# Dougherty, J., Aplt. v. Heller, K. > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · June 14, 2016 · 635 Pa. 507 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9824105 ## Case - **Full name:** John J. DOUGHERTY, Appellant, v. Karen HELLER, Appellee - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** June 14, 2016 - **Citations:** 635 Pa. 507; 138 A.3d 611; 44 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2288; 2016 Pa. LEXIS 1210; 2016 WL 3261814 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Strassburger - **Judges:** Saylor, Wecht, Colins, Friedman, Leadbetter, Brobson, Strassburger - **Cited by:** 24 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9824105 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding generalized claim that public disclosure of videotaped deposition could infringe upon appellant's privacy or cause him embarrassment insufficient to raise type of issue which is “too important to be denied review” under collateral order doctrine - noting that tax returns are subject to privacy rights pursuant to state law and confidentiality under a federal statute - observing a “trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected by discovery.” (citation omitted) ## Opinion text Judge STRASSBURGER, concurring and dissenting. I join in Parts I (Background), II (Temporary Judicial Assignments to the Supreme Court), and IV (Application of the Collateral Order Doctrine) of the Majority Opinion. I would not reach Part III (The Sustainability of the Dismissal Order). *542 A. Collateral Order Doctrine I have long advocated a strict application of the collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., Strausser Enterprises, Inc. v. Segal & Morel, Inc., 89 A.3d 292, 299-300 (Pa.Super.2014) (citing Calabrese v. Collier Twp. Mun. Auth., 432 Pa. 360 , 248 A.2d 236, 238 (1968) (O’Brien, J., dissenting) (“It is more important to prevent the chaos inherent in bifurcated, trifurcated, and multifurcated appeals than it is to correct each mistake of a trial court the moment it occurs.”)); Commerce Bank/Harrisburg, N.A. v. Kessler, 46 A.3d 724, 737 (Pa.Super.2012) (“ ‘The bifurcated appeal foisted upon the courts can only be termed a judicial Hydra. Would that a Hercules could appear ... to slay this monster.’ Hession Condemnation Case, [ 430 Pa. 273 ], 242 A.2d 432, 437 (1968) (O’Brien, J., dissenting).”). Failure to construe the doctrine narrowly results in scenarios like the instant one. We are six and one-half years out from the filing of the complaint, and nowhere near a trial. Assuming mistakes are made by a trial court, not every mistake need be corrected at once by an appellate court. The learned Majority cites to Commonwealth v. Williams, 624 Pa. 405 , 86 A.3d 771 (2014), as a recent undertaking to enforce the high collateral order threshold. Majority Opinion, at 534 n. 9, 138 A.3d at 627 n. 9. Let us hope that undertaking is successful because otherwise, justice delayed will be justice denied. I fully agree with the Majority that the order appealed from does not meet the importance prong of the tripartite collateral order test because it was “of an individualized, fact-intensive nature.” Id., op. at 539-40, 138 A.3d at 631. B. Sustainability of the Dismissal Order I would not reach the issue of the sustainability of the dismissal order. Two justices purported to dismiss the appeal as improvidently granted. Likewise, two justices purported to grant reconsideration of that dismissal. Whether two justices constitute a quorum or do not constitute a quorum, the same result obtains. If two justices are insufficient to take action, the appeal remains pending. If two justices are sufficient to take action, the appeal is dismissed, but then reinstated on the *543 docket when reconsideration is granted by vote of two justices, and, once again, the appeal remains pending. Thus, there is no need to consider this hypothetical question. My joinder in Part II of the Majority Opinion evidences my belief that the five intermediate appellate court judges, chosen randomly, are legally permitted to sit on this case. Yet we, the Fortuitous Five, so sit because it is necessary for the case to be decided. However, it should not be forgotten that once the clock strikes midnight for us, i.e., once this appeal is decided, we are no longer horses or coachmen, but we return to mice. For us to decide a hypothetical issue, pure dictum, contrary to the holding of the late Justice (later Chief Justice) Cappy in In re Larsen, No. 155 JIRB Dkt.1992 (Cappy, J. Jan, 22, 1993), is both unnecessary and ill-advised. The learned Majority correctly points out that quorum issues, although infrequent, tend to arise as a result of recu-sals. Thus, the argument goes, judges sitting by temporary assignment may well have to sit to decide the quorum issue. What this ignores is that the Supreme Court makes the rules, and can decide the quorum issue by a rule considered by all seven (six today) duly elected or appointed judges. Thus, I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s addressing this issue. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9824105. Public record. Not legal advice.