# Bridges Ex Rel. City of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte > Supreme Court of North Carolina · June 24, 1942 · 221 N.C. 472 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9810512 ## Case - **Full name:** N. W. BRIDGES, on Behalf of Himself and All Other Citizens and Taxpayers of the CITY OF CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA, v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE, a Municipal Corporation; L. L. LEDBETTER, Treasurer of Said City; BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTE, a Body Corporate; And BOARD OF TRUSTEES TEACHERS’ AND STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM - **Court:** Supreme Court of North Carolina - **Decided:** June 24, 1942 - **Citations:** 221 N.C. 472; 20 S.E.2d 825; 1942 N.C. LEXIS 494 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Barnhill - **Judges:** Barnhill, Seawbll, Stacy, WiNBORNE - **Cited by:** 46 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9810512 ## Opinion text Barnhill, J., concurring: The majority opinion concludes that the Teachers’ and State Employees’ Retirement Act of 1941 is Constitutional and that the special levy of 2c by the tax-levying authorities of Charlotte to provide for the payment of the local employer’s contribution to the retirement fund is valid. I concur. In so doing I wish to comment on the question of the validity of the tax. Article IX, section 2, of the Constitution provides a floor, a minimum —not a maximum. Frazier v. Comrs., 194 N. C., 49 , 138 S. E., 433 ; Taylor v. State Board of Education, 206 N. C., 263 , 173 S. E., 608 ; *485 Fuller v. Lockhart, 209 N. C., 61 , 182 S. E., 73 . It is tbe duty of tbe Legislature, under tbe mandate of tbe Constitution, to establish and maintain, witbin tbe means of tbe State, “a general and uniform system of public schools.” Tbe schools thus provided must be maintained for a minimum term of six months each year. Subject to this limitation tbe discretionary power to determine what is necessary and adequate and witbin tbe means of tbe State rests in tbe General Assembly. Any reasonable expense incurred to this end may be met by taxation without a vote of tbe people. Evans v. Mecklenburg County, 205 N. C., 560 , 172 S. E., 323 . In tbe performance of this duty tbe Legislature enacted cb. 562, Public Laws 1933, providing for a State-wide, uniform system of public schools for a term of eight months. This act creates two types of local administrative units — county and city. Tbe city unit, in respect to schools, has tbe same rights, powers and duties, and operates and is dealt with, as a county. Section 4, cb. 562, Public Laws 1933. Tbe city as an administrative unit and the municipality as such are treated as separate entities. Any local administrative agency, with tbe approval of tbe tax-levying authorities witbin tbe agency and tbe State School Commission, in order to operate schools of a higher standard than those provided by tbe State support, may supplement any object or item of school expenditure, including an extended term not exceeding a total of 180 days. Tbe tax levy to provide tbe funds with which to supplement must first be approved by tbe electorate. Tbe amount raised by taxation becomes a part of tbe total allotment for operational expenses and must be budgeted and approved by tbe State School Commission. Section 17. Tbe funds of tbe unit, including tbe part raised by local taxation, is audited by tbe school authorities, section 20 (2), and are disbursed under tbe regulatory provisions of tbe statute. Hence, it appears that tbe State supported school witbin tbe local administrative unit, as thus supplemented, doeá not, by virtue of thé supplement, become a separate school entity. It remains an integrated part of tbe State School System. Tbe discretion vested in tbe local authorities is tbe discretion to provide or not to provide higher standards, including an extended term. Tbe “school of higher standards,” once established, remains a part of tbe State-wide system under tbe general supervision of tbe State School Commission until tbe special levy is revoked or changed by an election. Section 17. Having elected to supplement and to provide an extended term of higher standard tbe local unit “comes in” cum onere. It must bear its proportionate part of tbe burdens then existing or thereafter imposed upon tbe State system as a necessary part thereof. *486 Is tbe “Retirement System” created by cb. 25, Public Laws 1941, as amended by cb. 143, -Public Laws 1941, an integral part of tbe State