# Gregory Dickens v. Charles L. Ryan

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · January 23, 2014 · 740 F.3d 1302

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9798636

## Case

- **Full name:** Gregory DICKENS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Charles RYAN, Respondent-Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** January 23, 2014
- **Citations:** 740 F.3d 1302; 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1248; 2014 WL 241871
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Watford
- **Judges:** Kozinski, Pregerson, Wardlaw, Berzon, Bybee, Callahan, Ikuta, Smith, Murguia, Christen, Watford
- **Nature of suit:** Prisoner Death Penalty
- **Cited by:** 263 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Abrogated on other grounds by Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9798636

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a petitioner is “entitled to present evidence to demonstrate 26 ||that there is ‘prejudice,’ that is that petitioner’s claim is ‘substantial’ under Martinez. 27 || Therefore, a district court may take evidence to extent necessary to determine whether the 28 || pet…
- finding that general allegations concerning sentencing counsel’s failure to “direct the work of the court-appointed psychologist” and adequately investigate petitioner’s background bear little resemblance to allegations that suggest petitioner suffered from FAS and organic bra…
- holding that the defendant was aware of a grave risk of death when he knew that his colleague had a violent and explosive temper, a history of violence, and that he recklessly handled guns, yet proceeded with participating in the robbery knowing his colleague had a gun
- holding that Pinholster did not bar petitioner from presenting new 25 evidence to support a cause-and-prejudice argument under Martinez because Pinholster 26 applies only to claims previously “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings”
- noting that this “approach encourages state defendants to concoct 'new' IAC claims that are nothing more than fleshed-out versions of their old claims supplemented with ‘new’ evidence” and observing that "[t]his cannot have been the Supreme Court’s intention, nor is it an unin…

## Opinion text

WATFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I join the majority’s opinion, except to the extent that it suggests the Arizona Supreme Court correctly applied Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), to the facts of Dickens’ case. I agree with the majority that the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of those precedents wasn’t “unreasonable” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1). As construed by the United States Supreme Court, § 2254(d)(1) allows us to grant relief only “where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [the] Court’s precedents.” Harrington v. Richter, —U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 , 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). I view that standard as functionally equivalent to the standard developed under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); it will seldom (if ever) be satisfied unless the petitioner shows that the Supreme Court’s cases “dictate the result” urged by the petitioner. Raffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 490 , 110 S.Ct. 1257 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990). As the majority explains, neither Tison nor Enmund dictates the result in Dickens’ case. His case falls in the gap between those two precedents, and fairminded jurists could expand either Enmund’s general rule or Tison’s exception to encompass Dickens’ conduct.
In these circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that we must give “deference” to the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of Tison and Enmund , even if we believe the state court’s interpretation is erroneous. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 , 123 S.Ct. 1166 , 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). Had we been permitted instead to grant relief based on our own “independent evaluation” of those precedents, Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 305 , 112 S.Ct. 2482 , 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), I would have held that the Eighth Amendment bars Dickens’ execution.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9798636. Public record. Not legal advice.