# People v. Hansen

> California Supreme Court · December 30, 1994 · 9 Cal. 4th 300

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9792964

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHAEL HANSEN, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 30, 1994
- **Citations:** 9 Cal. 4th 300; 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 609; 95 Daily Journal DAR 175; 885 P.2d 1022; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 71; 1994 Cal. LEXIS 6590
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Werdegar
- **Judges:** George, Werdegar, Mosk, Kennard
- **Cited by:** 132 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Overruled on other grounds by People v. Chun, 45 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009).
- Negative treatments: 2
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9792964

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that felony of willful discharge of a firearm at inhabited house could serve as predicate felony for felony murder when the shooting killed an occupant
- applying the merger doctrine where the second degree felony murder statute authorized conviction for a killing committed during any felony inherently dangerous to human life

## Opinion text

WERDEGAR, J., Concurring.
I concur in the judgment and in the reasoning of the majority on the question whether the offense of discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling in violation of Penal Code section 246 is an inherently dangerous felony for purposes of the second degree felony-murder rule. I write separately to express my understanding of the “merger” doctrine, as articulated in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 [ 75 *318 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ] (Ireland) and succeeding decisions, and as applied here.
I join the majority in rejecting the premise Ireland’s “integral part of the homicide” language is decisive of the merger issue in this case. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 314.) In my view, however, People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 185 , 481 P.2d 193 ] (Mattison), adopting the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in People v. Taylor (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 57 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 697 ] (Taylor), sets forth the operative test. Those cases require us to determine whether the underlying felony was committed with a “collateral and independent felonious design.” (Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 185 ; Taylor, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d at p. 61 .) Unlike the majority, I see no reason not to follow those decisions. I do not share the majority’s concern that application of the Mattison and Taylor rule leads to the anomalous result of punishing one who does not intend to injure more harshly than one who does. One who commits a felony inherently dangerous to human life with the intent to inflict injury is, in all probability, guilty of second degree murder under the implied malice theory. It follows there likely will be no disparity in the respective criminal liability of the two offenders; thus, the anomaly the majority fears is more apparent than real.
The evidence in this case supports the conclusion defendant entertained a collateral and independent felonious design under Mattison and Taylor , namely to intimidate Behaves by firing shots into his house. Accordingly, I join in the disposition this court’s judgment will effect.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9792964. Public record. Not legal advice.