# Hayes v. . Benton > Supreme Court of North Carolina · March 16, 1927 · 193 N.C. 379 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9809358 ## Case - **Full name:** James E. Hayes, and Ruth Hayes and Lois Hayes, by Their Next Friend, James E. Hayes v. E. A. Benton, J. L. Hofler, J. C. Holland, J. M. Glenn, C. D. Gatling, T. B. Parker, D. A. Wiley, T. J. Jessup, Board of Education of Gates County, and the Gates Consolidated School. - **Court:** Supreme Court of North Carolina - **Decided:** March 16, 1927 - **Citations:** 193 N.C. 379; 137 S.E. 169; 1927 N.C. LEXIS 349 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Clarkson - **Judges:** Adams, Clarkson - **Cited by:** 21 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9809358 ## Opinion text Clarkson, J., dissenting: This is a demurrer and the facts are taken to be true. Under 3 C. S., 5489, provision for the transportation of pupils was made in this consolidated district. On account of the expense, the limit was fixed so that only children outside of two and a half miles from the school could be transported in the four busses.. Plaintiff’s two children — one 6 years of age and the other 16 — lived with their father about fifty yards just inside the two and a half mile radius *384 and the bus passed the home of these children each day on the way to and from school. When school opened in the fall of 1926 these children were taken in the bus to school without objection. On 8 November, 1926, they were dismissed from school without any reason whatsoever, but solely because they had been riding in the bus to school, which was claimed to be against the rules. The principal of the school and the school committee of the district are willing that the two children shall attend school and have so expressed themselves, but the fiat of the board of education is to the contrary. This action of mandamus was brought to compel defendants to permit these children to attend school and to transport them to and from school in the bus which is provided and passes their home. So far as the little 6-year-old girl, Lois, is concerned, I think that she would have no right to go in the bus, as the compulsory attendance law is between the ages of 1 and 14. 3 C. S., 5757. She would be on a footing with all other children in the district. The record shows on the demurrer that Ruth is 16 years of age. She is afflicted, and has been operated on in a hospital, and because of the condition of her feet she is unable to walk to school and cannot attend without being transported. She is a cripple, and has been afflicted since infancy. Law has many definitions. Blackstone says: “Law is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power.” “Law,” according to an ancient maxim, “is good sense, and what is contrary to good sense is not good law.” “Law is the enforcement of justice among men.” “Law is a mode of human action respecting society, and must be governed by the same rules of equity which govern every private action.” There is nothing in the record to show that there was no room in the bus; in fact, Ruth had been, up to 8 November, 1926, taken to school in the bus. We have this picture: A little cripple child sitting by the roadside appealing to be taken with her more fortunate companions, who are not afflicted, to school. With room in the bus, defendants, board of education, command that it shall pass her by. Of all entitled to the benefits of the school, it should be this cripple. We can find nothing in the school law that gives any right to defendants to refuse a cripple, where there is room in the bus, to be taken to and from school. The bad example to the other children, as they see this cripple passed by, with room in the bus, is contrary to all sense of humanity and justice. I think she has a clear right. We hear now as of old the cry that drove Her to the manger “because there was no room for them in the inn.” It is admitted in the case that the father of the little cripple girl is unable to furnish transportation, and there is no other public school in *385 the county to send her to. The father is a farmer of limited means, with a wife and nine children to support, and desires to educate his children. This little cripple, “whom the finger of God has touched,” is unable to enjoy the sports and play of other children, but she can be educated, and the light of knowledge will help her bear the burden of affliction. But, with room in the bus, defendants pass her by and plead discretion. The humiliation — this cripple, naturally sensitive, being dismissed from school solely because she could not walk but rode in the bus. The principal of the school and the local school committee are willing, but the central body, the board of education, commands dismissal of the cripple. “Law is considered the perfection of reason and founded on justice and common sense.” In this case there is no reason, justice or common sense in the conduct of the defendants, board of education, in regard to this cripple. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9809358. Public record. Not legal advice.