# Board of Trustees, Jacksonville Police & Fire Pension Fund, etc. v. Curtis W. Lee

> Supreme Court of Florida · April 14, 2016 · 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 146

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9822706

## Case

- **Full name:** BOARD OF TRUSTEES, JACKSONVILLE POLICE & FIRE PENSION FUND, Etc., Petitioner, v. Curtis W. LEE, Respondent
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Florida
- **Decided:** April 14, 2016
- **Citations:** 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 146; 189 So. 3d 120; 44 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1769; 2016 Fla. LEXIS 783; 2016 WL 1458515
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Canady
- **Judges:** Pariente, Labarga, Lewis, Quince, Perry, Canady, Polstoñ
- **Cited by:** 20 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9822706

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “[w]hile there are statements in PHH that may have inadvertently resulted in confusion for the district courts of appeal,” grafting a good faith or honest mistake exception into the “unlawfully refused” term when a unit of government unquestionably meets the ag…
- holding that once the court determines that the defendant “unlawfully refused” to permit a public record to be inspected or copied, the court must assess reasonable attorneys’ fees, whether or not the defendant acted in good faith (citing Fla. Stat. § 119.12)

## Opinion text

CANADY, J.,
dissenting.
Because I would conclude that a public records custodian has not “unlawfully refused” to comply with the Public Records Act where the custodian has acted in accordance with the statutory duty of- good faith, I dissent. ■ I would quash the decision on review, disapprove Gonzalez, and approve the conflicting decisions in Alt-house, Greater Orlando, and Knight Rid-der.
Contrary to the reasoning of the majority, section 119.12, the provision of the Public Records Act imposing liability for attorney’s fees on custodians of public records, cannot reasonably be read in isolation from section 119.07(l)(c), the statutory provision that establishes the duty of custodians of public records to respond “in good faith” to requests‘to inspect or copy records. The majority’s reading of the statute uncouples the attorney’s fee remedy for a breach of > duty by a custodian of public records from the statutory definition of that duty.
The Legislature could, of course, uncouple the remedy from the duty and impose strict liability for attorney’s fees. But the language of section 119.12 neither suggests such an uncoupling nor supports the imposition of strict liability. The majority reads the phrase “unlawfully refused” in section 119.12 as equivalent to “unlawfully failed.” Majority op. at' 126. The meaning of “refused” and “failed,” however, are riot identical. Not every failure to comply constitutes á refusal to comply. Refuse means “to show or express a positive unwillingness to do or comply with.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary at 1910 (1993). A refusal to comply thus carries with it “a positive unwillingness” to comply that is not present with every failure to comply. Which brings us back to the duty on which the attorney’s fee provision is predicated: the duty to respond to public records requests “in.good faith.” Where the custodian of public records has acted in good faith, the custodian has not manifested “a positive unwillingness” to comply with the Public Records Act. In such circumstances,, an unlawful refusal to comply with the law has not occurred and *131 the attorney’s fee provision is not applicable.
POLSTON, J., concurs.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9822706. Public record. Not legal advice.