# Lawrence v. Western Union Telegraph Co. > Supreme Court of North Carolina · March 22, 1916 · 171 N.C. 240 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9807938 ## Case - **Full name:** William Lawrence v. Western Union Telegraph Company. - **Court:** Supreme Court of North Carolina - **Decided:** March 22, 1916 - **Citations:** 171 N.C. 240; 88 S.E. 226; 1916 N.C. LEXIS 56 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by BeowN - **Judges:** Clare, Beown - **Cited by:** 1 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9807938 ## Opinion text BeowN, J., dissenting: It is admitted in the opinion of the Court that there is no evidence of negligence upon the part of the defendant in failing to deliver the message the night it was filed at Scotland Neck, as it was not filed until about the closing hour of the Kinston office. I am of opinion that there is no evidence of negligence in the delivery next morning. The message was received at Kinston at 8 :29 a. m. and delivered, according to plaintiff’s evidence, at 10 a. m. The testimony tends to prove that the messenger boy searched for plaintiff an hour and a half before finding him; that he went to his home and to his barber shop, and did not find him at either place; that he continued the search, and found plaintiff at Mrs. Harvey’s at 9 :35 a. m. The plaintiff admits he was at Mrs. Harvey’s doing some work, and that the message was delivered to him'there about 10 a. m. Taking all the evidence into consideration, there is no evidence of unreasonable delay in delivering the message after it was received at the Kinston office. Again, it is admitted that plaintiff could not have reached Scotland Neck by train, as the only train left at 1:10 a. m., and the message was not received at the Kinston office until 8:29. In fact, the Kinston office did not open until after the train had left. Plaintiff swears it is 90 miles from Kinston to Scotland Neck, and that it requires six hours to make the trip by automobile. Plaintiff further says: “I tried to find an automobile. There was not'but one automobile that I knew of that would go under the circumstances, and he was out of town. He *246 came back in town about 11 o’clock. I asked bim if lie would carry me to Scotland Neck. I asked bim wbat it would cost. He says: ‘$20.’ I says: 'If you will guarantee to get me there by 3 o’clock, I will pay it.’ ” Tbe auto man told bim it was too late. Tbis evidence is conclusive tbat bad tbe message been delivered by 9 a. m. tbe plaintiff could not bave made tbe trip by auto. Furthermore, I am of opinion tbat damages for mental anguish are not properly recoverable upon tbe facts of tbis case. Tbe rule tbat plaintiff can recover only such spiecial damages as may be said to- bave been within tbe contemplation of both parties applies to damages for mental anguish as well as for actual pecuniary loss. 37 Cyc., p. 1781. In support of tbe text are cited cases from all tbe so-called “mental anguish” courts, including tbis Court: Williams v. Tel. Co., 136 N. C., 82 ; Bowers v. Tel. Co., 135 N. C., 504 ; Sparkman, 180 N. C., 447 ; Darlington, 127 N. C., 448 ; Kennon, 126 N. C., 232 . In all these courts, in order to prevent intolerable litigation, tbis rule and limitation has so far been adhered to in applying tbe doctrine. Many of these courts in recent cases bave expressed a disinclination to extend tbe doctrine beyond tbe limitations established by tbe earlier decisions, requiring tbat tbe damages recoverable shall not only be tbe proximate result of tbe negligence complained of, but shall bave been reasonably within tbe contemplation of tbe parties. 37 Cyc., 1779, and cases cited in note. Tbe doctrine of mental anguish was first promulgated in Texas in 1881, and has now become firmly established there, and yet tbat Court bolds tbat tbe addressee cannot recover for mental .anguish caused by delay in.delivery of a telegram announcing tbe death of a brother-in-law unless tbe company was put upon notice tbat a failure to deliver would cause such anguish. Tel. Co. v. McMillan, 30 S. W., 298 . Tbe same Court bolds tbat a telegraph company through whose failure to deliver a message plaintiff was prevented from visiting bis dying-stepfather is not responsible for mental suffering unless tbe circumstances were such as to give tbe company notice tbat tender and affectionate relations existed between the parties. Tel. Co. v. Garrett, 34 Tex., 649 ; Tel. Co. v. Coffin, 30 S. W., 897 . I think tbe consensus of judicial opinion in tbe “mental anguish States” is tbat tbe telegraph company is charged with notice of tbe relationship which actually exists between tbe parties named, whether disclosed by tbe terms of tbe message or not; but where no blood relationship existed and mental anguish damages are claimed upon tbe ground of tbe existence of tender and affectionate relations, tbe company must be fixed with knowledge of tbe existence of such relations. *247 The defendant not only moved to nonsuit, but asked tbe court to charge: “If the jury should find from the evidence that at the time of the transmission of the message the defendant had no notice that the failure on its part to transmit would cause mental anguish to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover.” I think the court erred in denying the motion and the prayer for instruction. There was no blood relationship, for plaintiff is a negro and the deceased wás a white man. There is nothing in the evidence tending to fix the company with any knowledge that tender and affectionate re-. lations existed between them. Certainly it does not appear on the face of the message, and there are no circumstances in evidence tending to fix defendant with such knowledge. Sixty similar telegrams were sent announcing Mr. Biggs’ death. The one to plaintiff contains nothing except a mere announcement of the death and time of funeral. There was no invitation to be a pall-bearer, as claimed by the plaintiff. The deceased was a white man of much prominence in the business and religious circles of the State. The plaintiff is a negro barber of Kinston and had been residing there for sixteen years. It is true, the plaintiff testifies that the fact that he did not get to the funeral as a pall-bearer was “very grievous to my very mind and soul.” It is a wonder that he has survived the terrible shock to his sensitive heart. Yet upon cross-examination he admits that he worked for Mr. Biggs when he was a boy, and not since, and was sexton of the Baptist Church, but has not resided near Mr, Biggs for a great many years. He admits that Mr. Biggs came to Kinston on a visit and did not go near plaintiff, and that he did not go to see Mr. Biggs. The whole evidence shows that plaintiff’s agony is of that kind that can only be assuaged by a financial solatium. It has no- real, substantial foundation in fact, and is manifestly manufactured for the occasion. It is such cases as this that bring the doctrine of mental anguish into such disrepute that it has been repudiated by the Supreme Court of the United States as well as by most of the State courts, including some of the ablest in the land. 37 Cyc., 1775, and notes. I realize that this Court has gone farther than the courts of the other mental anguish States in permitting the recovery of such damages in cases of distant relationship, but it has not up to this time gone so far as to permit a recovery in a case such as this. I think it time to call a halt and to observe those rules and limitations laid down in its earlier decisions and still applied in other jurisdictions. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9807938. Public record. Not legal advice.