# Commonwealth v. Giulian v. Aplt.

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · July 19, 2016 · 636 Pa. 207

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9834973

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Victoria C. GIULIAN, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 19, 2016
- **Citations:** 636 Pa. 207; 141 A.3d 1262; 2016 Pa. LEXIS 1513; 2016 WL 3908197
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Wecht
- **Judges:** Saylor, Baer, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht
- **Cited by:** 83 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9834973

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that "the same words[ ] placed in different contexts sometimes mean different things."
- stating that if an ambiguity exists in a penal statute, it must be interpreted in a light most favorable to the accused, and where doubt exists, the accused should receive the benefit of the doubt
- stating “the permissive language of Section 9122 . . . clearly vests discretion in the [trial] court[.]”

## Opinion text

Justice WECHT,
concurring.
I join the learned Majority’s opinion in full. I agree that the operative language of 18 Pa.C.S. § 9122(b)(3)(i) is ambiguous, and that Victoria Giulian presents the correct interpretation of the statute. The Majority aptly depicts the absurd and unreasonable results that a contrary construction would engender. I write separately to identify a peculiar consequence that would follow from the Commonwealth’s suggested interpretation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 9122(b)(3)(i), which further illustrates the untenable nature of the Commonwealth’s position.
In construing ambiguous statutory language, “we presume to be erroneous any interpretation that leads to an absurd or *227 unreasonable result.” Freedom Med. Supply, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 635 Pa. 86 , 131 A.3d 977, 984 (2016); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). I agree with the Majority’s assessment that the Commonwealth’s reading of the statute yields an unreasonable result, in that the 1997 offenses never may be expunged, while, oddly enough, expungement of the 1998 conviction is fully permissible. See Maj. Op. at 221-22, 141 A.3d at 1270-71.
I note, as well, that the Commonwealth’s suggested interpretation would countenance an even more plainly unreasonable and absurd result, as follows. The Commonwealth maintains that “a defendant with a subsequent arrest or prosecution within the five years following the initial summary offense conviction may never have the initial summary offense expunged,” but that a summary offense conviction may be expunged if the defendant “can simply remain arrest-free for five years following that conviction.” Brief for the Commonwealth at 10, 14. The Majority correctly notes that this interpretation would preclude expungement of the 1997 offenses even if Giulian remains arrest-free for another fifty years. However, over a similar fifty-year period, the Commonwealth’s interpretation would allow for the expungement of up to ten offenses, provided merely that five years elapsed between each conviction and subsequent arrest. While an individual that was arrested within five years of a summary conviction would have a criminal record forever, another individual would be free to recidivate in perpetuity, reoffending every five years while never being precluded from expungement as a matter of law. Although occurring over a period of time, this is precisely and ironically the sort of “volume discounting” and “expungement windfall” that the Commonwealth argues should be forbidden under the statute. See Id. at 17. These volume discounts and expungement windfalls would accrue liberally for recidivist offenders under the Commonwealth’s own interpretation.
The Majority’s analysis of the factors supporting Giulian’s construction of 18 Pa.C.S. § 9122(b)(3)(i) is well-reasoned and compelling. Even if those factors were absent, however, the *228 absurdity of the results that flow from the Commonwealth’s position renders its interpretation of the statute erroneous.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9834973. Public record. Not legal advice.