# Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment > Supreme Court of the United States · March 4, 1998 · 523 U.S. 83 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9795102 ## Case - **Full name:** STEEL CO., AKA CHICAGO STEEL & PICKLING CO. v. CITIZENS FOR a BETTER ENVIRONMENT - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** March 4, 1998 - **Citations:** 523 U.S. 83; 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 369; 98 Daily Journal DAR 2102; 1998 Colo. J. C.A.R. 1025; 66 U.S.L.W. 4174; 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20434; 46 ERC (BNA) 1097; 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1512; 118 S. Ct. 1003; 140 L. Ed. 2d 210; 1998 U.S. LEXIS 1601 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Breyer - **Judges:** Scalia, Scalía, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Stevens, Sou-Ter, Ginsburg - **Cited by:** 9,957 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9795102 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that a federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction, and explaining that failing to make a determination about jurisdiction first “carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial (10) “Citiz… - holding that environmental group did not have standing in Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act case because, “although a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that the United States Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just deserts, … - holding that " [d]ismissal for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the federal claim is proper ... when the claim is 'so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions . .. or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a fed… - stating that it is “established jurisprudence that the failure of a cause of action does not automatically produce a failure of jurisdiction” and quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) for the proposition that “ ‘jurisdiction ... is not defe… - stating that standing, which is jurisdictional, "is not defeated ... by the possibility that the ... petitioners [may not recover,]” i.e., that " ‘the right of the petitioners to recover under their complaint will be sustained if the ... [law is] given one interpretation and w… ## Opinion text Justice Breyer, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, I agree with the Court that the respondent in this case lacks Article III standing. I further agree that federal courts often, and typically should, decide standing questions at the outset of a case. That order of decision (first jurisdiction then the merits) helps better to restrict the use of the federal courts to those adversarial disputes that Article III defines as the federal judiciary’s business. But my qualifying words “often” and “typically” are important. The Constitution, in my view, does not require us to replace those words with the word “always.” The Constitution does not impose a rigid judicial “order of operations,” when doing so would cause serious practical problems. This Court has previously made clear that courts may “re-serv[e] difficult questions of . . . jurisdiction when the case alternatively could be resolved on the merits in favor of the same party.” Norton v. Mathews, 427 U. S. 524, 532 (1976). That rule makes theoretical sense, for the difficulty of the jurisdictional question makes reasonable the court’s jurisdictional assumption. And that rule makes enormous practical sense. Whom does it help to have appellate judges spend their time and energy puzzling over the correct answer to an intractable jurisdictional matter, when (assuming an easy answer on the substantive merits) the same party would win or lose regardless? More importantly, to insist upon a rigid “order of operations” in today’s world of federal-court caseloads that have grown enormously over a generation means unnecessary delay and consequent added cost. See L. Mecham, Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 1996 Report of the Director 16,18,23; Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States *112 106, 115, 143 (1971) (indicating that between 1971 and 1996, annual appellate court caseloads increased from 132 to 311 eases filed per judgeship, and district court caseloads increased from 341 to 490 cases filed per judgeship). It means a more cumbersome system. It thereby increases, to at least a small degree, the risk of the “justice delayed” that means “justice denied.” For this reason, I would not make the ordinary sequence an absolute requirement. Nor, even though the case before us is ordinary, not exceptional, would I simply reserve judgment about the matter. Ante, at 110-111 (O’Connor, J., concurring). I therefore join only Parts I and IV of the Court’s opinion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9795102. Public record. Not legal advice.