# Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Francis

> Court of Appeals of Texas · April 7, 1927 · 300 S.W. 137

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9829551

## Case

- **Full name:** EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ASSUR. CORPORATION, Ltd., v. FRANCIS Et Al.
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** April 7, 1927
- **Citations:** 300 S.W. 137; 1927 Tex. App. LEXIS 1104
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** On rehearing
- **Judges:** Lane
- **Cited by:** 7 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9829551

## Opinion text

On Second Motion for Rehearing.
On a former day of this term of this court we handed down an opinion reversing the judgment of the trial court in favor , of ap-pellees, and rendered judgment for appellant, holding that' it was essential to a recovery by appellees that it be shown that the injured party had good cause for not having filed his claim with the Accident Board within 6 months after the occurrence of his injury, and that no such showing was made.
Thereafter appellees filed their motion for rehearing, and upon a careful consideration thereof we concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that good cause was shown for not so filing the claim within 6 months, and, having so concluded, we granted the motion and affirmed the judgment.
Appellant has now filed.its motion for rehearing and insists that we erred in affirming the judgment, for the reason, among others, that there were no pleadings of the plaintiff suggesting good cause on the part of the injured party as would excuse him from filing his claim with the Accident Board within 6 months as required by law, and that not having so filed he was not entitled to show matters constituting such good cause as an excuse for not having filed his claim within the time required by the statute.
We have again examined the plaintiffs’ petition and find that there is no plea setting up, or attempting to set up, any matters as an excuse'for not having filed the injured party’s claim with the Accident Board within 6 months after the time of his injury. It has been held that in such circumstances the judgment in the claimant’s favor should be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Georgia Casualty Co. v. Ward (Tex. Civ. App.) 221 S. W. 298 ; Mingus, Receiver, v. Wadley, 115 Tex. 551 , at pages 558, 559, and 562, 285 S. W. 1084 , Hood v. Employers’ Ins. Ass’n (Tex. Civ. App.) 260 S. W. 245 .
In Mingus v. Wadley, supra, after holding that the provisions relative to filing claims with the Accident Board are mandatory and determine the jurisdiction of the courts, it is said:
“Jurisdictional allegations- are an integral and necessary part of the case, without the statement of which there is no cause of action.”
In Hood v. Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, supra, it was held that the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear and determine the suit of the claimant depends on the prerequisites required by the Compensation Act, which should be not only properly alleged but supr ported by requisite evidence.
In Georgia Casualty Co. v. Ward, supra, the court said:
“Ward was injured in June, 1916, he did not present his claim for compensation for the in-' jury until March 13, 1918. By the terms of the Act, April 16, 1913 (Laws 1913, c. 179 [Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 5246h-5246zzzz]), referred to in said opinion, Ward was excused from presenting such a claim within the time therein specified if and while he was physically or mentally incapacitated from making it. There were no pleadings by appel-lee suggesting such incapacity on Ward’s part as excused him from making the claim before he did, but appellees insist in the motion there was evidence tending to show such incapacity, and therefore that after reversing the judgment we should have remanded the cause for further proceedings in the trial court, instead of here rendering judgment dismissing the suit. We have concluded that appellees’ contention should be sustained in respect to the matter stated, and will set aside the judgment rendered here so far as it dismissed the case, and *142 will, instead, direct that the cause be remanded to the court below for such further proceedings there as are authorized by law.”
Haying reached the conclusions aho-ve expressed, the motion of appellant is granted, and our former judgment is set aside, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for such further actions as are by law authorized.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9829551. Public record. Not legal advice.