# State v. Sibert

> Utah Supreme Court · April 25, 1957 · 6 Utah 2d 198

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9792245

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frederick Ray SIBERT, Defendant and Appellant
- **Court:** Utah Supreme Court
- **Decided:** April 25, 1957
- **Citations:** 6 Utah 2d 198; 310 P.2d 388; 1957 Utah LEXIS 129
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Worthen
- **Judges:** Crockett, Henriod, McDONOUGH, Wade, Worthen
- **Cited by:** 28 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9792245

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that "[i]t would be going a long way indeed for us to entirely discount the possibility that [a police officer's inadmissible hearsay testimony] had some effect upon [the jury's] deliberations."

## Opinion text

WORTHEN, Justice
(concurring and dissenting).
I concur with the result reached by the majority opinion and agree that the case must be reversed. I am of the opinion, however, that it was error for the trial court to admit any testimony of Officer John J. Ferrin intended to rehabilitate the testimony of Butters. I entertain the view that it violates the hearsay evidence rule and does not fall within any recognized exceptions, nor do I wish to be understood as subscribing to the statement that the testimony of Officer Ferrin was admissible for any purpose. I believe the witness should be limited to explaining that he was mistaken at the time he testified at the preliminary hearing, and that he had further considered and reflected on the matter and had concluded that he was in error when he testified at the hearing. If the jury or the trier of the facts are persuaded by his integrity and straightforwardness, he will probably be able to show to the satisfaction of the court and jury that the facts were as testified to by him on the stand in the instant hearing.
Of course, the testimony of Officer Ferrin leaves the waters as muddy as they were before he entered. The opinion of the court observes:
“ * * * Upon cross-examination he was confronted with a claimed inconsistency in his testimony that at the preliminary hearing he had said the robber’s car was a green Pontiac of the early 1940 models, whereas his instant testimony was that it was a cream colored Pontiac, 1947 model. To bolster the testimony of Butters the State called as a witness Police Officer John J. Ferrin, who, over counsel’s objection, *207 was allowed to testify that Butters had told him immediately after the robbery that it was a cream colored Pontiac of the early 1940 models.”
It is a blind spot freak that justifies the admission of such hearsay evidence on the ground that Officer Ferrin was testifying to a fact — the fact that Butters told Officer Ferrin something. The prosecutor is not interested in any statement made by Butters except the statement by Ferrin which will rehabilitate Butters.
To open the door and to permit A, B, C and X, Y, Z to tell what Butters told them would unfairly extend the trial and would compel the party against whom the evidence was offered to lose one of his best weapons — a weak, discredited witness — a witness discredited by himself.
I can see some better reason for permitting C to bolster the testimony of B by attacking the testimony given against B by Witness A.
But to just let the uncontrolled witnesses with no basis for cross-examination run wild usually leads, as here, to further confusion — and next the prosecuting attorney will want to' prove that Officer Ferrin didn’t describe the car as a cream colored 1940 model and so on ad infinitum.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9792245. Public record. Not legal advice.