# Commissioners of Stanly County v. Snuggs

> Supreme Court of North Carolina · September 5, 1897 · 121 N.C. 394

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9812524

## Case

- **Full name:** Commissioners of Stanly County v. I. W. Snuggs, Treasure.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of North Carolina
- **Decided:** September 5, 1897
- **Citations:** 121 N.C. 394; 28 S.E. 539
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by PuRCHES
- **Judges:** Montgomery, Pürches, Clark, Faircloth
- **Cited by:** 27 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9812524

## Opinion text

PüRCHES, J.
concurring: As I concurred in the opinion of the Court in Carr v. Coke, 116 N. C., 223 , and also in the opinion of the Court in Bank v. Commissioners, 119 N. C., 214 ; and as it was claimed on the argument in this case that the two opinions were in conflict, and could not stand together, I propose, in addition to the well considered opinion of Justice Montgomery, to say briefly, what seems to me to constitute the distinction between the two cases.
The power to legislate is not conferred on the General Assembly by the Constitution. This it has without an express delegation of power. There are instances where the legislature is commanded to legislate. But these are the exception to the general rule and have nothing to do with the Act we are considering. The most of the provisions of the Constitution with regard to legislation are restraints upon its power.
The Act considered in the case of Carr v. Coke , was passed under- the general and inherent right to legislate. This being so, it fell under the general parliamentary law of authentication, and the signature of the presiding officers was final. But the Act now under consideration was passed under one of the restrictions or prohibitions placed upon the legislature by the Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 14, which pro- *405 vicies “that no law shall be passed to raise money on the credit of the State, &c., unless it be read on three several days in each House, and on the two last readings the yeas and nays are taken and recorded and this rule applies to counties, towns, cities, &c.
It must be admitted that the .Constitution might have prohibited the legislature from passing any Act to lend its credit, or to authorize any county, or town to do so. Suppose, then, that the Constitution had prohibited the enactment of any such law, but notwithstanding this inhibition the Legislature had passed such an act, and the presiding officers had signed and ratified it, should the Courts have gone on and enforced this Act because it had passed and ratified by the presiding officers of the two Houses? And if not, why should this Act be enforced, passed in a way in which the Constitution says it. shall not be passed — so as to authorize a County to raise money upon its credit?
•Suppose the Legislature should pass an Act providing for the payment of the special tax bonds, or the interest thereon, and the bill should be signed and ratified by the presiding .officers of- each body of the General Assembly: should this Court enforce this Act? I must suppose that the answer to this proposition would be no; that the Constitution prohibits the Legislature from passing such an Act. And, if such an Act as this could not be enforced because the Constitution prohibits its enactment, it would be difficult to draw the distinction and to see how we could enforce this Act, passed in a way the Constitution says it should not be passed.
I have had trouble in coming to the conclusion that we, as a co-ordinate department of the government, could look to the manner of its passage. But upon further consideration of the matter, I have come to the conclusion that these rules, preventing us from looking behind the ratification, are only applicable to Acts passed under the general power *406 of legislation. The precedents I have examined grew out of legislation under the general unrestricted power as to legislation. To adopt this rule with regard'to restricted or prohibited powers would be, in effect, to destroy these restrictions, these wise and beneficent provisions of the Constitution. In this it seems to me, lies the distinction between Carr v. Coke and Bank v. Commissioners , and this case falls under the rule governing in Bank v. Commissioners.
It is claimed that this is an Act of repudiation on the part of plaintiffs, and repudiation is not more distasteful to any one than it is to me. And it may be in a moral sense repudiation, but it cannot be in law, as the plaintiffs were never legally bound for these bonds.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9812524. Public record. Not legal advice.