# Department of Environmental Protection v. Cumberland Coal Resources, LP

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · September 24, 2014 · 628 Pa. 17

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9803961

## Case

- **Full name:** DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Appellant v. CUMBERLAND COAL RESOURCES, LP and Amfire Mining Co., LLC, Appellees; Department of Environmental Protection, Appellant v. Emerald Coal Resources, LP and Cumberland Coal Resources, LP, Appellees
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 24, 2014
- **Citations:** 628 Pa. 17; 102 A.3d 962
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Saylor
- **Judges:** Castille, Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Todd, McCaffery, Stevens
- **Cited by:** 48 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9803961

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “including” is a word of enlargement and that any list that follows is non- exhaustive and incorporated into the preceding phrase
- stating that "including” is a word of enlargement and that any list that follows is non-exhaustive and incorporated into the preceding phrase
- explaining that, per the doctrine of ejusdem generis, catchall phrases “should not be construed in their widest context”
- applying ejusdem generis to statute that defined “unanticipated event” as “including” a list of enumerated items

## Opinion text

Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion as it relates to the “accidents” question.
With respect to the Department’s compliance orders pertaining to placement of portable fire extinguishers on scoops to supplement their existing automatic fire protection systems, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that scoops are not locomotives, mantrip cars, or personnel carriers under Section 273(f) of the Mine Safety Act. See Majority Opinion at 49-50, 102 A.3d at 980-81. My only reservation about the majority’s reasoning concerns its breadth relative to the Department’s wider array of powers. See id. at 49, 102 A.3d at 981 (“[T]he DEP’s suggestion that, simply because it is safety related, it can require fire extinguishers on all vehicles, even if they are not statutorily required, would be to arrogate a power without a statutory basis, making it virtually impossible for a mine owner to reasonably understand what is required of it so as to comply with the law, and to raise the specter of constitutional infirmity on the basis of vagueness.”). Left to my own devices, I would confine the present discussion more closely to the factual scenario at hand, entailing the Department’s issuance of notices of violation expressly predicated on an incorrect interpretation of a statute.
*51 I realize that the Department suggests, as an alternative to its position on statutory construction, that we can disregard the specific grounds for its compliance orders which are plainly stated on the face of each, see R.R. 101a-107a (reflecting that each compliance order specifies Section 273 as the basis for the relevant violation), and treat such orders as a general exercise of the agency’s broader powers to effectuate the purposes of the Mine Safety Act and advance safety. However, I would simply decline to proceed beyond the matters at hand in such a fashion. In this regard, I would suggest that some underlying source of authority must precede a violation, whether this may be a statute, regulation, or other form of valid administrative prescription or pronouncement.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9803961. Public record. Not legal advice.