# Stackhouse v. People

> Supreme Court of Colorado · June 29, 2015 · 386 P.3d 440

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9810017

## Case

- **Full name:** James Robert STACKHOUSE, Petitioner v. the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Colorado
- **Decided:** June 29, 2015
- **Citations:** 386 P.3d 440; 2015 CO 48; 2015 WL 3946868
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Marquez
- **Judges:** Rice, Márquez
- **Nature of suit:** Sixth Amendment Right to Public Trial, Waiver.
- **Cited by:** 59 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9810017

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that counsel waived the defendant’s right to a public trial by not objecting to a known closure in part because “legitimate strategic considerations might motivate counsel to not 12 object to a closure”
- holding that waiver applies not only when counsel expressly states an intent to give up a right, but also where counsel does not object to the trial court’s action despite a clear opportunity to do so
- concluding that the defendant waived his right to a public trial — denial of which is a structural error — by failing to object when court closed the courtroom during jury selection
- concluding defendant waived his right to argue that he 18 was denied a public trial when defense counsel was aware of the courtroom closure but failed to object
- holding 5 that defendant waived his claim that the court erroneously closed the courtroom where counsel knew closure was happening and did not object

## Opinion text

JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ,
dissenting.
¶ 18 Today, the majority concludes that a defendant “affirmatively waives” his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, not by intentionally relinquishing the right or knowingly abandoning it, but merely through his counsel’s failure to raise a contemporaneous objection to a courtroom closure. Maj. op. ¶¶ 1, 9, 17. Because I cannot agree that a defendant’s silence necessarily strips him of the fundamental constitutional right to a public trial, I write separately and explain why, under United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), and this court’s own precedent, a defendant’s failure to object to a courtroom closure is, at most,, a forfeiture—not a waiver—of that right, reviewable on appeal for plain error. In my view, the trial court’s intentional exclusion of the public during voir dire in this case amounted to plain error warranting re *447 versal of Stackhouse’s conviction. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I. The Right to a Public Trial
¶ 19 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. This right serves four primary interests in our justice system: It allows the public to see that an accused is “fairly dealt with” and not unjustly condemned; it ensures that judges and prosecutors discharge their .duties responsibly; it encourages witnesses to come forward; and it discourages perjury. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). Although the Sixth Amendment right belongs to the criminal defendant, the United States Supreme Court has. held that the right to a public trial “extends beyond the accused and can be invoked under the First Amendment,” giving the press and the public, too, a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 212 , 130 S.Ct. 721 , 176 L.Ed.2d 676 (2010); Waller, 467 U.S. at 44-45 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 . The First Amendment right to a public trial likewise promotes the fairness, of the tribunal and “the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.” Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 , 104 S.Ct. 819 , 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984). The Supreme Court has made clear that the right to a public trial encompasses not only the trial itself but also other critical proceedings, including jury voir dire. Waller, 467 U.S. at 45 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 (citing Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. 501 , 104 S.Ct. 819 , 78 L.Ed.2d 629 ).
¶20 The right to a public trial is not absolute; it must in some situations yield to other rights or interests, including a defendant’s right to a fair trial or the state’s interest in protecting sensitive information. Id. As the Supreme Court has observed, however, such circumstances “will be rare.” Id.
¶21 The United States Supreme Court addressed the right of the public and the press to attend jury selection in Press-Enterprise. There, the tidal court closed the proceeding and, with the consent of both the prosecution and defense, refused to release a transcript of voir dire. Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 504 , 104 S.Ct. 819 . The Court observed that “[n]o right ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial. But the primacy of the accused’s right is difficult to. separate from the right of everyone in the community to attend the voir dire which promotes fairness.”' Id. at 508 , 104 S.Ct. 819 . The Court held that “[t]he presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.” Id. at 510 , 104 S.Ct. 819 .
¶ 22 In Waller,' the Supreme Court relied on Press-Enterprise and directly incorporated these factors into its Sixth Amendment analysis of the right, explaining that “there can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right' of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public. The central aim of a criminal proceeding must be to try the accused fairly....” 467 U.S. at 46, 48 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 (emphasis added). Thus, to justify closure of the courtroom:
• The party seeking closure must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be pi’ejudiced.
• The closure must be no broader than required to protect this interest.
• The court must consider reasonable alternatives to closure.
• The court must make findings adequate to support closure.
