedly requested medical documentation from
the appellant concerning her ability to work, assessed that documentation, and
twice refused to permit the appellant to work when she attempted to do so. Id.
Put another way, the agency did not take its action based on the appellant’s past
absences, but rather due to her continuing inability to return to work. See Savage,
11

122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶¶ 33-34 (interpreting a charge of unavailability for duty as a
charge of medically inability to work on this basis).
¶20 As in Edwards, the proposal and decision letter here were focused on the
fact that the appellant’s medical restrictions prevented her from performing her
duties. IAF, Tab 11 at 17-26. The proposal letter stated that, based on the
medical documentation the appellant provided, she was “unable to complete the
essential functions of [her] position” for medical reasons, recited the history and
nature of her medical restrictions, detailed the agency’s attempts to provide
reasonable accommodation, and explained why her requested accommodation of
teleworking was inconsistent with the in-person nature of her duties. IAF, Tab 11
at 17-20; see Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶¶ 11-13, 25-30 (finding that an agency
proved its medical inability to perform charge when an employee’s absences had
a negative effect on her performance and the performance of her team); Ellshoff v.
Department of the Interior, 76 M.S.P.R. 54, 68 (1997) (recognizing that a charge
of inability to perform job duties is equivalent to a charge of medical incapacity) ;
cf. Thome v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 315, ¶¶ 17-22
(2015) (concluding that the agency misrepresented its charge as a
non-disciplinary “unavailability for duty” charge when it actually removed the
appellant for a disciplinary-based charge of refusal to return to full duty, where
agency officials repeatedly testified that they removed her because she “refused”
to return to full duty).
¶21 The decision letter similarly reiterates that the agency’s action was based on
the appellant being unavailable for duty for compelling medical-based reasons
beyond her control, noting that it was evident from the documentation she
submitted that her “medical condition precludes [her] from performing t he
essential duties of [her] position on a full-time regular basis,” and that based on
the medical documentation, there was no foreseeable end in sight to her absences.
IAF, Tab 11 at 23. Further, the appellant did not provide a response to the
proposal, so there is no evidence in the record indicating that she interpreted the
12

agency’s charge as anything other than one based on her medical inability to
perform her job duties. See Thome, 122 M.S.P.R. 315, ¶ 22 (examining an
employee’s reply to see whether she defended against a charge in determining
whether she received adequate notice of the charge).
¶22 We also reject the appellant’s argument that the agency waived its right to
challenge the administrative judge’s reframing of its medical inability charge as a
charge of excessive absences because the agency failed to object to the reframing
of the charge before the record closed below. PFR File, Tab 3 at 9; see IAF,
Tab 15 at 2 (close of record summary identifying the agency’s charge as
“essentially an ‘Excessive Absence’ charge” and setting forth the applicable legal
standard for such a charge). The order summarizing the close of record
conference, in which the administrative judge identified the charge as one of
excessive absences, did not include any notice to the parties that they could object
to the contents of the order or how to do so. IAF, Tab 15. Following that order,
the agency argued in its close-of-record submission that it had proven that the
appellant was medically unable to perform her duties. IAF, Tab 20 at 8-11. The
appellant had an opportunity to respond to this argument and, in the context of
her claim of disability discrimination, disagreed with the agency’s assertion that
she was medically unable to work. 4 E.g., IAF, Tab 25 at 5-6.
¶23 Further, the Board has, on previous occasions, reopened an appeal on its
own motion when an administrative judge erroneously interpreted the agency’s
charge. See Boltz v. Social Security Administration, 111 M.S.P.R. 568, ¶ 11
(2009) (reopening an appeal on the Board’s own motion to address an
administrative judge’s erroneous interpretation of the agency’s charges, even
though not raised by either party on review); Valenzuela v. Department of the

4
Neither in her close-of-record submission nor in her response to the agency’s close-of-
record submission did the appellant directly contest the agency’s charge, either as a
charge of medical inability to perform or excessive absences. IAF, Tabs 19, 25.
Instead, she argued that she had proven her affirmative defenses. IAF, Tab 19 at 4-12,
Tab 25 at 4-13.
13

