# Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Climax Telephone Co.

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · January 18, 2000 · 202 F.3d 862

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9813483

## Case

- **Full name:** MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, D/B/A Ameritech Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLIMAX TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant, John G. Strand, John C. Shea, and David A. Svanda, Commissioners of the Michigan Public Service Commission (In Their Official Capacities and Not as Individuals), Defendants-Appellants, United States of America, Federal Communications Commission, Intervenors
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** January 18, 2000
- **Citations:** 202 F.3d 862; 19 Communications Reg. (P&F) 849; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 585; 2000 WL 29984
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Cole
- **Judges:** Boggs, Cole, Jones
- **Cited by:** 64 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9813483

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that application of section 252 against the individual commissioners of the Michigan Public Service Commission “is a straightforward Ex parte Young case”; noting that most district courts have held the same
- noting that separate issues on appeal were the state officers’ argument that they are not proper parties and their argument that they are entitled to sovereign immunity, and addressing these arguments separately
- declining to find that the state had waived its immunity by regulating under the Act and instead relying on the Ex parte Young doctrine to allow suits against individual state commissioners
- declining to find that the slate had waived its immunity by regulating under the Act and instead relying on the Ex parte Young doctrine to allow suits against individual state commissioners
- finding that Ex Parte Young provides valid exception to state commission's Eleventh Amendment immunity

## Opinion text

COLE,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I am in complete agreement with the majority’s disposition of the Commissioners’ Eleventh Amendment claim. I write separately because I do not believe that this court has jurisdiction to consider the interlocutory appeal of the Commissioners’ other claims.
*869 The Commissioners’ Eleventh Amendment claim is clearly appealable under the collateral order exception. See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 5 F.3d 147, 149 (6th Cir.1993). However, the Commissioners’ Tenth Amendment and § 252 claims are not appealable collateral orders because those claims are not “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468-69 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). In addition, those claims do not fall under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction because they are not “inextricably intertwined” with the Eleventh Amendment claim, such that the Eleventh Amendment claim could not be determined without first addressing the nonappealable claims. See Chambers v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Servs., 145 F.3d 793, 797 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 408 , 142 L.Ed.2d 331 (1998).
Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s denial of the Commissioners’ motion to dismiss based on the Eleventh Amendment, but dismiss the Commissioners’ other claims for lack of jurisdiction.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9813483. Public record. Not legal advice.