# Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. and Brien Garcia v. Nury Chapa > Texas Supreme Court · December 22, 2006 · 50 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 278 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9811271 ## Case - **Full name:** TONY GULLO MOTORS I, L.P. and Brien Garcia, Petitioners, v. Nury CHAPA, Respondent - **Court:** Texas Supreme Court - **Decided:** December 22, 2006 - **Citations:** 50 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 278; 212 S.W.3d 299; 2006 Tex. LEXIS 1301; 2006 WL 3751591 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Johnson - **Judges:** Brister, Jefferson, Hecht, Wainwright, Green, Willett, Johnson, O'Neill, Medina - **Cited by:** 1,183 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9811271 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that a 4.33:1 ratio was unconstitutionally excessive where only the fifth reprehensibility factor was present and explaining that “[pjushing exemplary damages to the absolute constitutional limit in a case like this [e.g., purely economic harm] leaves no room for punis… - holding that attorneys need not keep separate time records for claims for 11 Seventy-five percent of $119,162.79 is $89,372.09. 26 which fees are recoverable and claims for which fees are not recoverable and stating that “an opinion would have sufficed stating that, for exampl… - explaining that some recoverable and non-recoverable tasks are so intertwined as a matter of law that they cannot be segregated and to prevail on a contract claim a party must overcome all affirmative defenses like prior material breach, and the opposing party who raises them … - holding that amount awarded by court of appeals exceeded constitutional limitations on exemplary damages considering that defendant's fraudulent actions, although deceitful, did not cause physical, rather than economic, harm; did not threaten health or safety of others; did no… - stating that though state law governs the amount properly awarded as exemplary damages, this amount is still subject to "an ultimate federal constitutional check for exorbitancy" and concluding the remedy for the constitutionally excessive award of exemplary damages was for th… ## Opinion text Justice JOHNSON, concurring. I concur in the Court’s judgment, and, except for part III.B. as to Exemplary Damages, I join its opinion. The court of appeals properly identified State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003) and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996) as guiding authorities for its review of the $250,000 exemplary damages jury award. It then concluded that $125,000 exemplary damages is constitutionally permissible under this record. That amount is between 4.33 and 4.34 times the actual damages of $28,852 found by the jury. The court of appeals’ analysis as to the exemplary damages issue is not as detailed as that in this Court’s opinion. But, because the court of appeals did not give a detailed explanation for its conclusion does not mean that its conclusion is wrong. The United States Supreme Court has not set a bright line constitutional limit for exemplary damages. Some of its specific language bears reviewing: We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed. Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate, however, that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process. In Haslip, in upholding a punitive damages award, we concluded that an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety. 499 U.S. at 23-24, 111 S.Ct. 1032 . We cited that 4-to-1 ratio again in Gore. 517 U.S. at 581 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 . The Court further referenced a long legislative history, dating back over 700 years and going forward to today, providing for sanctions of double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish. Id., at 581 , and n. 33, 116 S.Ct. 1589 . While these ratios are not binding, they are instructive. They demonstrate what should be obvious: Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the State’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1, id., at 582 , 116 S.Ct. 1589 , or, in this case, of 145 to I. Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we have previously upheld may comport with due process [under certain circumstances]. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 (emphasis added). *316 The Court says that “The court of appeals’ judgment at least pushes against, if not exceeds the constitutional limits.” 212 S.W.3d 310 . A ratio of 4.33 to 1 is clearly close to the ratio of 4 to 1 which “might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 . But, there are no rigid constitutional benchmarks that an exemplary damages award may not surpass. Id. Unless we determine that the court of appeals misapplied the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court, however, I consider a 4.33 ratio of exemplary damages to actual damages under this record to be within the discretion lodged in the court of appeals to determine the amount of remittitur to suggest. I would remand to the court of appeals for reconsideration of the exemplary damages issue and more complete explanation of its analysis as to the remitti-tur. I would not instruct the court of appeals, at this juncture, that it should determine a different, more appropriate, remittitur. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9811271. Public record. Not legal advice.