Army, 107 M.S.P.R. 549, ¶ 11 (2007) (same). Additionally, the Board is required
to adjudicate an adverse action solely on the grounds invoked by the agency and
may not substitute what it considers to be a more appropriate charge. Gamboa v.
Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 594, ¶ 7 (2014). Because it is clear
based on our review of the record that the administrative judge incorrectly
reframed the agency’s charge, we find it appropriate to reassess the charge as a
charge of medical inability to perform, applying the correct applicable standard
for such a charge.
¶24 In sum, we find that the agency’s charge was one of medical inability to
perform and the administrative judge erred in interpreting the charge otherwise.
Accordingly, the correct applicable standard is as follows: whether the agency
proved a nexus between the appellant’s medical condition and observed
deficiencies in her performance or conduct or a high probability, given the nature
of the work involved, that her condition may result in injury to herself or others.
Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 25; Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 5. Stated more
simply, the question is whether the appellant’s medical condition prevented her
from being able to safely and efficiently perform the core duties of her position.
Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 5; Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 24. In determining
whether the agency has met this burden, we will consider whether a reasonable
accommodation exists, short of reassignment, that would enable the appellant to
safely and efficiently perform her core duties. See Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 26
(noting that the core duties of a position are synonymous with its essential
functions, i.e., the fundamental job duties of the position, not including marginal
functions); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

The agency proved its medical inability charge.
¶25 Although we conclude that the administrative judge erred by applying the
incorrect standard to the agency’s charge, because the record is fully developed
and there was no hearing requiring demeanor-based credibility determinations,
the Board can determine whether the agency met its burden of proving the correct
14

charge without a remand. See Boltz, 111 M.S.P.R. 568, ¶¶ 11-20 (2009)
(concluding that the administrative judge incorrectly interpreted the agency’s
charge but declining to remand the appeal and instead re-analyzing the charge,
while deferring to the administrative judge’s demeanor -based credibility
findings); see also Haas, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 20 (applying the proper standard to a
medical inability to perform charge, rather than remanding the appeal, when the
administrative judge applied an incorrect standard but the record was fully
developed on the relevant issues).
¶26 By the appellant’s own admission, at the time she was removed from her
position she was absent and “unable to report” to duty in person without the
accommodation of full-time telework, due to medical reasons. IAF, Tab 19 at 19.
The medical evidence the appellant submitted showed that she was “totally
incapacitated” and unable to work following a severe anxiety attack on or around
June 14, 2018, and in a July 12, 2018 letter, her physician stated that she was on
“full disability” until further notice based on a concussion she sustained on
May 16, 2018. IAF, Tab 11 at 64-65, 69. On August 7, 2018, she began a period
of FMLA-protected leave and ultimately exhausted all her paid leave and FMLA
leave and accrued 1,440 hours of LWOP and negative leave balances while she
and the agency engaged in the interactive process to accommodate her conditions.
Id. at 53-58, 78. After the appellant rejected the agency’s offered accommodation
of part-time telework, see id. at 84-88, 90-92, 98-100, the agency continued to
attempt to search for effective accommodations for her, id. at 114-218. As of
March 27, 2019, the appellant’s psychiatrist was still unable to unconditionally
clear her to return to full duty. Id. at 76. The interactive process ultimately
concluded on October 1, 2019, with the agency unsuccessfully attempting to
accommodate the appellant through the accommodation of last resort, her
requested reassignment. IAF, Tab 22 at 150; see Angel v. Office of Personnel
Management, 122 M.S.P.R. 424, ¶ 9 (2015) (describing reassignment as the
reasonable accommodation of last resort, which is required only after it has been
15

determined that there are no effective accommodati ons that would enable the
employee to perform the essential functions of her current position or that all
other reasonable accommodations would impose an undue hardship).
¶27 Based upon our review of the record, the appellant did not return to work or
provide updated medical records before her removal in November 2019. See,
e.g., IAF, Tab 11 at 53-76. At the time the interactive process ended, the
appellant’s medical conditions had effectively kept her from working on a
full-time regular basis for nearly a year and a half , and the agency had exhausted
its obligations under the reasonable accommodation process. See id. at 17, 102.
Under such circumstances, we find that the agency met its burden of proving that
the appellant was medically unable to perform her job duties .
¶28 We also find no merit to the appellant’s argument that the agency failed to
adequately attempt to accommodate her because she could perform her job duties
while on full-time telework despite the agency’s determination otherwise, and
because the agency initially sent an outdated version of her résumé as a part of
the reassignment job search. IAF, Tab 19 at 8-11; Tab 25 at 7-10, 12. In
considering the appellant’s disability discrimination claim, the administrative
judge conducted a thorough analysis of the parties’ reasonable accommodation
interactive process and concluded that the agency met its obliga tions, and we
adopt her findings in this regard. ID at 10-14.
¶29 Among other things, the administrative judge determined that the agency
established that it was unable to accommodate the appellant’s request for
full-time telework because some of her job functions required face-to-face
coordination and the use of agency tools and equipment that could not be
accessed remotely, which would have necessitated the agency to remove essential
functions of her position. ID at 11-12; see IAF, Tab 11 at 177, 179-81, 220-23.
The administrative judge also rejected the appellant’s argument that the agency
failed to conduct an adequate reassignment job search because it used an outdated
résumé, noting that although the agency initially used the appellant’s outdated
16

résumé for the first of its three job searches in error, it became aware of the error
and completed the two subsequent searches using the correct, updated résumé,
and still failed to find any positions to which the appellant could be reassigned.
ID at 12-13; see IAF, Tab 11 at 192-202, 212-15; Tab 26 at 13-14.
¶30 In conclusion, we find that the agency met its burden of proving its charge.
The agency proved that the appellant’s medical condition prevented her from
being able to safely and efficiently perform the core duties of her position, with
or without accommodation.