Id. at 48 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 . Under Waller, a defendant’s right to a public trial is violated where these, factors are not met. See id. Importantly, the erroneous deprivation of the right to a public trial is structural error. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999); People v. Hassen, 2015 CO 49, ¶ 7 , 351 P.3d 418 ; Hugos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 10 , 288 P.3d 116, 119 ; accord maj. op. ¶ 7.
, ¶23 Despite the.importance of the fundamental constitutional .right to a public trial *448 and its role in preserving the fairness of the proceeding, and despite the majority’s recognition that the erroneous deprivation of this right is structural error, maj. op. ¶7, the majority holds that a defendant’s failure to object to a courtroom closure “affirmatively waives” his right to a public trial—even where a trial court wholly fails to consider the Waller factors in deciding to close the courtroom. Maj. op. ¶ 1 (relying on Anderson v. People, 176 Colo. 224 , 490 P.2d 47, 48-49 (1971) (holding that a defendant waives his public trial right by failing to object to closure)).
¶24 Although the majority observes that “the United States Supreme Court’s precedent on the right to an open trial has evolved” in the decades since this court decided Anderson, the majority concludes that our decision in Anderson remains good law because it was not abrogated by the Supreme Court’s more recent decisions in Waller and Presley, which held that closure of the courtroom over a defendant’s objection without satisfying the Waller factors requires automatic reversal. Maj.- op. ¶¶ 6, 11. But our holding in Anderson has been called into question, not by Waller and Presley, but by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). In my view, the majority fails to properly consider the impact of Piano on our holding in Anderson and wrongly concludes that Stackhouse waived his right to a public trial by failing to object to the court’s closure.
II. Waiver Versus Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights
¶25 Many courts have used the terms “waiver” and “forfeiture” interchangeably or have confused the two concepts. See, e.g., 3 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 10.2(a) (3d ed. 2014) (“[Failure to make a timely objection] is commonly characterized as a “waiver’ of the constitutional objection, but because such a failure does not ordinarily involve an intentional relinquishment of a constitutional right it is better to view it as a ‘forfeiture.’ ”).
¶26 In United States v. Plano, the Supreme Court clarified the difference between waiver and forfeiture. 507 U.S. 725, 733-34 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Waiver, the Court explained, is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Id. at 733 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotation marks omitted). When a defendant waives a right, constitutional or otherwise, there is no error. Id. at 733-34 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 .
¶ 27 Mere forfeiture, in contrast, does not extinguish a legal error. Id. at 733 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 . The Court explained that “[n]o procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right, or a right of any other sort, may be finfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right....” Id. at 731 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet, if a legal rule is violated during trial, “and if the defendant did not waive the rule, then there has been an ‘error’ ... despite the absence of a timely objection.” Id. at 733-34 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 . Under plain error review, appellate courts have “limited power” to correct an error when a defendant has forfeited a right, but courts must consider the error, “putative or real, in deciding whether the judgment below should be overturned.” Id. at 731-32 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 .
¶ 28 The majority holds that “Plano does not alter Colorado’s longstanding rule that not objecting to a known' closure constitutes ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’ ” Maj. op. ¶ 14 n.5. But that is precisely what Plano does. Plano plainly distinguishes between a forfeiture, which occurs when a defendant fails to object, and a waiver, which requires more: specifically, the “intentional relinquishment” of a “known right.” 507 U.S. at 733 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 . This distinction cannot lightly be cast aside.
¶ 29 This court has embraced Plano’s principle that “unobjected-to constitutional errors” are reviewed for plain error. People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 748, 749-50 (Colo.2005) (discussing Olano, 507 U.S. at 731-33 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , in the context of the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury properly on an essential element of the charged crime). Specifically, this court has observed that a *449 defendant “may forfeit his right to fix a constitutional error by failing to make an adequate objection” and has held that if a party raises an unpreserved argument on appeal, “the reviewing court will apply the plain error standard.” Martinez v. People, 2015 CO 16, ¶¶ 13, 14 , 344 P.3d 862, 867, 868 (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 731 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , in the context of the trial court’s use of a constitutionally deficient jury instruction). We have also acknowledged Plano’s definition of waiver as the “ ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo.2007) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation); see also People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 498 (Colo. 2007) (holding that “an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege” is required for a defendant to waive his Sixth Amendment right to sentencing by jury).
