# Teel v. Brown > Court of Appeals of Texas · February 5, 1916 · 185 S.W. 319 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9830795 ## Case - **Full name:** TEEL Et Al. v. BROWN Et Al. - **Court:** Court of Appeals of Texas - **Decided:** February 5, 1916 - **Citations:** 185 S.W. 319; 1916 Tex. App. LEXIS 422 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** On rehearing - **Judges:** Dunklin - **Cited by:** 2 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9830795 ## Opinion text On Motion for Rehearing. [6] Appellants, with much earnestness, press the contention that as the judgment revived was rendered in a county other than that in which the land in controversy is situated, R. S. Stephens was not affected with notice of the pendency of the original suit, and for that reason we erred in affirming the judgment of revival as against him as well as against Henry Teel. The authority relied on particularly is the decision in the case of Jones v. Robb, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 263 , 80 S. W. 399 ,'by the Court of Appeals of the First District, in which the following was said by Justice Gill: “In Benton v. Shafer, 47 Ohio St. 117 , 24 N. E. 197 , 7 D. R. A. 812, the rule which unques- . tionably prevails in this state is announced, viz., that the suit, in order to affect lands purchased during its pendency, must be brought in the county where the land is situated.” Appellees reply, first, that the announcement quoted was dictum, since the suit in which the judgment was rendered was in fact instituted in the county where the land was situated; and, second, that the Ohio decision referred to was controlled by a statute of that state restricting jurisdiction to try title to land wholly situated in any county to the courts of that county; while by section 13, article 1830, of the statutes of this state, suits for partition of land may be instituted in the county in which any of the defendants resides, as well as in the county where the land is situated. And in support of their contention that the common-law rule of lis pendens notice, which prevailed prior to the enactment in 1905 (Acts 29th Leg. c. 128) of articles 6837 to 6840 (Vernon’s Sayles’) inclusive, is contrary to the announcement so made in Jones v. Robb, appellees cite Latta v. Wiley, 92 S. W. 436 ; Southern R. I. Plow Co. v. Pitluk, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 327 , 63 S. W. 354 . It is unnecessary to determine that question in this case. No contention is made by appellants that the court rendering the former judgment was without jurisdiction of the controversy, which was one of partition and clearly within the jurisdiction of the court which rendered it. Article 1830, subd. 13, Vernon’s Sayles’ Texas Civil Statutes. If that court had such jurisdiction, then the confession by defendant Stephens in the present suit that he had notice of the. pendency of the former suit at the time he purchased from parties thereto is binding upon him upon this appeal. All other questions now presented by appellants in their motion have been sufficiently discussed in our original opinion, and we adhere to the conclusions there expressed. [7] Appellees likewise have filed a motion for rehearing in' which it is earnestly insisted that we were in error in so reform ing the judgment of the trial court as to eliminate therefrom a recovery of title to the land, and cast appellees in the costs of the appeal by reason thereof. The contention is made that the revival of the former judgment and the award of a writ of possession has the legal effect of a new judgment in plaintiffs’ favor for title and possession of the land. Article 5696, Vernon’s Sayles’ Texas Civil Statutes, reads: “A judgment in any court of record within this state, where execution has not issued within twelve months after the rendition of the judgment, may be revived by scire facias or an action of debt brought thereon within ten years after the date of such judgment, and not after.” The three cases which appellees cite in support of their contention are Bludworth v. Poole, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 551 , 53 S. W. 717 , Collin County Nat. Bank v. Hughes, 154 S. W. 1183 , and Coleman v. Zapp (Sup.) 151 S. W. 1043 . The judgment revived in each of those cases was a judgment for debt, and the pleadings and proof which authorized a revival of the judgment also authorized a new judgment for the debt under the terms of the statute. But that statute does not authorize a new and independent judgment upon the same demand, except it be for debt, and hence the decisions do not apply in the present case. After the plaintiffs dismissed their suit in trespass to try title, their only cause of action remaining was a suit to revive the former judgment. Defendants consented and agreed to the granting of that relief, and nothing more. Whether or not defendants have acquired title to the property subsequently to the rendition of the former judgment, could not be determined after the dismissal of the suit to try title, and whether *323 or not the revival of the judgment would preclude the defendants from hereafter asserting any such title, if they have acquired any, is an issue we are not called upon to decide, and hence decline to determine it. See Moore v. Snowball, 98 Tex. 16 , 81 S. W. 5 , 66 L. R. A. 745, 107 Am. St. Rep. 596 . Both motions for rehearing are overruled. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9830795. Public record. Not legal advice.