School System? Tbe answer is yes. Tbe Retirement payment provided by tbis Act constitutes delayed compensation in consideration of services rendered. It is compensation for public services. Its purpose is to induce experienced and competent teachers to remain in service and thus promote tbe efficiency and effectiveness of tbe educational program. S. v. Levitan, 181 Wis., 326 , 193 N. V., 499. Tbe objective sought and tbe means adopted were within tbe legislative discretion of tbe General Assembly. Any local administrative agency which has elected to supplement tbe State term under section 17 of tbe 1933 Act must comply with tbe provisions of tbe Retirement Act. Tbe language of tbe 1941 statute is mandatory. “. . . each board of education of each city ... in which any teacher receives compensation from sources other than appropriations of tbe State of North Carolina shall deduct from tbe salaries of these teachers paid from sources other than State appropriations an amount equal to that deducted from tbe salaries of tbe teachers whose salaries are paid from State funds, and remit tbis amount to the State Retirement System. City Boards of Education ... in each . . . city which has employees compensated from other than tbe State appropriation shall pay to tbe State Retirement System tbe same per centum of the salaries that tbe State of North Carolina pays.” Section 8, (1) (c), Public Laws 1941. Tbe taxing authorities within tbe agency must provide tbe funds necessary to pay tbe local employer’s contribution and “for tbe purpose of enabling . . . tbe Board of Trustees of city administrative units to make such payment, tbe tax levying authorities in each such city . . . unit are hereby authorized, empowered and directed to provide tbe necessary funds therefor.” Section 8, (1) (c). Public funds ordinarily are raised by taxation and tbis language not only empowers tbe taxing authorities in tbe local units to levy tbe necessary tax but it compels it. In my opinion tbis is tbe only construction tbe language permits. It was argued here that by ch. 143, Public Laws 1941, tbe local agency was granted discretionary authority to accept or reject tbe provisions of tbe Retirement Act. I do not so read tbis statute. It gives tbe local agency authority “with tbe approval of tbe tax levying authorities of such unit, to provide for tbe payment from local tax funds of any amount specified in subsection (c) of tbis section (section 8, [1] [c], ch. 25, Public Laws 1941), in excess of tbe amount to be paid to tbe Retirement System on tbe basis of tbe State Salary Schedule and term.” In tbe event tbe local agency has sufficient funds derived from tbe levy under tbe 1933 Act with which to make its contribution without any additional *487 levy the agency, with the consent of the tax-levying authorities in the unit, may pay its contribution out of this fund without resorting to an additional levy. This, and nothing more, is the meaning of this amendatory provision. It is well to note that this same Act provides that “in case the salary is paid in part from State funds and in part from local funds, the local authorities shall not be relieved of providing and remitting the same per centum of the salary paid from local funds as is paid from State funds. In case the entire salary of any teacher, as defined in this Act, is paid from . . . local funds, the . . . city paying such salary shall provide and remit to the Eetirement System the same per centum that would be required if the salary were provided by the State of North Carolina.” Here again the Legislature makes participation by the local agency which has supplemented the State term compulsory. It follows that the tax levied for the purpose of enabling the Charlotte School District to comply with the requirements of section 8, (1) (c), of ch. 25, Public Laws 1941, is authorized by the Legislature. Tate v. Board of Education, 192 N. C., 516 , 135 S. E., 336 . It was levied for an administrative agency of the State School System established by the General Assembly pursuant to Article IX of the Constitution. School Committee v. Taxpayers, 202 N. C., 297 , 162 S. E., 612 ; Frazier v. Comrs., supra. It was levied to meet a necessary part of the operational expenses of the State School System. Greensboro v. Guilford County, 209 N. C., 655 , 184 S. E., 473 . Under all our decisions the levy was a valid exercise of the taxing power of the State. "WiNBORNE, J., joins in concurring opinion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9810512. Public record. Not legal advice.