# State v. Coassolo > Idaho Supreme Court · July 27, 2001 · 136 Idaho 138 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9795400 ## Case - **Full name:** STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John D. COASSOLO, Defendant-Appellant - **Court:** Idaho Supreme Court - **Decided:** July 27, 2001 - **Citations:** 136 Idaho 138; 30 P.3d 293; 2001 Ida. LEXIS 83 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Schroeder - **Judges:** Trout, Schroeder, Walters, Kidwell, Eismann - **Cited by:** 38 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9795400 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding it is important for trial court to receive report from Department on its assessment of defendant’s conduct during period of retained jurisdiction and, in interest of fair judicial process, court should also receive in writing any response defendant may choose to make r… - holding that a defendant does not have a protected liberty interest in being granted probation after a rider; rather there is the “mere possibility or a „coveted goal‟” - concluding that no constitutionally protected liberty interest exists at a jurisdictional review hearing ## Opinion text Justice SCHROEDER, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the Court’s decision that deteimines Coassolo does not possess a constitutionally pi-otected libei-ty intei-est that requires a hearing-before the district judge l-elinquishes jurisdiction. Doubtless the legislature can determine that no such healing is necessary before the board or department of correction. Nevertheless, the due process right of an inmate to be heard in some meaningful manner and forum remains. In Wolfe, this Court placed responsibility for the conduct of a hearing with the department of correction. The logic and practicality of that decision were obvious. The inmate and virtually all persons who would have relevant information were at the site where the inmate was held. The report to the judge would include this information so the judge would have a full statement upon which to base a decision. The procedure centralized the process instead of casting that burden to forty-four sites within the state where hearings might be held, often far from the location of witnesses and documentary material. However, the fact that a different system may be less efficient and more costly does not preclude its implementation. The due process right remains and must be satisfied in a meaningful way. Greenholtz bears a strong resemblance to the facts of this case, but that resemblance is not a mirror image nor sufficiently reflected to determine that the logic of Wolfe is undermined. Greenholtz involved a parole revocation hearing. The sentencing process by the court had concluded. The only question that remained was whether the facts warranted a release through an administrative process. The retained jurisdiction process is distinguishable. *145 When the district court utilizes retained jurisdiction, sentencing by the court has not been completed. The district court may drop jurisdiction, in which ease the defendant selves the sentence originally imposed. On the other hand, the district court may modify the sentence by shortening either the total sentence or the mandatory term that must be served. In most instances the primary consideration is whether to grant probation and suspend the balance of the sentence. There are no doubt different motivations in the minds of district judges in retaining jurisdiction, but it is safe to say that in the majority of eases the judges have not completed the sentencing process. If the defendant fails to meet the goals of the retained jurisdiction, the judge may take no action, and the defendant serves the sentence originally imposed. But even this choice is a conscious decision arrived at based upon information submitted for the judge’s consideration. The other alternatives require a similar thought process. Has the defendant shown the capacity to be placed on probation, avoiding the consequence of further incarceration in the penitentiary? In court proceedings for many years district judges have told defendants that if they do well they will be placed on probation. That is a primary goal of the program based upon the notion that both society and the individual defendant may benefit if the financial and human costs of continued incarceration are avoided. In short, the district court’s role in sentencing is not complete until the judge makes a decision at the end of the retained jurisdiction. This conclusion is buttressed by the language of I.C. § 19-2601 that, “[a]ny recommendation by the department to the court regarding the prisoner shall be in the nature of an addendum to the presentenee report.” The title “presentence report” is self-explanatory — it is a report created prior to sentencing. Anything that is “in the nature of an addendum to the presentence report” invokes the defendant’s right to be heard prior to final sentencing by the court. In the past that forum was at the correctional facility where those most concerned were located. Before final sentencing the district court had the assurance that a fair process of evaluation existed. I.C. § 19-2601 removes that convenient and economical forum. It does not, however, eliminate the due process right of a defendant to be heard in a meaningful manner before final sentence is pronounced. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9795400. Public record. Not legal advice.