The administrative judge properly determined that the appellant failed to prove
her affirmative defenses.
¶31 The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove her claims
that the agency failed to accommodate her disability, subjected her to
status-based discrimination based on her disability, and retaliated against her for
her protected EEO activity. ID at 8-17. The parties do not challenge these
findings on review, and we discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s
conclusion. However, in light of developments in the case law after she issued
her initial decision, we have modified her analysis.

Disability discrimination claims
¶32 The appellant alleged disability discrimination, but the administrative judge
denied her claims. IAF, Tab 19 at 4-11. Neither party challenges the
administrative judge’s finding on review. Nonetheless, we modify those findings
here in light of the Board’s decision in Haas, 2022 MSPB 36. As clarified in
Haas, both a claim of disability discrimination based on an individual’s status as
disabled and a claim based on an agency’s failure to reasonably accommodate
that disability require that the individual be “qualified.” Id., ¶ 28. A qualified
individual with a disability is one who can “perform the essential functions of the
. . . position that such individual holds or desires” with or without reasonable
accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Haas, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 28.
17

¶33 As noted above, the administrative judge determined that the appellant
could not perform the essential functions of her position, with or without
reasonable accommodation, and we decline to disturb this conclusion. ID at 9-10.
At the time of her removal, the appellant could only work in her current position
if allowed to telework full-time. IAF, Tab 11 at 76, 173-75. The administrative
judge determined that the majority of the appellant’s duties required the use of
equipment and tools that could not be replicated at home and that her duties also
necessitated face-to-face interactions. ID at 10; IAF, Tab 11 at 222.
¶34 The appellant argued below that the agency should have considered her for
an Analyst position within the agency’s Office of Budget and Programs Analysis .
IAF, Tab 19 at 8. The administrative judge found that the appellant did not
submit any evidence demonstrating that she would have been permitted to
telework full-time in this position, consistent with her existing medical
restrictions. ID at 11. She also found that the appellant failed to prove she was
qualified for the position. 5 Id.
¶35 The parties have not disputed the administrative judge’s determination that
the appellant failed to prove that she was qualified for her position or the Analyst
position she desired. ID at 9-12. We discern no basis to disturb these findings,
and affirm the administrative judge’s denial of the appellant’s disability

5
The appellant argued below that, at some unspecified date prior to her November 2019
removal, the agency “set [her] up for failure” by reassigning her to the Program and
Management Analyst position from which she was removed. IAF, Tab 1 at 13 , Tab 11
at 17, 24, 28-38, Tab 19 at 21, 24, Tab 25 at 10. The administrative judge determined
that the appellant failed to provide any relevant facts, such as when the reassignment
occurred, the agency’s claimed reasons for the reassignment, and how the appellant’s
duties changed. ID at 13-14. Further, the administrative judge noted record evidence
suggesting that the reassignment may have been part of a reorganization that impacted
other FSA employees, not just the appellant, and in any event the appellant never
worked in the Program and Management Analyst position prior to her removal. ID
at 13-14; IAF, Tab 5 at 17-18. Thus, the administrative judge found that the appellant
failed to prove that her medical condition or any request for accommodation was a
motivating factor in her reassignment. ID at 13-14. The parties have not challenged
this finding on review, and we discern no basis to disturb it.
18

discrimination affirmative defenses on this basis. Haas, 2022 MSPB 36,
¶¶ 28-30. To the extent the administrative judge improperly characterized the
appellant as a “qualified” individual, we find that this error did not impact the
disposition of the appeal. Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R.
281, 282 (1984) (explaining that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a
party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision).