¶ 30 The majority correctly points out that not all constitutional rights require a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver “personally executed by the defendant.” Maj. op. ¶ 15. To be sure, some rights, like the right to confrontation, may be waived on behalf of a defendant by his counsel. E.g., Hinojos-Mendoza, 169 P.3d at 668 . However, in my view, the majority is wrong to conclude, especially after Plano, that “a defendant affirmatively waives his public trial right when he does not object to a known closure,” maj. op. ¶ 9. The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial implicates a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial and therefore requires more than the defendant’s mere silence before it can be said that the defendant intentionally relinquished that right.
III. Plain Error Review
¶ 31 The majority acknowledges that “[u]n-der Waller, the public trial right is violated when a defendant objects to a closure and the court does not satisfy the four factors of the Waller test.” Maj. op. ¶ 7. The majority also acknowledges that the erroneous deprivation of the right to a public trial is structural eiTor. See id.; People v. Hassen, 2015 CP 49, ¶ 7, 351 P.3d 418 ; Hagos v. People. 2012 CP 63, ¶ 10, 288 P.3d 116, 119 ; see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 513 , 104 S.Ct. 819 , 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984). It recognizes that structural errors require automatic reversal because they are not amenable to the prejudice analysis inherent in harmless error or plain error review. Maj. op. ¶ 10 n.3. Yet it concludes that, because the violation of the right to a public trial is structural error, either a defendant affirmatively waives this right by not objecting to a known closure, or the error requires automatic reversal. Id. In other words, to avoid automatic reversal associated with structural error, the majority chooses to ignore the potential structural error by automatically treating a defendant’s silence as an “intentional” relinquishment of his right.
¶32 In my view, a defendant’s silence should not automatically strip him of relief if in fact his constitutional right to a public trial has been violated. Given that we routinely review unpreserved alleged constitutional errors for plain error, I see no principled justification not to review an unpreserved alleged error of this nature for plain error. See Hagos, ¶ 14, 288 P.3d at 120 (“[W]e review all other errors, constitutional and nonconstitutional, that were not preserved by objection for plain error.”); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); Martinez v. People, 2015 CP 16, ¶ 14, 344 P.3d 862, 868 ; People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 748-49 (2005). 1
*450 ¶ 33 Plain error review is an exacting standard, and for good reason. To ensure an efficient, orderly trial, it is incumbent on defendants to timely object to constitutional violations, See People v. Rollins, 892 P.2d 866 , 874 n.13 (Colo.1995) (“An accused may not withhold his objections until completion of his trial and after conviction, and later complain of matters which, if he had made a timely objection, would have, allowed the trial court to take corrective action.”). Thus, where no contemporaneous objection to the asserted error is made at trial, appellate review is limited to determining whether the error or defect constitutes plain error. Id.
¶ 34 Plain error review allows appellate courts to correct “particularly egregious errors.” Hagos, ¶ 14, 288 P.3d at 120 (internal quotation marks omitted). To be “plain,” the error must be “obvious and substantial,” and it leads to reversal if it “so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself so as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Puckett v. United States, 566 U.S. 129, 135 , 129 S.Ct. 1423 , 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (holding that plain error requires reversal if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶ 35 In his special concurrence suggesting that plain error review may be.warranted under the circumstances of this case, Judge Gabriel correctly observes that the United States Supreme Court has left open the question whether structural errors automatically satisfy the prejudice prong of the plain error test. People v. Stackhouse, 2012 COA 202 , ¶ 42, — P.3d - (Gabriel, J., specially concurring). In my view, reversal is warranted in this case under a plain error standard.
¶ 36 First, the trial court committed an “obvious and substantial” error when it sua sponte closed voir dire to family members and the public because it did not have enough space to seat fifty-jurors. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213-16 , 130 S.Ct. 721 , 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010) (reversing the defendant’s conviction where the trial court closed the courtroom during voir dire because it was “well settled” under Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. 501 , 104 S.Ct. 819 , that, absent consideration of alternatives, the trial court could not constitutionally close voir dire); Anderson, 490 P.2d at 48 (“It is ... undisputed that the right to a public trial includes that stage of the proceedings which is devoted to the selection of a jury”).
¶37 Second, this closure was reversible plain eiTor because, had the trial court applied the Waller factors, it is clear on this record that excluding the public during voir dire would not pass constitutional muster. See Waller, 476 U.S. at 48, 106 S.Ct. 1683 (holding that the party seeking closure must advance an overriding interest likely to be prejudiced; closure must be no broader than necessary; the court must consider reasonable alternatives; and the court must make adequate findings to support the closure). The trial court made no findings regarding the necessity of closing the courtroom. -Indeed, the record indicates only that the court believed that there was not enough space to seat both the public and the fifty potential jurors and that it was concerned that family members would commingle with the venire. Insufficient courtroom capacity does not necessarily rise to the level of an overriding interest, and even “threats of improper communications with jurors or safety concerns” cannot justify a courtroom closure unless the court articulates specific findings, Presley, 558 U.S. at 215 , 130 S.Ct. 721 . To the extent that the trial court was concerned with the public comingling with the jury, the court should have- considered reasonable alternatives such as “reserving one or more rows for the public; dividing the jury venire panel to reduce courtroom congestion; or instructing prospective jurors not to engage or interact with audience members.” Id.
