# Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc.

> California Supreme Court · August 30, 2001 · 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 564

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9795397

## Case

- **Full name:** MANUEL TORRES Et Al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. PARKHOUSE TIRE SERVICE, INC., Et Al., Defendants and Respondents
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** August 30, 2001
- **Citations:** 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 564; 26 Cal. 4th 995; 2001 D.A.R. 9391; 2001 Daily Journal DAR 9391; 30 P.3d 57; 66 Cal. Comp. Cases 1036; 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7641; 2001 Cal. LEXIS 5599
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Brown
- **Judges:** Chin, Brown, Werdegar
- **Cited by:** 150 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9795397

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that emotional flare-ups are expressions of human nature and “incidents inseparable from [people] working together.”

## Opinion text

BROWN, J., Concurring.
I sign the majority opinion with the understanding that the intent-to-injure requirement it articulates is limited to cases like this one where the determinative factual issue is whether the plaintiff’s injury was caused by a coemployee’s “willful and unprovoked physical act of aggression” (Lab. Code, § 3601, subd. (a)(1)) or, instead, by horseplay— even rough horseplay—for which workers’ compensation would be the exclusive remedy. Where this distinction is critical—that is, where the conduct in question is aggressive but might also be characterized as horseplay—the language of section 3601, subdivision (a)(1) provides insufficient guidance to juries. For such cases, we must find some appropriate measure for the jury to apply, and though we might direct juries to consider whether or not the conduct was marked by hostility or ill-will, these factors ultimately turn on whether the actor harbored an intent to injure. On the other hand, where the conduct in question clearly exhibits hostility, not merely high spirits or recklessness—such as in the case of a credible threat of injury (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 1006, fn. 6)—I see no reason to superimpose an intent-to-injure gloss on the statutory language, and I do not read the majority opinion as doing so.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9795397. Public record. Not legal advice.