EEO Reprisal
¶36 The appellant alleged that the agency retaliated against her based on her
request for reasonable accommodation and her prior EEO activity alleging
discrimination and harassment by agency officials. IAF, Tab 19 at 11, 19, 23;
Tab 25 at 6-12. The administrative judge denied the appellant’s EEO reprisal
affirmative defense claim, concluding that even though she engaged in protected
EEO activity when she complained of discrimination and sought reasonable
accommodation, she failed to prove that her reasonable accommodation request or
EEO activity was a motivating factor in the agency’s decision to remove her. ID
at 17-19.
¶37 To establish an affirmative defense of reprisal under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16,
i.e., Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims involving race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, an appellant must prove by preponderant evidence that her
membership in a protected class was a motivating factor in the contested
personnel action, even if it was not the only reason. Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612,
¶¶ 41, 51. The Board will evaluate the evidence as a whole to determine i f an
appellant met her burden. Gardner v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶¶ 28-31 (2016), clarified by Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31,
¶¶ 23-24. If she does so, the appellant establishes that the agency violated
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 and committed a prohibited personnel practice under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1). Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 51. If the agency is able to
prove that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the
19

discriminatory or retaliatory motive, its violation will not require reversal of the
adverse action. Id.
¶38 However, after the initial decision was issued in this case, the Board
recognized that a more stringent standard applies in the context of reprisal claims
arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 and
Rehabilitation Act, such that the appellant must prove that her prior EEO activity
was the “but-for” cause of the retaliation. Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 44-47.
The administrative judge did not have the benefit of Pridgen and instead relied on
Savage and its progeny in analyzing the appellant’s disability-based EEO reprisal
claim. ID at 17-19. We therefore recognize that the more stringent “but -for”
standard should have applied to the appellant’s EEO reprisal claim, rather than
the motivating factor standard. Nevertheless, because we agree with the
administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to meet the lesser
motivating factor standard, she necessarily failed to meet the more stringent
“but-for” causation standard applicable to her disability-based EEO reprisal
claim. Haas, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶¶ 31-32.

The appellant’s removal is appropriate.
¶39 Because the administrative judge found that the agency failed to prove its
charge, she did not make findings regarding a nexus between the appellant’s
inability to perform her duties and the efficiency of the service or whether the
removal was reasonable. Therefore, we do so here.
¶40 Generally, removal for inability to perform the essential functions of a
position promotes the efficiency of the service, as required by 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a).
Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 40. Although a removal action may be rescinded on the
basis that such action would not promote the efficiency of the service when the
evidence clearly and unambiguously demonstrates that the appellant has
recovered before the administrative judge issues an initial decision in their Board
appeal, the appellant provided no such evidence here. Owens v. Department of
20

Homeland Security, 2023 MSPB 7, ¶ 15; Wren v. Department of the Army,
121 M.S.P.R. 28, ¶ 6 (2014).
¶41 The evidence before the agency at the time of the appellant’s removal did
not reflect a foreseeable end to her unavailability for duty. Instead, the March 27,
2019 letter from the appellant’s psychiatrist—the last medical documentation the
appellant provided to the agency before her removal—did not clear her for an
unconditional return to duty, stating that she could only return to work in a
full-time telework capacity, and that a return to “the same work environment and
condition would likely impede [her] progress.” IAF, Tab 11 at 76, 173-76. As
previously noted, at that point the appellant had been unable to report to duty on a
full-time regular basis since April 23, 2018, and all her medical status letters
from the prior year indicated that her conditions persisted and that there was no
end in sight to her inability to return to duty on a full-time regular basis. Id.
at 61-74. Despite this, the agency continued to work with the appellant to find a
suitable accommodation that would permit her to perform the essential functions
of her position for an additional 6 months before determining that her condition
could not be accommodated without removing the essential functions of her
position. See IAF, Tab 11 at 17, 102, 114-223; Tab 22 at 128-50. Accordingly,
we conclude that the appellant’s removal promoted the efficiency of the service .
See Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 5; Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 24, 40.
¶42 In summary, we conclude that the administrative judge applied an incorrect
standard to the agency’s charge. Under the correct legal standard, the agency met
its burden, the appellant failed to prove her affirmative defenses, and her removal
is appropriate. Accordingly, we grant the agency’s petition for review . We
affirm the initial decision’s findings that the appellant failed to prove her
affirmative defenses and we modify the analysis, as set forth above. We
21

otherwise reverse the initial decision and sustain the appellant’s removal for
medical inability to perform her job duties. 6

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable t ime
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U .S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

6
Because we conclude that the administrative judge incorrectly analyzed the agency
action as a charge of excessive absences instead of a charge of medical inability to
perform, we need not consider the agency’s alternative argument that it met its burden
of proving the excessive absences charge. See PFR File, Tab 1 at 14-17. Consequently,
we also deny the agency’s request to submit the October 12, 2018 FMLA letter as
additional evidence on review. Id. at 16, 24-25.
7
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
22

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
23

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
24

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

8
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
25

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9837919. Public record. Not legal advice.