*451 ¶ 38 Thus, the error here was obvious and affected Stackhouse’s substantial right to a public trial. Under Supreme Court case law, an improper closure impairs the fairness, integrity, and public appearance of the proceeding. Therefore, I would hold that the Waller factors were not satisfied in this ease and that the trial court committed reversible plain error by excluding members of the public from voir dire.
¶ 39 The majority expresses concern that allowing a defendant to raise an unpreserved public trial right objection on appeal would encourage “gamesmanship” on the part of defense counsel—i,e., attorneys might deliberately not object to a courtroom closure, then claim reversible error on appeal. Maj, op. ¶ 16. However, the majority fails to credit the exacting standards of our circumscribed plain error review. A defendant may prevail on an unpreserved public trial violation only if the error is so “particularly egregious,” Hagos, ¶ 14, 288 P.3d at 120 , that it is abundantly apparent to a reviewing court that closure of the courtroom did not satisfy the Waller factors.
¶ 40 Importantly, reversal is warranted, in my view, not because the court “erred” by failing to expressly consider the Waller factors, but because the closure was not in fact justified under those factors. Where, by contrast, a record on appeal demonstrates that closure of the courtroom would have been appropriate under the Waller factors, then such closure is not reversible plain error. And where a record is insufficient for a reviewing court to discern whether the Waller factors would have been satisfied, a remand to the trial court for a Waller hearing is the appropriate remedy. In short, to review such unpreserved alleged errors is hardly an “appellate parachute” providing a convicted defendant with the windfall of a new trial. See maj. op. ¶ 16.
¶41 Even if I agreed with the majority that Stackhouse’s failure to object was the functional equivalent of an intentional relinquishment of his public trial right, I would still find the trial court’s closing the courtroom during voir dire deeply problematic. As discussed above, the right to a public trial does not belong to the defendant alone,- The public and the press have a qualified First Amendment right to attend criminal trials, see Waller, 467 U.S. at 44-45 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 , and, in Colorado, our constitution guarantees crime victims the right to be “present at all critical stages of the criminal justice process,” see Colo. Const, art. II, § 16a. Just as more is required from a defendant than silence before he waives his right to a public trial, more must be required of a trial court before it can override the interests of the public (including the interests of victims and family members) in being present. Certainly, the qualified right of the public to attend criminal trials must sometimes yield to other interests, such as the defendant’s right to a fair trial or a juror’s right to privacy. See Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510 , 104 S.Ct. 819 . But the Waller factors evolved .to protect the rights of all stakeholders to a public trial, and a trial court’s careful consideration of these factors will satisfy both the Sixth and the First Amendments. Without satisfying these factors, a trial court cannot constitutionally close a courtroom. See id. at 511 , 104 S.Ct. 819 (“Absent consideration of alternatives to closure, the trial court could not constitutionally close the voir dire [to the public].”).
IV. Conclusion
¶ 42 In my view, the right to a public trial, like other constitutional rights that exist to preserve a fair trial, cannot be affirmatively waived by a defendant’s silence. I would hold that Stackhouse’s failure to object to the courtroom closure constituted a forfeiture subject to plain error review. Under plain error review, the trial court reversibly erred by excluding the public from voir dire without adequate justification. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
. The majority cites cases from other jurisdictions to support its assertion that “Colorado remains in good company through our holding that Anderson's waiver principle is still controlling precedent.” Maj. op. ¶ 16 n.6. Yet several courts have come to the contrary conclusion, holding that a defendant’s right to a public trial is not waived by his silence. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir.2012) ("[A] defendant may ... forfeit the right [to a public trial], either by affirmatively waiving it or by failing to assert it in a timely fashion.” (cited in United States v. Santos, 501 Fed.Appx. 630, 632 (9th Cir.2012) (holding that the defendant forfeited his right to a public trial by failing to object and reviewing for plain error under Olano, 507 U.S. at 731, 733 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 ))); Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 433-34 (7th Cir.2004) (applying a heightened standard of waiver to the public trial right and concluding that a defendant must knowingly and voluntarily waive the right); People v. Vaughn, 491 Mich. 642 , 821 N.W.2d 288, 296-303 (2012) (applying Olano, 507 U.S. at *450 731, 733 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , and concluding that an unpreserved objection to closure is subject to plain error review); State v. Haskins, 38 N.J.Super. 250 , 118 A.2d 707, 710-11 (1955) (holding that the right to a public trial cannot be waived by a defendant's silence); State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416 , 854 N.E.2d 150, 170 (2006) (same); State v. Wise, 176 Wash.2d 1 , 288 P.3d 1113, 1120 (2012) (same).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9810017. Public record. Not legal advice.
