# Home Life & Accident Co. v. Orchard

> Court of Appeals of Texas · December 12, 1920 · 227 S.W. 705

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9830559

## Case

- **Full name:** Home Life & Accident Co. v. Orchard
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** December 12, 1920
- **Citations:** 227 S.W. 705; 1920 Tex. App. LEXIS 1248
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** On rehearing
- **Judges:** Walker
- **Cited by:** 28 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9830559

## Opinion text

On Rehearing.
In our judgment, this case turns on the fact as to whether Orchard was one of Willis’ Texafe employés. If he was, then under the express terms of the policy and the 1917 amendment to the Workmen’s Compensation Act he was protected. In his motion on rehearing, appellant asserts that this court did not “even mention the effect of the undisputed evidence that Willis deliberately divided his work, and that he undertook to cover the work in which Orchard was engaged by the Louisiana policy, and undertook to cover the remainder of his work, in so far as being conducted in Texas, under Home Life & Accident Company policy.” We recognized this contention, and found as follows:
“Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Louisiana, he (Willis) carried insurance with the Georgia Casualty Company for the protection of his Louisiana employés, and he also carried with appellant, under the Texas Workmen’s Compensation Act, protection for his Texas employés.”
We also stated that the Caddo fields covered the work in Louisiana, and also the work in Marion and Panola counties, Tex. At the time he was injured, unquestionably Orchard was engaged on the Caddo work, but this was not his permanent work. He was in the regular and permanent employ of Willis. He had been with Willis for many years. Willis sent him where he was needed. At this particular time, as we have said, he was temporarily in Louisiana — temporarily in charge of the Caddo work. He was not employed by Willis to do this work; but “in the course of his employment” by Willis — just an incident of his regular Texas employment — he was sent to the Caddo fields. The conclusion is irresistible that Willis had a right, under this contract, to recall Orchard from this work and place him on another job. Had Willis done so, Orchard’s general employment would have continued. It is also true that Orchard hired his help in Louisiana, that is, Willis hired the help, acting through his agent, Orchard. These men so employed were Louisiana employés. They were hired for this special work, and for this work only. They were protected by the Georgia Casualty policy. It seems to us the 1917 amendment was enacted to cover just this character of employment. If Orchard had been employed for the purpose of managing the Caddo job, and his employment had ended with the completion of that work, we would have before us a different question.
We believe the other propositions advanced by appellant are fully covered in our original opinion.
The motion for rehearing is in all things overruled.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9830559. Public record. Not legal advice.